3 messages portrayed to the world by choosing Sinwar to succeed Haniyeh

The assassination of the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, in the Iranian capital, Tehran, on 31 July, raised a storm of questions about its potential repercussions on the paths of the war in Gaza and the regional confrontation associated with it, the negotiations issue, and the internal situation of the Movement and its relationship with the outside world. However, Hamas’s choice of its head in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, to succeed Ismail Haniyeh, gives a clear glimpse of how the Movement will manage its strategy in the war from now on.

This choice, although it seemed surprising to many who expected a figure from the Movement’s political wing to assume this position for various reasons, appears to be a natural result of the assassination of Haniyeh, and the new course that the war has taken after the recent Israeli escalation, and the increase in its regional risks.

The Movement’s internal reasons as a major factor in this choice suggests that Sinwar, who is seen as the engineer of the 7 October attack, is still effectively leading the Resistance on the ground. This is despite the many months that have passed since the war, as Israel, with all its advanced military, intelligence and espionage capabilities, is unable to reach him and assassinate him. It also shows the confidence that both of the Movement’s wings, the political and military, have in Sinwar as a strong figure capable of managing Hamas, both at home and abroad in times of war.

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His selection for this task was also a need for the Movement to demonstrate cohesion between its two wings: the military at home, and the political abroad in order to refute allegations that the Israelis sought to raise, about a division between its military and political wings, about Sinwar’s isolation from the outside world and about the existence of conflicts within the Movement over the succession of Haniyeh. The selection of Sinwar carries within it three prominent messages from the Hamas Movement.

A message of cohesion and defiance to Israel

In addition to demonstrating internal cohesion at the level of the relationship between its wings in Gaza and abroad, the selection of Sinwar sends a message of defiance to the Occupation, stating that the Movement is still strong and capable of producing new leadership to cope with the challenges imposed by the new phase of the war after the assassination of Haniyeh.

While Israel managed to assassinate the head of the Movement’s Political Bureau abroad in order to hinder the Resistance’s resolve in Gaza, and to showcase its military and intelligence capabilities in order to restore its concept of its deterrence, which was cracked after the 7 October attack, it will now have to confront Sinwar, not only as the engineer of the Al-Aqsa Flood or the leader of the Resistance on the ground, but also as the political leader of Hamas.

A message of humiliation to Netanyahu

Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, promoted the assassination of Haniyeh – even if he did not acknowledge responsibility for it – as part of a display of Israel’s ability to assassinate senior ranking leaders in Hamas’s political wing, such as Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh Al-Arouri, to fulfil his promises to eliminate Hamas’s senior political and military leaders, and to compensate for his failure to achieve victory in the war.

By choosing Sinwar to succeed Haniyeh, the Movement means to humiliate Netanyahu and exacerbate the internal embarrassment he is facing due to the military and intelligence failure to reach and assassinate Sinwar, whom Israel holds primarily responsible for carrying out the 7 October attack. After this choice, Netanyahu will face great embarrassment in continuing to promote the assassination of Haniyeh and his claims of assassinating the commander-in-chief of the Qassam Brigades, Mohammad Deif, and his deputy, Marwan Issa, as a success in achieving the goals of the war.

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Netanyahu has generally lost much of his standing at home in this war and is widely seen as the person primarily responsible for the strategic impasse Israel has reached. It is not likely that the assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders will help him restore his leadership to the level it was before the war and avoid the heavy political price he will ultimately have to pay.

Strength in negotiations

The late Ismail Haniyeh was seen as a driving force within Hamas’s political wing to reach a deal to end the war. It is self-evident that his assassination was designed, in part, to undermine the chances of reaching such a deal. Something that Hamas, many Israelis who want the return of the detainees and the US agree on is that Netanyahu alone is obstructing an agreement to end the war.

In fact, the assassination of Haniyeh clearly demonstrated the deception practiced by Netanyahu in the negotiations to evade the deal and prolong the war for as long as possible. Choosing Sinwar as Haniyeh’s successor sends three messages from Hamas regarding the negotiations file. The first is that it is no longer prepared to proceed with these negotiations as long as Netanyahu continues to deceive the world in them. The second is that the Movement’s final word in the negotiations is determined by the Resistance on the ground. The third is that the mediators will have to deal with Sinwar from now on to determine the frameworks of any possible deal in the future.

Hamas’s main priority, ending the Israeli massacre in the Gaza Strip and reaching a deal that preserves the strategic gains made by the Palestinian cause after 7 October, will remain in place regardless of the potential implications of Sinwar’s selection as the leader of its Political Bureau. Sinwar’s selection for this position is designed to maximise the chances of achieving such an outcome.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.