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Is Iran about to let go of its regional allies, from Yemen to Lebanon? Could it actually do that?

October 10, 2024 at 8:00 am

A massive billboard is replaced with a new display reading, ‘If you want war, we are masters of war,’ featuring visuals of the Iran’s missile attacks on Israel, in Enqelab Square, Tehran, Iran on October 3, 2024 [Fatemeh Bahrami – Anadolu Agency]

Social media is rife with conspiracy theories focused on how Iran sold out its allies, from the late Ismail Haniyeh to the late Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Similar theories also surround the exploding pagers and wireless devices that killed and injured thousands in Lebanon. In both cases, it all comes down to an alleged Iranian conspiracy against its own allies—absurd as it might sound, but it is already believed by many. The claims allege that Iran is already, secretly, negotiating with the United States and others to normalise ties and, as a goodwill  gesture, it has already handed over key allies like Hamas and Hezbollah, to start with. The allegations also include that Iran is seeking an end to the crippling sanctions to be lifted and its nuclear deal to be activated against.  Some conspiracy theorists go all the way to suggest that, in the end, Iran, as a Shia power, will have its hands free to impose Shiism on the entire region.

Leaving this grandiose mother of all theories until later, let us examine if Tehran is, indeed, about to give up its allies and what it will get in return.

Many such theories are being well pushed into the wider public space using tactics as fake news and outright lies even discussed on TV talks shows and, in many cases, particularly in the Gulf States.

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In fact, the other day on the news bar of an Arabic major TV station, known for being pro-Israel, a news item read something like this “Iranian President says he has no problem negotiating with the US.” Such fake news is well-grounded in the fact that Iran has just had its new President who is definitely in the process of setting his foreign policy agenda, both regional and international.

First and foremost, it should be said the Israeli penetration of Iran’s security and that of its allies is not new, deep and wide. Over the last two decades, Israel’s Mossad successfully carried out complicated operations inside Iran, including assassinations, theft of sensitive documents related to Iran’s nuclear program and sabotage. Then came the admission by the Iranian former President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that the entire Iranian counter-Mossad intelligence unit were agents of Mossad.

All that aside, along with the sectarian aspect of the debate, the central questions here are about Tehran’s relations with its regional allies and how far is Tehran willing to go in using them as bargaining chips in any secret talks with the West to, say, normalise ties between the two sides? More specifically, is Iran willing to give up its support for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Houthis and Iraqi’ Kata’ib Hezbollah?

Like any country, Iran is always willing to negotiate issues to achieve goals and protect its interests in a peaceful and less confrontational manner. Making behind-the-scene deals are always part of international relations, just as having allies and proxies are also increasingly dominant in inter-state relations, particularly in the dangerous and volatile Middle East.

But deal-making is a long and precarious process, depending on the issue at hand. A good example of this is Iran’s negations with the West to reach the 2015 nuclear deal, which former President Donald Trump tore up in 2018. Negotiators have to compromise to reach an agreement and such compromises, the essential details of deal-making, involve giving up certain demands while sticking to others—leading us to the simple question: what would Iran demand for it to sever its ties to any of its regional allies?

The prices Iran will ask for to, say, stop all dealings with Hezbollah in Lebanon are likely to be beyond what the US, i.e. Israel, could accept. In the real world, Iran does not pose any serious threat to the US, which the US cannot deal with on its own without any Israeli help. But the US’ Middle East policy has been, and will always be, what is best for Israel, regardless if the same is good for the US.

In any negotiations over its regional alliances, Tehran is likely to ask for the maximum, including the lifting of both economic and financial sanctions imposed by the West and particularly the US over the years. Tehran will also demand lifting of the oil embargo imposed on it by other side, even though the oil sanctions have all but became useless, as major oil consumers like China never stopped buying Iranian oil. Such a price tag is more than what Tel Aviv can allow after what happened over the last year of war and destruction.

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When it comes to Tehran’s alliance with Hamas, any negotiations are likely to become even more complicated and protracted. Hamas is only a small part of the overall issue of Palestine, whose independence has always been Iranian regional policy. Militarily, Hamas has been seriously hurt after a year-long Israel onslaught, but the very idea of resisting Israel will always be part of the Palestinian DNA, unless the Occupation ends.

The least Iran could demand, under the current circumstances or less severe-future ones, is some kind of international protection for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, for instance. Demanding US recognition of a Palestinian State, for example, would become de-facto outcome. Neither Israel nor the US could ever accept giving Iran or any other country that much. But, again, what Iran is ready to give up in order to hand-over its allies to the US, i.e. to Israel, are much more that what Israel and US could ever accept.

Similar and maybe slightly different demands are likely to be made by Iran to, say, hand over its alliance in Iraq or Yemen for that matter. In any normalisation of relations in exchange for a complete revamp of Tehran’s regional relations and polices, it is Tehran that stands to lose the least while Washington and Tel Aviv have to give up great deal.

Another basic question arises here: can Iran really give up its allies even if it gets what it wants?

Of course, not!

Tehran’s regional allies are, in practice, defensive outposts for Iran against present enemies like Israel and potential future ones. This does not mean organisations like Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis, for example, are Iranian proxies who act only on Tehran’s orders. This silly assumption is not even worth discussing. In Yemen, the problem there predates any alleged Iranian meddling while, in Palestine, the case for resistance against the Occupation has been there since Iran was an Israeli ally before it turned into foe after the Shah was toppled, despite all the American protection he had.

In the case of Iraq it was, essentially, an American policy error that made Tehran an important player in the country. The situation in Iraq today and Iran’s influence is a direct consequence of the US’ 2003 invasion and, unless the US puts Iraq where it was before 2003, it will never weaken Iran’s leverage.

Finally, why should Iran even bother to negotiate, unless it is certain that its demands will be met—something neither present genocidal Israel, nor a future one, can ever sign up to.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.