clear

Creating new perspectives since 2009

From division to managing the reconciliation

November 30, 2017 at 5:52 pm

Palestinian Fatah movement leader Azzam Al-Ahmad (R) and Deputy Chairman of the Movement’s Political Bureau Saleh Al-Arouri (L) in Cairo, Egypt on 12 October 2017 [Ahmed Gamil/Anadolu Agency]

It has become apparent that the phase of official and actual division is over, and there is no longer place for its discourse, tools, or influential parties. It has been declared dead, while its supporters have abandoned its care, its funders have become distracted, and those benefitting from it have been disappointed. It is no longer easy to revive it or repeat it, as the international and regional circumstances have changed and the local and Arab situation can no longer bear it. Moreover, the consequences of the division have become too costly, it is difficult for the citizens to accept it, and the regional and international forces’ recognition of the division once again has become impossible. Therefore, the end of the division has been officially and permanently declared. This declaration was accompanied by joy, pleasure, optimism and hope that tomorrow will be better, that the future will be brighter, the sanctions and blockade will be lifted, the economy will flourish, and prosperity will spread across the country.

However, the end of the division will not achieve true reconciliation, will not create actual unity, will not end the contradictions and differences, and will not end the double-standards amongst the forces, disputes over authority, a clash of influences and opposing interests. It will not help eliminate the exploiters, benefiters, those fearing for their interests and those seeking to serve their own interests, nor will it reduce the gap between perspectives, melt the ice between the divided parties, or create genuine visions for reconciliation, agreement, cooperation, coordination, accepting legitimacy and adhering to the rule of law. This shocked the citizens, disappointed the people, and led to their despair. They went back to their old hopes, which they thought would be locked away. Meanwhile, the colluders were joyful, the ill-wishers laughed, and the enemies and rivals sang and danced.

Read: The Arab pressure on the Palestinian leadership

This is the reality that we must admit and recognise and should not deny. We should not try to portray a false face or delude ourselves and trick others into believing we actually escaped the state of division and its differences. We did leave the phase of division, but we did not transition to a phase of reconciliation and agreement. Instead, we transitioned to a new phase of de-escalation and reduced tension that imposes new concepts on all the parties, based on managing and handling the agreement. This means admitting that the division is enrooted, the foundations of the dispute and differences are still strong, and that its figures still have a strong presence. However, the outer indications and forms of agreement are present and they need to be managed and dealt with wisely and rationally, in order for things to remain under control, to keep things from descending into armed conflict and violent disputes, and to keep the Gaza Strip and its people from going back to the same situation they suffered for over ten years.

US President Donald Trump meets with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in the Oval Office of the White House on May 3, 2017 in Washington, DC. [Thaer Ganaim/Apaimages]

US President Donald Trump meets with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in the Oval Office of the White House on May 3, 2017 in Washington, DC. [Thaer Ganaim/Apaimages]

Although the state of division is over, the failure of the reconciliation confirms what we have been hearing from senior officials in the PA about “empowerment”, which is a new term we haven’t heard before, nor have Palestinian negotiators demanded this before. This is because they had never dreamed of re-entering Gaza alone, unless a reconciliation agreement was reached between all divided parties. It is worth noting that the empowerment operation they are referring to is actually the confiscation of the resistance’s weapons under the pretext of the unity of arms and the illegitimacy of any arms outside of the government. This empowerment operation desired by the PA may take many months or even years to achieve, and it may not even manage to impose its full control over the Gaza Strip or enable its ministries to work freely and sovereignly, if its true purpose is to disarm the resistance.

The PA is trying to exonerate itself by claiming it is not free in its positions and has no choice in the conditions imposed on it, claiming it cannot move forward with the reconciliation without getting the green light from the US. Some of its officials have even stated that they are under great American pressure, that is clear and explicit, and that the American administration is exploiting and threatening them. The US did actually shut down the PLO office in Washington and refused to renew its licence, and therefore it is urging the parties to understand the circumstances and situation and to accept the status quo, as well as give in to the changes and respond to the phasic conditions.

However, Hamas and all the Palestinian resistance forces and armed military wings and brigades know that their weapons provide them with immunity, protect them and the people, and keep the enemy at bay. They know that without them, they will become weak, humbled and violated. This would allow the enemy to violate them whenever it wanted, raid their areas if it wants to, and arrest any of its people, as there will be no deterring force or a resistance to confront and deliver blows. Therefore, they will not surrender their weapons nor will they abandon their source of pride and power, regardless of how this would affect the reconciliation, stall what the PA calls empowerment, delay reform, continue the blockade, and intensify sanctions.

Read more: Fewer symbolic gestures and more action is needed for Palestine

The PA believes that Hamas was forced to surrender its control of the Gaza Strip and that it is no longer able to withstand regional and international pressures. It also believes the movement is no longer able to meet the people’s increasing needs, which are basic needs that cannot be ignored, and therefore, Ramallah believed that the general situation was not in Hamas’ favour and was more in its own favour, and that the balances of power were leaning more towards it. Hence, it saw an opportunity to push its conditions and be inflexible with its positions.

The PA went far in its rejections and tried to impose new conditions that the majority of Palestinians, as well as their factions and groups, would not accept. They felt that these were not Palestinian conditions, as much as they were Israeli and American conditions, as the Israeli government is trying to use the reconciliation to achieve something it has failed to do by means of invasion, raids and weapons, taking advantage of the blockade imposed on Gaza, the political harassment of Hamas and the fact that its financial sources have dried up.

In the face of this reality, which seems to be a dead end or impasse, as the resistance cannot surrender its weapons, while, at the same time, the PA cannot pass a purely national agreement that achieves Palestinian independence and sovereignty, all of the parties will enter a new phase called reconciliation management. They will have to work within the minimal space available to them, without actually transitioning into a real reconciliation or realising a practical translation of its clauses. This phase may last long and new realities might be built upon it that would harm the people and the cause, creating a new reality sought and desired by the occupation. We may not have the power to reject, prevent, or confront this, and we may not find the conditions conducive to its resistance or thwarting it. At that point, we will be the only losers and the ones harmed by this.

This article first appeared in Arabic in Felesteen on 29 November 2017

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.