Saudi Arabia’s policy priorities in 2017

I am not close to a decision-maker in Saudi Arabia, nor do I have a position in the government or contact with the foreign policymakers. What follows is simply a personal analysis of Saudi Arabia’s policy priorities for 2017 with regards to Yemen, Syria and Iraq; there is no hidden agenda.

In Yemen, there are three important factors that the Saudis should take into account this year: the consequences of the long war, the hesitation of some allies and the intervention of major superpowers. Each one of these factors has its own unique details and complexities, but the three combined are similar in terms of their ultimate effects and main results.

For a start, we must look at the patterns, methods and nature of “Operation Decisive Storm”. It will have undesirable consequences in time, as it will contribute ultimately to the Arab allies achieving results that are completely different to what they had planned for at the beginning of the conflict. The time involved usually creates new and unexpected problems that always require equally new and unexpected solutions. This will push towards a shift in internal allegiances, a change in priorities and a change in interests, as Yemeni parties who are with the Arab coalition today may change their allegiance tomorrow. Those who believe in the legitimate government today may tomorrow follow the rebel path or create their own political sphere, making them a third, fourth or even fifth part of the equation of a solution in Yemen. In addition, the international community cannot hold the same position forever, as media and civil society will try to influence the “restoration of hope” process by embracing all sides of the conflict for the very simple reason that the world is not, for many reasons, obliged to listen to only one side.

The second factor, represented in the hesitation and retreat of some of the allies, will, in one way or another, put pressure on the unity of the others. Some countries that announced their participation in the Arab coalition early on are now putting pressure on its approach. They are hindering the coalition’s progress under the pretext of Arab security and protecting innocent civilians.

The third factor is represented by the intervention of the major powers, which may complicate the conflict and prolong it for a number of reasons: exhausting the regional countries; keeping the conflict raging beyond its original borders; taking the opportunity to test new weapons in a real war zone; and developing “practice” political and diplomatic confrontations in neutral arenas.

What should Saudi Arabia do to confront these very real threats? It must strive to obtain new legitimacy for the Yemeni government-in-exile so that it is accepted in the country, and work to enter the capital Sanaa at the earliest opportunity in order to manage the “return” war from there. It must also sieve through the current internal alliances, even if this requires including past enemies in order to suffocate the Houthis and force them to return to their pre-2014 areas. Yesterday’s enemies in Yemen may be today’s friends, especially if the legitimate government and coalition forces extend their hands of friendship towards them. The Houthis alone cannot be included in any peaceful process, as this conflicts with their main agenda to provoke unrest and sectarianism, and create turbulence to control the state without being involved in its government, as happens with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia must also train Yemeni civil society groups capable of communicating directly with the world about the Houthis’ repeated human rights violations. What is happening now is that the Saudis are communicating with the world to talk about such violations, while the Yemenis are talking about the coalition’s violations. This is an obvious flaw, in my opinion, as those who should be concerned first and foremost about the Houthi violations are the Yemenis themselves. Moreover, the battle is not between Saudis and Yemenis per se, but between some Yemenis under the umbrella of legitimacy and others who have rebelled for ideological and sectarian reasons.

Rushing to end the operations from Saudi territory and replacing them with political and logistical support for the newly re-legitimised government within Yemen, and then working on attracting UN peacekeeping forces through friends in the Security Council, will halt the impact of threats two and three; an effective Yemeni government on the ground will be a match for the world.

Saudi Arabia achieved its two most important goals of its operations against the Houthi rebels by removing the danger from its own borders and isolating the Houthis from their regional surroundings. I believe that the government in Riyadh is unable, due to the nature of the Yemeni people, to impose a perfect democracy in the country. It is always safer to hand Yemen to those Yemenis whose patriotism is trusted (widely approved and wise individuals) and support them, with the help of the free world, to achieve political stability. This will also bring about economic, social and cultural stability.

As for Syria, I believe that supporting the Turkish position and standing behind it in managing the crisis will have the biggest impact on the success of Saudi Arabia’s diplomacy. This is because Turkey is a trusted and reliable party in Saudi eyes and those of the Syrian people. It would also mean that the major countries do not use Riyadh’s genuine desire to liberate the Syrian people as a political trap through which it can pull Saudi Arabia into the desired positions and impose reciprocal solutions that do not align with its interests. The crisis in Syria has gone beyond preliminary solutions that could have been reached in 2012 and 2013 by means of one statement or international forum. The situation there at the moment has turned into an international gathering and Saudi Arabia must support Turkey, on one hand, and speak on behalf of the Muslim world on the other if it wants its voice to be heard.

Iraq 2017 will be a copy of Iraq 2016, and so I do not believe that there is an urgent need to reconsider relations with Baghdad in a radical manner. What is always important is working with all the international parties in order to preserve the country’s numerous and varied Arab and Muslim identities.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.