Between victory and defeat in Mosul

The Iraqi forces, in cooperation with an international alliance, will free the city of Mosul and the Nineveh province in northern Iraq and Daesh will be forced out of Iraqi cities and towns.

However, the tactics of the victory will remain thwarted by the current strategies that are being implemented on the ground, which afford Daesh the opportunity to gain control of Iraqi cities and provinces to begin with. Some of the factors in question include: central Iraqi politics, internal regional conflicts and a feelings of exclusion and alienation felt by a large number of Iraqis who stand in opposition to the government in Baghdad more than they do to Daesh.

What will come after the liberation of Mosul will be worse than its liberation, especially if fair and just policies are not implemented ones that can be agreed upon by the majority of Iraqis. In truth, Daesh’s hegemony over large parts of Syrian and Iraqi territory is only the nom de guerre of the true problem. If new policies do not take a positive direction in Iraq, then a victory in this battle will be transformed into a large-scale strategic loss. Chaos will take over; conflicts and rates of revenge will rise in the same horror and gravity that occurred under Daesh’s control.

There are obvious challenges to the post-liberation period of Mosul that do not require a great deal of analysis. These challenges are simply related to law and security, the return of the displaced and the regulation of Shia militias, as many residents have complained about their aggressions in Fallujah and other large Iraqi cities which are no less than the crimes committed by Daesh if not worse. Thus, these families are either under the mercy of Daesh or vengeful extremist militias who seek to exacerbate sectarian tensions.

Fallujah’s residents have yet to return to their city despite its “liberation”. For this reason many are doubtful that Mosul’s residents will be able to return to their homes. It has been made clear through the media that there is a large and worrisome Iranian presence in Iraq. The presence of Shia militias seems to be imposed on Prime Minister Hadier Al-Abadi, as many are now beginning to question the legitimacy of the central government in Baghdad and how independent it is from Tehran. The main question is whether or not the Iraqi government is able to govern an independent Iraq without Iranian interference. American analysts are publishing columns in newspapers suggesting that Qassem Soleimani, a senior military officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the commander of the Quds Force, has sent a great number of his forces to Iraq and that they are currently present there.

Both Iran and Turkey have a great deal of interest in sending forces to Iraq, which further complicates both regional and domestic alliances and conflicts. Both countries view northern Iraq as an important bridge to securing there interests due to the presence of Turkmen, Kurds and Shias, which directly affect the events taking place in the north of the country. Moreover, the complicated conflict in Syria does not differ greatly from what is taking place in Mosul and perhaps Iran is planning accordingly to build a geographic land bridge between Iran and Syria.

Turkey appears invested in protecting the rights of the Turkmen as well as its other alliances in Iraq and it also concerned with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s (PKK) initiatives. The Turkish government is hoping to contain the PKK between the Iraqi and Turkish borders, if expelling them is not an option. Turkey would also like its ally, Athil Al-Najafi, governor of the Nineveh Region, to have a role in the future the province. The central government in Baghdad wholly rejects this. Thus begins the Turkey-Iraq conflict before we have even recaptured Mosul. There is now a conflict in the Nineveh between Ankara’s ally, Athil Najafi and Nofal Hamadi, who stands in an alliance with Baghdad/Al-Abadi and Iran. Both of the aforementioned individuals have their own disagreements with the Kurds and their tribes.

Of course, there are also obvious questions regarding the reconstruction of Mosul and other cities that have been destroyed by Daesh and how basic services will be provided to them; however, no one is addressing these questions with sincerity and a sense of conviction. The Iraqi government and its allies are not talking about realistic strategies that can be implemented in the wake of Mosul’s liberation and re-settlement. It also appears that Iraq is not the direct target in this scenario but that Iran’s involvement with the Iraqi central government is an effort to control the region and provide direct support for the Syrian regime. It also appears that the US wants little other than to achieve a quick victory in the wake of the new elections. For this reason, the US is ignoring many of the real implications on the ground that have resulted from Iran’s involvement.

The fall in oil prices has also negatively impacted Iraq such that the development challenges in the affected areas of the country make the economic struggle and the advent of poverty greater challenges which must be tackled than extremism and extremists. Will the Nineveh province, and perhaps the Sunni Iraqi areas, be transformed into federal rule similar to the Kurdish regions? This is precisely the outcome that Iran fears most because it undermines its presence in the region and keeps it from achieving its goal of creating a land bridge to Syria. In fact, more federations might form as a result of the political situation in the region and in places such as Basra. We have begun to talk about the liberation of Mosul and the future of Iraq but it now seems that that fight for the future of Mosul far exceeds the gravity and ferocity of the fight against Daesh.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 28 October 2016

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.