Conflict over religion and state in Egypt

The conflict over religion and state in Egypt has gone through many phases and forms, but two stand out. The first is the struggle over the “civil” nature of the state between the Islamic movements on one side and the so-called “civil forces” on the other. The second extended and grew from the moment the military coup was staged until the moment Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was inaugurated as president and his subsequent actions.

It is useful to examine the Egyptian scene as a “civil state” which, according to the discourse, expresses the demand for the modern state that the political and intellectual elite has aspired for following what they believe is the demise of the Islamic or religious opposition. The term “civil state” itself comes from modern political thought and is based on the principle of citizenship, the rule of law and refraining from using religion to achieve political objectives. However, those studying events after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi will find that it is moving steadily in the opposite direction, away from the concept of the civil state under the sponsorship of the civil forces, either towards the perceptions of the state and the logic of its work, or towards the function of religion within the state.

In terms of perceptions regarding the state, we find that the notions of citizenship and equal rights have been eliminated by the law banning demonstrations and the labelling of all dissenting views as terrorism. In addition, we have the politicisation of the judiciary and its rulings which have failed to provide justice for the martyrs of the revolution; instead, they have prosecuted the Muslim Brotherhood and some of the revolutionary icons.

The relationship between the state and the people has been redefined, whereby the latter are merely witnesses summoned upon demand, mandate or in silence while the new government and its political, media and cultural leaders speak on their behalf. The people are cursed and insulted if the government is not applauded or given a mandate, as was the case during the last presidential election, after which all a modern state’s mechanisms for providing the means for the expression of the popular will were disabled.

The relationship between the president and the people is no longer a contractual relationship, as it is in a modern state, but is based partly on the supposed “love” of the people for the ex-defence minister/president, and partly on the “sanctity” of the military establishment, and the “obedience” imposed by Egyptian “nationalism” which is neither defined nor identified, but confined to the concept of “with us” or “against us”. We also have the “individuality” of the leader which degenerates to the level of letting down the entire nation due to an emotional reaction when Al-Sisi refers to the country as an “embrace” for the people. He ran for president for personal reasons, including his “dreams”; there was nothing partisan or political about the decision. A political programme is, therefore, an added bonus rather than a priority or even a duty.

All of this comes after a revolution that awakened the popular will and freedom of choice by means of modern state democratic mechanisms, such as elections, referendums and the overflowing freedoms that emerged during the revolution and shortly after it, as well as in terms of organised demonstrations with clear political demands and the opening up of the public sphere to various political actors and views.

Regarding the function of religion in the state after the coup, it is said to contradict the idea of the civil state. The new government emerged with religious legitimacy from Al-Azhar, the Coptic Church and the heads of the Salafist movement. This use of religion was a firm approach that made Al-Sisi’s religiousness a fundamental issue.

On the level of language, concepts, and logical thinking, the Al-Azhar Sheikh established the legitimacy of the coup on the theory of “the lesser of two evils”, a theory associated with necessity. This resonated with writer M. H. Heikal, who referred to Al-Sisi as the “candidate of necessity”.

The Head of the Department of Comparative Jurisprudence at Al Azhar University, Saad El-Din Hilaly, had considered the then defence and interior ministers to be “messengers” of God who came with a religious task. This was later repeated by Al-Sisi in a meeting with the Sufi Sheikhs when he spoke about staging the coup “in the service of Islam”, that he asks for “reward” from God and that He accepts his deeds, which have actually resulted in thousands of casualties.

In addition to this, the entire “religious perspective” is evident through the “presidential inauguration” speech during which Al-Sisi referred to what he called “the renewal of religious discourse”. He explained the function of religion in the public sphere, and said that the state which advocates for this renewed discourse is knowledgeable in the “true religion” and “preserves our system of values and ethics”, while “maintaining the true image of our Islamic religion and forming the minds and hearts of Muslims.”

Al-Sisi’s “innovative” religious vision, which is in alignment with the idea of the “sultan state” that preserves religion, is reflected in the concept of freedom, the framework of which includes “religious and moral laws and rules”. It is also reflected in the measures taken by the Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments) that, after taking office, included the re-organisation of religious affairs ranging from sermons and mosques to the religious discourse itself and its content.

In my opinion, the most dangerous matter is the Mubarak and coup governments’ use of the religious institutions as a tool to “legitimise” volatile political choices, which has implicated the icons of the religious institution in three sins: blatant contradictions, acting as muftis (religious jurists) when the government requires a fatwa (religious opinion), and abandoning the language of jurisprudence for the language of politics.

Such contradictions include the fact that “official” fatwas are in line with the existing or dominant power, despite the fact that the issue and context remains the same, and the only variable is the position of the mufti.

The ruling regarding demonstrations was changed by Ali Gomaa from banned during Mubarak’s rule, to being allowed after the fall of Mubarak, then back to banned once again after the ouster of Morsi. He explained his opposition to the January Revolution as fear of strife and bloodshed, but after the military coup, he allowed bloodshed and the killing of protestors, using a historical term to label them as “Kharijites”, saying “whoever kills them is closer to God than them”.

The same thing happened with Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayeb. He deemed protesting impermissible during Mubarak’s reign, and after Mubarak was overthrown, he deemed protests to be a “national liberation movement”. He then issued a statement saying that “confronting any national peaceful demonstration with force, armed violence and bloodshed contradicts the Charter of Governance between the nation and their rulers, thus diminishing the legitimacy of the authority”. Since he supported the coup, all the bloodshed resulting from the military coup is considered to be a case of “the lesser of two evils”.

