clear

Creating new perspectives since 2009

Is a Palestinian reconciliation possible?

March 29, 2014 at 2:55 pm

Some reliable sources are saying that there is a new attempt on the horizon to achieve Palestinian reconciliation. The idea for this started when a meeting between some Hamas and Fatah leaders was held in Doha on the side lines of the conference organised by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies in December 2013.


Following that meeting, there were phone calls between Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, and Ismail Haniyeh, Palestinian Prime Minister, on the one hand, and President Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), on the other hand. These were accompanied by other calls between senior Fattah Leader Azzam Al-Ahmad and Haniyeh and Mousa Abu Marzouk, a senior official in Hamas’ political bureau. Meanwhile, sources also mentioned a meeting between Meshaal and Jibril Al-Rajoub, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, in this regard.

Perhaps the Palestinian parties felt the need for reconciliation at the moment due to the abandoned Palestinian scene, which no one is concerned with at the moment in light of the ongoing regional unrest.

The settlement issue is on the brink of an abyss, either going along with US Secretary of State John Kerry under the roof of the framework agreement that does not meet the Palestinians’ minimum requirements and its stipulations which will completely liquidate the Palestinian cause, or refusing to do so and suffering from a financial blockade and the restriction of the Palestinian Authority.

On the other hand, the resistance is blockaded in Gaza by the Arabs and Israelis and tied down in the West Bank. It is suffering under two occupations; the Palestinian security services and the occupation forces.

No one doubts the importance of Palestinian reconciliation as a national necessity needed to overcome the obstacle of division that has impacted the Palestinian national project, combined with the current state of Arab weakness, thus opening the window of opportunity to the Jewish state to implement its strategy of taking over more Palestinian land in the West Bank in the context of its intensive settlement project. The number of settlers has currently risen to over 650,000 settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

This settlement project is also accompanied by the intense Judaisation of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque, as the latter has now been divided in terms of prayer times between the Muslims and Jews, and the plan to achieve spatial division is underway.

The Palestinian reconciliation process went through several stages, sometimes coming close to being achieved, but international and regional effects prevented it several times.

What are the requirements for Palestinian reconciliation? What are the factors that drive and hinder it? The horizon for its achievement, as in, is it possible in light of the current circumstances?

Reconciliation requirements

Due to the fact that the reconciliation relapsed at various stages and its failure left serious effects on the national cause and the people, based on experience, a reasonable amount of foundations necessary for its success must be established in order to overcome the obstacles and challenges in its way. Some of the most prominent requirements are as follows:

  • In order for the reconciliation to succeed, it needs a balanced regional sponsor, accepted by all concerned Palestinian parties. Impartial to any of the disputing Palestinian parties, this sponsor must also be able to neutralise regional and international effects prohibiting the realisation of the reconciliation.
  • The success of the reconciliation requires genuine and serious political will on the parts of the main Palestinian parties who are not entering reconciliation in order to realise its personal goals.
  • The reconciliation project must include an accepted political programme based on common grounds, because a reconciliation without such a programme will merely act as a package of fragmented measures without being governed by a political vision.
  • To ensure the realisation of reconciliation, there must be serious Arab support, including providing a political cover that supports its programme, as well as providing a financial safety net to liberate the Palestinian Authority of Western financial pressure.
  • It must be in the context of a programme that contains clear and chronological mechanisms, accompanied by controlled standards of implementation within an integrated package that meets a reasonable amount of the Palestinian demands, supported by sufficient guarantees from an impartial party.
  • In order to enhance how seriously the Palestinian parties take the process, it is best to time the implementation at a time that is suitable for the disputing parties, in order for them to eliminate any political effects during the implementation period that may benefit one party over the others.
  • Most importantly, the reconciliation must be in accordance with a national strategic vision in order to manage the conflict with the enemy. Therefore, they will be able to take measures to face the occupation state on the basis of common ground and in accordance with a programme that aims to maximise all resources of strength and focus them to achieve the higher Palestinian goals.

