Is Saudi Arabia heading towards an abyss?

In a recent perceptive essay on Saudi Arabia, Roula Khalaf of the Financial Times identified a number of major challenges to the Kingdom, problems that she labels as being a part of a “wake-up call”. Saudi Arabia’s chief problem is that it is going through an era when cheap oil prices are part of permanent reality. Thus, it must say farewell to running a rentier state, where citizens are bribed into accepting autocratic rule, while the rulers continue to provide them with an artificially-created economic stability. “Backed by an army of highly paid western consultants,” Khalaf wrote, “the royal aides have identified billions of dollars of waste and government largesse that the desert kingdom can no longer afford.” The only people who are getting rich right now are those highly paid Saudi aides and their Western counterparts.

In the post-Arab Spring era, when the Arab masses have ousted four dictators, all dictatorships are under intense pressure either to reform or be ousted. While the order of the day in the Arab world is good governance, the Saudi royalty is clueless about what that good governance model should entail. In the meantime, the ailing King Salman has implemented a highly questionable process of nepotism by giving too much power to his young son, Mohammad, who wants to bring about his version of economic reform, while running a highly expensive, and potentially ruinous, war in neighbouring Yemen. In the process, he has yet to prove himself as either a shrewd governor or a wily warrior. “Known for his appetite for detail and data,” wrote Khalaf about Mohammad’s governing style, “the young prince has been preparing for his father’s succession for several years. He asked aides to identify areas in need of reform and officials who could be promoted. His spadework led to what analysts describe as a tsunami reshuffle when the monarch assumed the throne in January, on the death of his half-brother King Abdullah. Never in the kingdom’s history had so many royal decrees been issued at once, with dozens of new officials appointed to government.”

The chief problem with contemporary Arab rulers is that, while they are obsessive about hiring Western number crunchers and analysts to identify critical problems facing their polities and to use that data to resolve problems, which the rulers themselves are the least equipped to do, the entire practice of giving the appearance of modern governance remains an endless exercise in futility. The Gulf monarchies are sad examples of that reality.

Another critical problem about hiring Western analysts is that they are the statistical/analytical version of mercenaries. In that capacity, they neither have the necessary understanding of what ails those monarchies, nor are they really interested in offering candid advice, which may cost them their jobs.

For all of the Gulf monarchies, the chief requirement is transformation of governing style and substance. However, it is very hard to imagine the Saudi government trying sincerely to transform itself into some version of democracy. The Wahhabi religious establishment is the chief obstacle in its way, since it envisions Islam and democracy to be highly incompatible.

Saudi antipathy toward the Shia and the hatred and fear of Iran is another major challenge that its ruling elite will not succeed in overcoming. In fact, my feeling is that the Saudi-Iranian competition is likely to intensify in the coming years, not only in West Asia but also in the Levant and other regions.

In the aftermath of the US-Iran nuclear deal, Iran promises to emerge as a rising regional power. It has already established a firm sphere of influence inside Iraq. As long as the United States and Russia remain on opposite sides of the fence on the issue of removing Bashar Al-Assad from Syria, Tehran’s unflinching support of the current regime in Damascus also promises to remain a firm basis for Iranian presence in the Levant. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, largely because of its misguided support of the Islamists in Syria and its refusal to end the war in Yemen, appears to be heading towards a steady decline.

Even viewing Saudi Arabia from the perspective of a growing challenge from Daesh, the future does not look promising. As the Saudi-sponsored war intensifies in Yemen, the terrorist group is likely to do everything it can to take advantage of the ensuing chaos to escalate its dark presence in that country. In Iraq, the two effective fighting forces against Daesh are the Iran-sponsored Shia militias and the Kurdish groups supported by the American air campaign. Saudi Arabia has no role in that theatre of operation. More to the point, notwithstanding the fact that both Daesh and Saudi Arabia operate on the Wahhabi ideology, the former is quite intent about escalating its own presence and influence inside the kingdom. That can be interpreted as anything but good news for Saudi Arabia.

Ehsan Ahrari is an independent consultant who recently served as Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. His previous positions include Professor of National Security and Strategy at the Joint Forces Staff College of the National Defence University (1994-2005), and Professor of West Asian Studies, US Air War College (1990-1994). He frequently briefs US military officials and has written and edited numerous books and articles.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.