What does Iran’s Nuclear Policy look like with the new president?

As Iran stands on the brink of electing a new president, the future of its nuclear policy hangs in the balance. The collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) following the United States’ abrupt withdrawal in 2018 has left a profound impact on Iran’s political landscape. The agreement, designed to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions, has been mired in controversy and distrust. Both leading candidates in the presidential run-off, reformist-backed Pezeshkian and ultra-hardliner, Saeed Jalili, offer starkly different visions for Iran’s nuclear policy and its engagement with the world. Understanding their perspectives and potential impacts on Iran’s nuclear trajectory is crucial as the nation navigates this critical juncture.

The JCPOA: From hope to collapse

The JCPOA, signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany), was hailed as a diplomatic triumph. It aimed to curb Iran’s nuclear program and prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, in return for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions. Iran complied by reducing its uranium enrichment levels, dismantling a significant portion of its centrifuges, and allowing extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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However, the deal’s fragility was exposed when President Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the agreement in 2018, re-imposing severe sanctions on Iran. The promised economic benefits did not materialise, leading to widespread disillusionment within Iran. This breach of trust has significantly shaped Iran’s political narrative and public opinion as they show the strategic shift in their opinion on nuclear weapons. Today, Iran justifies the breach of the JCPOA terms by arguing that the other signatories, particularly the US, failed to honour their commitments. This sentiment is not confined to the political elite; it resonates deeply with the Iranian public, which has endured economic hardship without seeing the anticipated relief.

Pezeshkian: A diplomatic approach with a Western outlook while under strain

Mohammad Reza Pezeshkian, backed by reformists, presents a vision of re-engaging with the West and reviving the JCPOA. Pezeshkian’s campaign is heavily influenced by Javad Zarif, Iran’s former foreign minister and the primary negotiator of the original nuclear deal. Zarif, known for his constructivist approach to international relations, emphasises the importance of Iran’s revolutionary discourse and soft power over military might. However, Zarif’s tenure was not without controversy. He was involved in a severe dispute with Qassem Soleimani and the “axis of resistance”, highlighting internal divisions over Iran’s foreign policy direction.

Pezeshkian’s strategy hinges on the belief that lifting sanctions and re-entering the JCPOA will stabilise Iran’s economy and enhance its international standing. If Pezeshkian wins the election, he will pursue reviving the JCPOA based on the approach of normalising ties with the West, which can be a window of opportunity for the West to slightly distance Iran from China and Russia by offering Iran a good deal. However, it is naive for the western powers if they think Iran will go back to 3/67 per cent uranium enrichment, which was agreed in the JCPOA.

Pezeshkian’s approach faces substantial internal and external challenges. Domestically, the Iranian parliament is dominated by hardliners who view the JCPOA with suspicion and hostility. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who holds ultimate authority over foreign policy, remains sceptical about Western intentions and is wary of repeating “past mistakes”.

Externally, the geopolitical landscape has shifted since the JCPOA’s inception. The US-Iran relationship is fraught with distrust, and the Biden administration, while expressing willingness to re-enter the deal, faces its own set of domestic and international pressures. Moreover, the recent advancements in Iran’s nuclear capabilities have changed the dynamics, making a simple return to the original terms of the JCPOA unlikely. Pezeshkian’s potential presidency would thus involve navigating a complex web of political resistance and strategic recalculations.

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Jalili: A hard-line stance with an Eastern pivot

In stark contrast, Saeed Jalili, an ultra-hardliner and former chief nuclear negotiator (2007-2013), advocates for a more confrontational approach. Jalili perceives the JCPOA as a disarmament treaty that compromised Iran’s sovereignty and security. He and his allies argue that the sanctions, rather than being purely detrimental, can be leveraged to foster internal resilience on condition of minimising corruption within the system. One of Jalili’s closest allies, Abolfazl Zohrevand, an Iranian diplomat and current MP from Tehran, often states that “it was God who pushed Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA”, reflecting a narrative of divine intervention and resistance.

Jalili’s foreign policy is characterised by a pivot towards Eastern alliances, particularly with China and Russia. He believes that these relationships offer strategic counter-balances to Western pressure and hostility. Jalili’s stance is influenced by his close ties with Qassem Soleimani and the “axis of resistance”, underscoring a commitment to regionalism and a strong defensive posture.

Should Jalili win the presidency, Iran’s nuclear policy is likely to take a more defiant turn. He supports maintaining Iran’s nuclear threshold capability, arguing that this is essential for national security in the face of perceived Western aggression. Jalili views the ideological conflict with the US as a fundamental and intractable issue, necessitating a robust military and nuclear deterrent. His administration would likely continue to enrich uranium at higher levels, pushing the boundaries of the JCPOA and increasing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran. If the EU3 activates the snapback mechanism, re-imposing Security Council sanctions, it could lead Iran to consider changing its military doctrine. As Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to the Supreme Leader, told Al-Jazeera, “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb, but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine.”

As Iran elects its new president, the nation’s nuclear policy stands at a critical crossroads. The collapse of the JCPOA has left a legacy of mistrust and strategic recalibration. Pezeshkian offers a diplomatic route fraught with internal and external obstacles, while Jalili’s hardline stance promises a more confrontational and potentially perilous path. The outcome of this election will not only shape Iran’s future but also test the resilience of global non-proliferation efforts and the stability of the Middle East. The international community must navigate these developments with caution, balancing pressure with diplomacy to avoid escalating tensions and ensuring a path towards sustainable peace and security.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.