Everyone makes mistakes, and some may think that the Muslim Brotherhood made a mistake when it first met with ex-intelligence chief Omar Suleiman at the beginning of the January 25 Revolution, and that its mistakes were compounded from the time that Mubarak left office until the moment that the protest in Rabaa Al-Adawiyya Square was dispersed. It is only natural that some Brotherhood leaders would admit to their mistakes during the Morsi presidency while others would refuse to do so, blaming instead the conspiracies against them, as well as the fierce media campaign that has discredited them. However, what analysts must pay attention to is the correlation between the Brotherhood’s mistakes in government and the turbulence during the period of the movement’s rise to power.
No sane person would deny the Brotherhood’s mistakes, but most were made because the leadership thought well of the military council; they relied only on their own skills; they were over-confident in their ability to gather the masses in the field; and they believed that the revolution would triumph sooner or later as long as the movement maintained its unity and was able to guide the people to their desired goals of freedom, dignity and social justice. The Muslim Brotherhood did not pay attention to Egypt’s distinctness, nor did it take into consideration its geographical and historical significance or its influential presence in most regional and international issues and conflicts. Furthermore, the movement overlooked the fact that its success in government would put to shame the experiences of former and current Arab regimes.
The leadership also failed to pay attention to the Yemeni revolution, which was aborted and distorted by those plotting against the Arab people, leading to the cloning of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. Nor did they focus on the fate of the Syrian revolution and how the plotters attacked the people; and they ignored the counter-strike launched by the camp opposing the Arab revolutions, which relied on the Brotherhood making mistakes and then condemned them.
The movement’s fatal mistake was the failure to estimate the danger of the Renaissance project adopted by the political wing during the elections and the effect it had on its enemies. It underestimated the weight of the mission it faced and did not realise that the civilised, humanitarian and liberation values promoted by the Islamic movement went beyond Egypt’s borders and are timeless.
The extent of the plotting against the Egyptian revolution has been transnational. The Brotherhood’s mistakes have forced it to re-evaluate its considerations and update the list of its enemies in light of the bitter experience of the past few years. Once done, it will be able to determine its priorities, which must include the reinforcement of the revolutionary camp by creating local and regional alliances able to advance the aims of the revolution, as the social realities which prompted it to start in the first place are still in place. The people of Egypt have no hope for change unless the revolution continues until it achieves what it set out to do.
This is a translation of the Arabic text published by Al Aqsa Voice on 3 March, 2014