Downsizing Qatar?

In October of last year, the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies published an article titled “Downsizing Qatar”, which envisaged Qatar’s regressing role although it has been playing a prominent regional role despite its small size. The article emphasised that Qatar’s prominent role was due to its vast economic potential and the decline of other major regional players in the wake of the Arab Spring. The author, however, did not explain how this decline would take place, but he did indirectly outline a sort of roadmap.

According to the analyst, the transfer of power to Qatar’s young Prince Tamim Bin Hammad would preoccupy the country with a number of its internal affairs and as a result, it would become less active in its external or regional role. In addition, Qatar’s loss of a number of stakes it had in the region (the end of rapprochement with Syria, the unrest in Libya after the revolution and the fall of President Morsi) has negatively impacted it. This was followed by an international campaign against Qatar due to the worsening conditions of foreign workers and the unrest and alarm that is being experienced by its neighbours because of the rise of the Islamist ties. According to the analyst, all of these factors function as the catalyst for a potential siege on Qatar, which would weaken it on the short run; however, adds the analyst, no one can ignore this country on the long run.

It appears that Qatar’s neighbours, mentioned by the writer, expedited this regression when three Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain all decided to recall their ambassadors in Doha in protest of Qatar’s failure to meet its obligations as required by Gulf security agreements. Yet, it seems the true problem stems from Aljazeera’s coverage of the events in Egypt as many of these countries have placed crucial bets on the coup’s success. Furthermore, Qatar’s failure to tighten Aljazeera’s reigns serves as a threat to Gulf projects in Egypt, all of which would have dire consequences on these regimes.

This undoubtedly serious step demonstrates the level of discomfort and concern experienced by these countries. This is an unusual step to take for the Gulf, especially in the case of Saudi Arabia, which normally takes the time to reflect and think about these types of foreign policy situations before making any rash or dramatic decisions. For instance, the GCC countries have not cut ties with Iran or recalled their ambassadors from there despite the strained nature of relations with the country. Moreover, these countries often avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, even indirectly through the media.

Some observers link this strange and unexpected decision made by the Gulf States, which often advocate for stability and avoid confrontations especially among themselves, to the challenges of the current transitional period in the Gulf region. This issue is specifically related to the question of transitioning power in Saudi Arabia to a new generation of princes. This new phase in history will undoubtedly be risky especially when combined with other ambitious projects that aim to transform the region, especially its most significant countries such as Syria, Egypt and Iran.

Whatever the reason for recalling the ambassadors of these three countries may be, it sends the wrong message, one of panic and desperation especially since they failed to convince Kuwait and Oman [the other GCC countries] to join them in this decision, which would have given the decision a Gulf nature.

The biggest confusion of all stems from the contradictory message, as mentioned in the tripartite statement, which implied Qatar’s prominent regional role and its ability to threaten its neighbours’ security, and the latter’s inability to defend themselves. Yet, this type of reasoning implies that by recalling their ambassadors from Qatar, the countries in question aspire that they would be able to coerce Qatar into meeting their demands, and that these countries fear Qatar, but that Qatar does not have the same fear. If Qatar were truly capable of threatening the interests of other countries it would respond violently and threaten the countries that threaten it such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain.

At the heart of this conflict is Aljazeera, otherwise known as Qatar’s strategic weapon. Similar to the case of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program, Qatar’s opponents are waging numerous threats in an effort to force it to disarm, which would render it vulnerable to blackmail. Qatar has had previous experiences with blackmail pre-dating Aljazeera and was not victorious. If Qatar were to give in to these current threats and give up its weapons, its situation will only worsen.

Qatar’s foreign policy is not without fault and there is even more reason to criticise its domestic policies. Many of the problems that Qatar is facing stem from other countries being envious and jealous of its success in the regional arena and diplomatic officials should have anticipated these problems. Qatar also plays the role of a superpower due to the gaps that have been left by some of the region’s key players; however, it does not possess the military capabilities of such countries. This requires a lot of caution and wisdom.

Yet despite its drawbacks, Qatar remains a rare example of an Arab success story, not only in the domains of media and foreign policy but also in terms of economy, education and scientific research. Perhaps other Arab countries should learn from Qatar’s success as opposed to adding it to the loser’s camp. For example, the countries in question [Bahrain, UAE and Saudi Arabia] should wonder why their television station Al-Arabia did not achieve the same amount of success as Aljazeera and they should try to emulate Qatar’s success when it comes to experiences like Dubai’s economic treatment, by reassessing its pros and cons.

Most importantly, the Gulf’s biggest countries must find a way out of what caused these tensions, which was mainly the Egyptian military coup. Gulf countries should not try to replicate the Egyptian coup by staging one against Qatar.

The Egyptian coup has drained the Gulf countries and it will remain a cause of strain for decades to come. This is the first coup that has been supported by Gulf countries, as they are usually known for focusing on reforms and improving relations between the rest of the Arab countries as was evident in the Taif, Makkah and Doha accords. It would prove beneficial for the Gulf countries if they would revert to their traditional role as opposed to trying to reincarnate Nasser in an attempt to spread an Arab revolution, because the difference this time around would be that we would be moving against the course of history and the world around us.

Translated from Al Quds Al Arabi newspaper, 6 March, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.