Don’t be fooled; if Britain bombs Syria, it won’t be a victory for human rights

Ever since the surprise election victory for David Cameron’s Conservative Party in March, the possibility of Britain extending its current mission against Daesh/ISIS in Iraq to include bombing Syria has been growing stronger. There is a range of drivers for this, but the humanitarian argument – which is cited most often as justification by supporters of a prospective bombing campaign – should not be considered one of them.

Rather, any reasonable analysis of the situation will find that the piling on of British bombs, alongside military interventions by at least 10 other states and several non-state actors in an already chaotic and tumultuous war-zone, will not improve the lot of ordinary Syrians in any way. Don’t be fooled, if the British parliament votes to bomb Syria, it won’t have much to do with saving civilian lives. Instead, such action is more likely to be motivated by a concern that Britain should not be left out of America’s circle of closest allies.

In September 2013, Cameron – then head of the coalition government – was humiliated when parliament stymied a previous attempt to enter the war. This was in the aftermath of a chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime and the vote in Westminster had an impact on the whole allied effort build-up. It was Ed Milliband’s Labour Party that prevented Britain’s march to war.

Though there were numerous arguments against military action at the time, it is likely that the main driver for Labour’s vote against was the long shadow cast by previous disastrous engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet as the sheer scale of human devastation resulting from the conflict has become impossible for Europeans to ignore and the cancer of ISIS has metastasised, it appears the British government has set its sights on joining the campaign.

One important shift that might enable this is that a large segment of the parliamentary Labour Party seems more likely to vote with the government (against the wishes of its new leader, Jeremy Corbyn). Unsurprisingly, justification for this potential shift has been framed in the language of human rights. Indeed, according to a an article authored by Andrew Mitchell, former Secretary of State for International Development, and Jo Cox, a Labour MP and former Head of Policy for Oxfam: “We need a military component that protects civilians as a necessary prerequisite to any future UN or internationally provided safe havens. The creation of safe havens inside Syria would eventually offer sanctuary from both the actions of Assad and Isis, as we cannot focus on Isis without an equal focus on Assad. They would save lives, reduce radicalisation and help to slow down the refugee exodus.”

But it’s not really about human rights

Of course the vision that Mitchell and Cox set out is appealing; however, in reality, this proposition is evidently absurd. This is not because Mitchell and Cox are wrong to point to a moral imperative to provide help where it is needed, but rather it is because there is no way in which British intervention is likely to bring about this kind of solution.

There are four main factors that lead us to that conclusion. The first of these is the most obvious: that Britain’s impact on this crisis is likely to be far too small to be seriously meaningful. Indeed, in a conflict were at least 10 other outside countries have already got themselves involved and, as MEMO has previously argued, many of them appear more interested in pursuing their own interests than the welfare of Syrian civilians, why on earth would we expect that a few extra sorties undertaken by the Royal Air Force will make the slightest difference?

Secondly, if Britain does join the campaign, it will certainly do so as part of the US-led coalition. Those arguing in favour of this are likely to suggest that – while the US would continue to do the heavy lifting in military terms – the UK’s presence would add some political clout and, in turn, may allow British leaders to push for policies such as a no-fly zone or a buffer zone. There is, though, no evidence that this is likely.

Rather, the argument over such humanitarian measures has been floating around since the civil war began, and now it is apparently resistance from the White House – against other parts of the US government – that is a major stumbling block. Thus, it is unlikely that requests from London – which would still be bit-part player in the war – would have an impact on the president’s decision if his own secretary of state cannot.

Third, there are serious reasons to question Britain’s commitment to the cause of humanitarianism in its military interventions. Indeed, while the Libyan civil war is an example that is cited by both advocates for intervention in Syria and as a reason to oppose it, one conclusion is clear: British policy toward human rights abuses in the Middle East is incoherent.

While the case for going to war in Libya rested on humanitarian grounds, in the aftermath of the regime’s collapse the coalition abandoned Libyans to continuing violence (which may have cost more than 4,000 lives since 2013 and allowed room for an ISIS affiliate to obtain a foothold). Moreover, in Yemen, Britain remains a staunch backer of the Saudi-led bombing campaign, despite warnings about Saudi conduct by human rights groups. And, to cap it all, some aspects of Britain’s response to the human rights of refugees from Syria and elsewhere has been utterly reprehensible, particular it’s opposition to search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean.

The final major factor that undermines the humanitarian argument for British intervention is that the UK’s stance on the conflict has changed dramatically since the 2013 vote. At the time the government was itching to drop bombs on the regime yet, more recently, the government has changed its tune, suggesting that Assad could stay in power for three months, despite the fact the he is responsible for about seven times more deaths than Daesh.

So what is it all about?

If the humanitarian argument for intervention is discredited, what could be driving the push for British bombs on Syria? There are two possibilities, the first of which is that ISIS presents an intolerable security threat and so must be fought.

On 7 September the prime minister announced that a British drone strike had killed two British nationals who were plotting an attack on the UK. This obviously raises all sorts of questions and concerns in its own right (not least because of recent revelations about how the US drone-war has been conducted). However, the fact that it took place and – according to Secretary of Defence Michael Fallon – the government “wouldn’t hesitate to take similar action again”, suggests that such “security” actions are not contingent on the execution of a larger bombing campaign.

The second reason that is possibly driving the march to war is something different; the British government does not want to lose its place at the top table. While the UK-US relationship is one that is frequently called “essential” and “special” it is no longer of any particular strategic significance and is “in need of more focused effort” according to a 2013 study from Chatham House.

Put another way, despite Britain’s support for US action in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, London is simply less important in Washington than it once was. As David Rothcopf explains, “Britain has not so much offended as it has simply slinked away from centre stage. Perhaps in the wake of British public revulsion at the degree to which Tony Blair was seen to have become George W. Bush’s ‘poodle’, perhaps due to the degree to which national attention has been drawn to domestic problems, we have seen a reordering of the power landscape of Europe. Britain, once our closest and most important ally, now falls third on that scale.”

Perhaps, then, in the mind of David Cameron – who is still, apparently, undecided on where the UK fits into the power landscape of Europe – bombing Syria will prove that Britain deserves to sit at the top table in international affairs.

Yet the prime minister would do well to learn from recent history and take heed of the lesson implied by the “poodle” accusation. Neither Germany nor France followed the US into Iraq but both now rank as more important than Britain for a number of reasons. The British government could, therefore, show the world its worth to an even greater degree by forging its own path as a leader of truly humanitarian policies, particularly towards refugees from Syria.

The Syrian civil war is a domestic struggle between an abhorrent regime and several opposition forces, some of which offer only more hopelessness and death and a terrific clash of global and regional powers. At the same time, however, it is a catastrophe that tests our very humanity in how we respond.

If the British government really wants to do the right thing in this humanitarian crisis then it should stop banging the drums of war and accept the obvious: more bombs won’t help. Instead, Britain’s focus should be on doing more for the only constituency it can really support; the refugees who have fled the battlefield. In short, this means not following the Americans into another military quagmire and instead offering true leadership on the issue of human rights.

Dr Philip Leech is the co-editor of Political Identities and Popular Uprisings in the Middle East. He is on twitter @phil_haqeeqa and his profile is available at academia.edu

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.