I cannot explain this serious contrast in the “fatwas” which are considered to be “a declaration of God’s judgment regarding the situation” by citing jurisprudence. The political system and government declared these muftis to be part of the state institutions and followed their orders. We could view these fatwas as “jurisprudent fatwas” if they had not been so in tune with the government and its needs; if they had distanced themselves from the government’s political position; and if they did not label other contradicting fatwas as “political”.

Jurisprudence disputes have historic traditions, the most important of which is that they recognise the legitimacy of all interpretations on principle, but I cannot find a trace of such a concept in the “official fatwas” because they are issued to perform a political function by muftis who oppose the Muslim Brotherhood; they hold religious positions that would be threatened if the Brotherhood’s authority is established.

The second sin that these muftis committed is that they have become muftis serving the needs of the government. We only see them speaking during political occasions that suit the powers-that-be, while they are absent in the contexts that suit the community, such as their positions on the state’s bloodshed, attacks on mosques and human rights violations.

Moreover, their fatwas correspond constantly to the position of the government, leaving no distance between it and the opinion, or between the will of the president and the religious ruling. Their discourse is only aimed at the general public, and does not address the behaviour or policies of the government or institutions of state.

Going back to what I had said in the beginning of this article, I find that the latest phase of the last presidential elections exposed the magnitude of the second and third sins (their transformation into muftis serving the purpose of the government, and their preference for the language of politics). We have witnessed many frequent appearances of the religious figures for the sake of stressing one idea: the duty of the people to participate in the elections due to the coup government’s fear of a boycott.

I cannot read into the motives behind these fatwas and statements in isolation from the media and political context which promotes the participation in the elections in order for the new government’s arrangements to succeed, as well as to confront the contrasting fatwas that call for boycotts of the elections. We must ask why the institution has made an appearance here, but was absent during the previous elections during Morsi’s rule. Duties should not change from one era to another. The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the Egyptian Grand Mufti and the Awqaf Minister all agreed on the idea of participating in the elections, opposing the boycott and persecuting anyone calling for the boycott.

This duty to participate in the elections was also voiced in other formats. The Al-Azhar Sheikh claimed that it was “the responsibility and duty of every sacred national, and they will not be pardoned from this duty until they vote.” He repeated the same thing when he made a statement on behalf of Al-Azhar to Shawki Allam, the Supreme Mufti, when he said, “It is an urgent national responsibility” and, to the Awqaf Minister, that it is “a religious duty and every individual will be held accountable on the Day of Judgment”; those boycotting the elections “will bear the sin of withholding testimony.”

This responsibility is voiced by those claiming to represent the “rule of religion” by either being a religious or national duty in order for the decisions of religion and the state to be the sole choice of the government. However, we are facing a political operation in a “state” established on freedom of choice and popular will and, based on this, they are not supposed to influence the will of the voters through any coercive means, religious or governmental.

It is ironic that those calling for the duty to participate in elections are basing their calls on an incorrect jurisprudence standard by considering the elections as a “testimony”. According to Islamic Law, testimony is “proving the truth for another individual against another in a judicial session” while elections are a popular choice and giving the state the authority to manage public affairs.

If we study the matter of religious testimony with these muftis, we would depart from the logic of the modern state, because testimony has conditions to be accepted, and it provides justice for the witnesses. The basis of justice in Islam would eliminate a large number of individuals from the right to vote if we wanted to go down the road of religious testimony.

Leaving the area of jurisprudence and resorting to pure politics has driven the official muftis to misguide their opponents and label them as traitors and infidels for the sake of a purely “discretionary” issue based on personal choice and political preferences; this is true in the logic of jurisprudence or in the logic of the modern state.

The Al-Azhar Sheikh considered the fatwa to boycott the elections as “abnormal, biased and misleading” and those who issued such fatwas as having “betrayed their countries and sold their religion to the devil”; they were not “fatwas, rather a mockery.” Shawiki Allam said the same thing, and added that it “lacked the criteria considered when issuing fatwas.”

If we take a look at these “misguided and misleading, treacherous individuals”, as described by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the Grand Mufti and the Minister of Awqaf, we find that they include individuals such as Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Sheikh Mohamed El Hassan Ould Dedew (Mauritania), Ahmad Raissouni (Morocco), Abdul Majid al-Zindani (Yemen) and others who were pioneers and established the jurisprudence of interests and the foundations of issuing fatwas decades ago.

It is ironic that the Islamists who have hesitated for so long to hand over legitimacy to the approach of elections, and then considered them “procedural” because the supreme reference is to God, are now fighting over the necessity of political action, elections and boycotts, but by means of the crossing between the logic of the modern state and the logic of historical jurisprudence.

I have noted this whole debate to say that the conflict over the “civil state” was neither real nor based on principles. Instead, it was an investment in hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood, overlooking all principles and ideas. The Egyptian elite has allied with the military and acknowledged the severe regression in the achievements of the revolution and the modern state, and has now accepted what was once considered blasphemous. For example, we see Abdul Muti Hijazi and Salah Fadl appearing on Egyptian television stations to praise the only “democratic elections” Egypt has seen in six decades (which brought Al-Sisi to power) and that these elections protected them from the “Islamic Sultanate” that the Brotherhood would have brought.

Translated from Al Jazeera net, 19 July, 2014