The Philadelphi Corridor proposal is a trap that can explode at the Egyptian border

The Philadelphi Corridor has become an important part of the ongoing negotiations under Egyptian, Qatari and US mediation to agree a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists that Israel will not withdraw from the border corridor between Gaza and Egypt.

Hamas, meanwhile, insists on a complete Israeli withdrawal from the enclave, thus putting strategic pressure on the Egyptians, given that the corridor is a buffer zone under the peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

With the approach of the first anniversary of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October, negotiations seem to be stumbling as the issue of the Philadelphi Corridor — 14 kilometres in length and 100 metres wide — remains unresolved.

The devil lies in the detail, and the detail of the newly-proposed Philadelphi map represents a booby trap which can explode at any moment. It puts negotiations in danger and imposes a new reality on the border, which may have serious repercussions for Egypt’s national security as Netanyahu insists on keeping it under his control.

The proposal and map adopted by Israel’s Security Cabinet, and voted against only by Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, causing a rift between him and Netanyahu, allows for the repositioning of the Israeli army along the corridor through operational points, watchtowers, heavily-armed forces and air cover if necessary. In general, they represent pressure not only on the Palestinian resistance groups, but also on the Egyptian army.

The presence of Israeli forces at the border between Gaza and Egypt imposes new rules of engagement.

It violates the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel agreed as part of the Camp David Accords, which means more tension and increased risks at the border.

The Israelis are keeping secret the size of the proposed deployment of troops in the Philadelphi Corridor, the arms they will carry and the nature of the monitoring missions. Israel also desires to expand the buffer zone deeper inside Palestine.

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The ongoing discussions address several points, including placing remote sensors, operating and control systems, mechanisms for reporting violations, full access to information and surveillance cameras, and freedom of movement against infiltration and penetration operations, which are specific details that are causing tension between the Israelis and the Egyptians.

A preliminary reading of the proposal shows that Netanyahu wants to besiege the Palestinian factions and tighten control over the Gaza Strip from the south by controlling the Philadelphi Corridor, stopping any infiltration through underground border tunnels, and ensuring disarmament in the area. He also wants to control the Netzarim axis in the middle of the Gaza Strip, to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its capabilities.

The Israeli plan disregards the understandings of the Philadelphi Agreement signed by Israel with Egypt in 2005, as a security annex to the Camp David Accords, which allowed the transfer of control over Area D, which includes the Philadelphi Corridor, to the Palestinian Authority. The agreement was reached after the Israeli Knesset agreed in 2004 to withdraw all Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, a decision which came into effect in August 2005.

Egypt completely rejects the Israeli proposal that talks about the presence and deployment of Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor.

This may lead to Cairo becoming more rigid in the negotiations that have been ongoing for months.

According to the US website Axios, Egyptian officials have rejected this plan, and informed the US and Israel that the map as proposed is not feasible. A few days ago, Cairo News Channel, which is close to Egyptian intelligence, quoted a senior source as saying that Egypt will not accept any Israeli presence at the Rafah crossing or the Philadelphi Corridor, which the Israeli army occupied in May as part of its war against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

A political expert on Palestinian affairs, Mohamed Gamal, told me that the decision to remain in the corridor and draw up maps of the Israeli forces’ presence, along with the decision to appoint an Israeli military governor for the Strip under the pretext of supervising humanitarian affairs, indicate several things: the occupation state is ready to stay in Gaza for a long time; the intention is to disrupt any ceasefire agreement; it wants to prevent a prisoner exchange deal; and it wants to impose a new reality on Egypt, even though the presence of the occupation army in Rafah is already contrary to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

If Netanyahu succeeds in achieving these goals, Egypt will have to give in to the new reality on the ground and accept a booby-trapped area along its borders. Egypt may be caught in the crossfire or in border clashes, which may likely lead to its involvement in future conflicts, especially since the Palestinian resistance will target the occupation forces in the Philadelphi Corridor.

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Egypt’s weak position since the beginning of the war on Gaza, and its identification with the Israeli desire to eradicate Hamas, which Cairo considers part of the Muslim Brotherhood and classifies as a terrorist organisation, encouraged Netanyahu to try to create a new reality in Rafah and the corridor, which may be difficult to change without both secret and public concessions. These might be related to joint monitoring operations of the axis or perhaps pushing Egypt to agree to participate in the security administration of the Gaza Strip on the “day after” the war.

Israeli newspapers reported that Egypt and the UAE agree to participate in peacekeeping forces in Gaza, as part of the arrangements for the “day after”, if the Palestinian Authority requests them to do so. This coincided with negotiations conducted by a delegation from the Israeli Mossad with Egyptian intelligence officials in the city of El Alamein on 5 August, and with the visit of UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed to El Alamein to meet with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.

Alternatives remain limited, given Netanyahu’s cunning approach, which has sent the ceasefire negotiations back to square one. He has even got the Egyptians involved and entangled further in complications caused by the proposal for the Philadelphi Corridor, resulting in a volatile situation that can explode in everyone’s face.

It may seem that the Israeli presence in the corridor will be in Tel Aviv’s favour, but the high cost of securing it, and the level of expected losses, suggest that it will turn into a hot spot, perhaps even a metaphorical swamp for the occupation army as well as the Egyptians, who may be drawn into the conflict at any moment.

There may also be a wave of forced displacement of Palestinians to the Egyptian Sinai.

According to political researcher Amr Al-Masry, possible tactics that Egypt can resort to whereby it can be tough with Israel include diplomatic and military steps such as stopping security coordination with the occupation, freezing normalisation between the two countries, recalling the Egyptian Ambassador from Tel Aviv, and resorting to international courts to accuse the occupation of violating the Camp David Accords. This could force Netanyahu to withdraw his controversial Philadelphi proposal.

However, observers do not rule out the possibility of the Sisi regime approving the proposal and adapting to it, with US support, and perhaps UAE support as well, while granting Cairo secret privileges, military and economic, and security and intelligence coordination at the highest level regarding the management of the corridor. Such a deal may match the interests of both parties, even if temporarily, provided that Tel Aviv commits to withdrawing from the corridor after completing its arrangements in Gaza.

Yedioth Ahronoth quoted Netanyahu on Monday as saying that Washington and Cairo agreed to his proposal, to which Gallant responded by saying that it is not up to them but up to Yahya Sinwar, the head of the Hamas political bureau since Ismail Haniyeh’s murder by Israel at the end of July.

Other options are being discussed, of course. They include the US proposal presented by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, which stipulates the presence of solely international forces in the Philadelphi Corridor for six months, with US and Palestinian forces affiliated with the Palestinian Authority at the Rafah crossing, if Israel withdraws completely from the Gaza Strip at that time.

In any case, Israel wants to trap the people of Gaza between the Philadelphi Corridor and Netzarim axis and to cut them off completely by controlling the only land border with Egypt. The latter will face geopolitical risks and dire consequences that may put its national security on the very edge of a very volatile situation.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.