Encouraging factors

There is no doubt that there are many factors that push for the realisation of reconciliation, as it is a national requirement. The division poses great harm that damages the foundations of the Palestinian national project, as the scene of conflict shows the Zionist front to be united, while the Palestinian national movement appears to be divided against itself. The following is a list of the most important factors that push for the accomplishment of the reconciliation:

  • In light of the division, the scene portrays the Palestinian parties in the form of an incomplete power struggle (an authority under occupation) and shows them as conflicting parties that seek partisan interests at the expense of the national agenda.
  • The Palestinian division limits the influence of either wing of the National Movement (Hamas and Fatah) in the circle of geographical influence, which is a great loss for the entire national project. With time, it creates and has already created a sort of political sectarianism that is harmful to national action, especially since it is used by the enemy as a means of breaking the Palestinian front.
  • The Palestinian public mood is pressing for the achievement of reconciliation because its social, economic and political effects have affected the Palestinians. It is no surprise that the public is looking forward to achieving national unity to confront the Zionist project, which threatens their existence and identity.
  • Reconciliation is necessary to hinder the Jewish state’s strategy of confiscating land by means of settlements, as well as erasing the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque by means of Judaising them according to a well-thought out schedule that races against time to reap the fruits of the historical moment available to them.
  • Reconciliation must be considered a gateway to Palestinian consensus in order to reach a unified national strategy in order to remove the Palestinian issue from its current marginal position in the region’s turbulent scene, and to face the enemy within the framework of the a national consensus programme.
  • The reconciliation is being used by some Arab parties as an excuse for their failure to fulfil their duty of supporting the Palestinian cause and people. Therefore, it is important to eliminate this excuse used by some to justify their negligence towards the main Arab cause.
  • Reconciliation is important to restore the Palestinian cause to its central position in the regional arena and to impose it in the arena as the focus of the conflict. The international parties are currently singling out the Palestinian side, because of the marginalisation of the Palestinian issue and the Arab’s preoccupation with their internal affairs, in order to impose a settlement based on the demands of the Zionists. This calls for the unification of Palestinian efforts to save the issue from permanent liquidation.

Hindering factors

Several factors have accumulated throughout the reconciliation process and have worked on hindering and causing its failure at a number of stages. In the current phase, a new factor has been added regarding the regional variables after the coup against the Arab Spring, which produced a turbulent regional scene that is clouded with grim uncertainty.

Perhaps the most prominent of these variables is the campaign against “political Islam” and all of its branches in the region.

The most prominent hindering factors are:

  • The lack of a balanced regional sponsor. As the current Egyptian government is opposed to Hamas and blockades its government in Gaza, therefore it cannot act as a balanced sponsor, not to mention the government’s preoccupation with its internal affairs.
  • The current weakened state of the Arab world and the preoccupation of most governments with their troubled internal affairs resulting from the Arab Spring, as well as the consequent counter-revolution.
  • The absence of trust on either side of the Palestinian dispute, as the Palestinian political behaviour towards the reconciliation in the past has indicated that the reconciliation is reactivated for urgent political matters, not in the context of a united Palestinian national vision.
  • The lack of a national political programme based on common denominators has contributed to the failure of reconciliation opportunities. There is no doubt that it is the backbone of any serious and successful reconciliation project.
  • The regional scene is dominated by a fierce campaign to combat “political Islam” launched by regional and international parties on the ground that it acts as the foundation for the Arab Spring, which threatens tyrannical Arab regimes. It provided a strategic opportunity to eliminate the impact of Western domination of the area.

As Hamas is considered a targeted manifestation of “political Islam”, the campaign also seems to include it and is presented in the form of the stifling the blockade imposed by the new Egyptian government on the Hamas government in Gaza.

When the reconciliation issue suddenly emerges, at this particular time, while Ramallah is on the verge of signing a framework agreement while a crippling blockade is being imposed on the resistance in Gaza, then the suspicions are intensified surrounding the most recent step towards reconciliation (especially since Abbas is the one who suddenly conceded the condition of holding elections after three months). Therefore, the current reconciliation may only be an attempt to gain access to the Gaza Strip to confront Hamas from the inside and loosen its grip in Gaza, aiming to impact the resistance programme, as it is the central point of focus.

The possibility of reconciliation

In an atmosphere of regional turbulence – characterised by devastating liquidity – it is unlikely that the upcoming reconciliation attempt will succeed due to the absence of an unbiased regional sponsor and due to the weakened state of the Arab world at the moment, deeming it incapable of supporting the Palestinian parties in this regard. It is also unlikely to succeed because of the lack of the political programme necessary to organise a reconciliation agenda and guide its national compass.

There is also a lack of mutual trust between the disputing parties, reinforced by a new factor posed by the campaign targeting “political Islam” in the region stretching from Rabat to Ankara. The campaign reflects Hamas’ fears that the new step towards reconciliation is merely a part of this regional comprehensive campaign, aiming to weaken the grip of Hamas on the Gaza Strip, as a prelude to the dismantling of the resistance programme.

The essence of the last idea is addressed in a special study issued by a US State Department research centre a few months ago.

This article is a translation of the Arabic text published by Al Jazeera net on 23 February 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.