The night Egyptian politics fell

On the anniversary of the (1952) July 23rd Revolution, Khaled Meshaal, Head of the Hamas political bureau, addressed a speech to a press conference telling Israeli war generals that the resistance’s disarmament would be dependent on an end to the occupation and disarmament of Israel. He also said that no one could dictate the terms of the resistance. He went on to say that Netanyahu and his defence minister must need to send out their best men to kill or capture them. These events cannot be ignored by the free people of the world.

The war on Gaza is the first real test for the coup leader in Egypt, who, according to many political circles and decision-makers around the world, does not possess the personal intelligence and skills to manage the current events. Instead, he is acting on whatever credit has been gained from Egypt’s role in suggesting policies and proposals that might resolve the crisis and by comparing it to Mubarak’s reign.

The strategic error of the regime in Egypt, an error of one of the most basic rules when proposing initiatives, was failing to negotiate with the genuine party in the crisis i.e. Hamas. Egypt did not invite Hamas to the talks, dealt with the movement superficially and ignored the military force that shocked analysts with their victories on the ground. This drove Hamas politicians to deal a direct blow to Egypt and expose the lax role it played, as well as announce a desire to stop the fighting without assistance from Cairo.

This has left the coup regime in Egypt in a dark tunnel of political isolation, putting it in a position where it was unable to even make a proposal in a professional way. I am not only referring to the coup leader, but also to the sovereign institutions involved in managing the crisis, which I view as a serious crack in the decision-making system. What if the resistance was successful in imposing its rights and did succeed in making strategic achievements on the ground? In this case, the coup leader would have to go to Hamas to amend his initiative and attempt to save what little face he has left in front of the world’s public opinion.

The treatment of Hamas by the Egyptian authorities and the disregard of the Egyptian society’s will reflects the confusion between the various issues. The Palestinian cause, to the Egyptian people cannot be disregarded or overlooked. The Egyptians will never forget the massacres committed by Israel against civilians in the Abu Zaabal factory and Bahr El Baqar primary school, nor will they forget that Israel buried alive the Egyptian prisoners of war during the June war. We cannot erase the fact that the Zionist enemy is the enemy of the army and the people. It is superficial and shallow to link Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood and treat them the same and to link a foreign issue with an internal issue.

I cannot discuss the flaws and failures of Egyptian foreign policy, which views its relations with America as a legitimate marriage and allowed the US secretary of state to make a statement from inside the presidential palace describing Israel’s actions taken in self-defence. I am no longer concerned by hollow political speeches, but allowing the US secretary of state to provide political cover for the war crimes in Gaza from inside your decision-making institution, you are stripping down to your last piece of clothing and are losing what little credit you have from the masses who believe they support you. You will not find a place in the world as the Zionist enemy deliberately exposes the Egyptian role that reveals the daily communications that could resolve the crisis, representing the ‘brave’ alliance between Netanyahu and Al- Sisi.

The state of senselessness and professional and moral deterioration in the media outlets reporting of the Gaza war and the emergence of media support to hit Gaza has never before happened in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The fact that we are witnessing such corruption and ugliness in the media merely as a means to settle the score with the Muslim Brotherhood and out of hatred and anger over the victory of one of its factions in Gaza over the strongest army that defeated the Arab armies in six days is, I believe, breaking away from the control of the state.

The only loser in current war on Gaza is the political system in Egypt, it is retuning, empty-handed after the resistance forces agreed not to withdraw their conditions for an end to the war. After the most recent press conference by the head of the Hamas political bureau, the losses suffered by Egypt will weaken the state institutions’ ability to control the media, which has become rowdy and insolent about the bloodshed and the hospitals being bombed, thus increasing Egypt’s international isolation. This will cause those who support the coup to turn away from the political system in Egypt, as it fails its first test miserably, the opposite of what happened during President Morsi’s term.

We are on the verge of changing the general strategy of the coup leaders in Egypt, who will go from regarding the Zionist enemy as the enemy to regarding Hamas as the enemy. But I am asking if this is wise, what if Hamas was not stationed on the eastern Egyptian border, would Israel be content with only occupying Palestine? We are witnessing a freefall of all political principles and values, as well as the minimum level of respect in Egyptian minds.

The state’s foreign policy represents its main sovereign value through its international relations, while it bases its structure on the independence of the state, as well as its political decisions, and degree of possession of free will that enables it to formulate a foreign policy, mechanism, and determine its orientations and paths in accordance with the state’s goals and national security. I say that Egypt will become politically isolated and distrusted by foreign governments. The biggest loser in the current conflict in Gaza is Egypt’s regional and international role, because the resistance will inevitably prevail.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.