Does Sharaa’s Syria reflect Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ or Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’?

Since the end of the Cold War, two grand theories have shaped discussions on global political evolution: the late Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and his former student, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and The Last Man. Such has been their legacy that they have often been regarded as opposing theories, replacing the capitalism-vs-communism debate.

Yet both have faced significant criticism over the years. Huntington’s thesis, which posited that post-Cold War conflicts would be shaped primarily by cultural and religious divides, has been derided as overly simplistic, reducing civilisations to rigid, monolithic entities. Meanwhile, Fukuyama’s confident assertion that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism represented the ultimate, universal model for human governance has been challenged increasingly by the persistence of authoritarianism and alternative economic models, most notably in China and Russia. Yet, despite their apparent shortcomings, both frameworks find renewed relevance in the case of post-Assad Syria under the leadership of former rebel, interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa.

While the Syrian Civil War has had multiple dimensions — sectarian, political and geopolitical — its resolution has given rise to a government that defies conventional classifications. For the first time since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Taliban’s second takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, what is essentially an Islamist government has emerged in the region; it’s the first of its kind in the Arab world. However, notable differences exist; beyond Iran’s status as a Shia theocracy, the Taliban has expressed hope that the new Syrian government will “lay the foundations of a sovereign and service-oriented Islamic government.”

Al-Sharaa has pointed out that there are “many differences” between Syria and the Taliban. “The way we govern is different.”

He has also acknowledged his Al-Qaeda past, and now leads a state that is shedding decades of Baathist secularism in favour of governance rooted in Islamic principles. This trajectory is notable because it exemplifies the kind of identity-driven political realignment that Huntington foresaw, albeit with significant caveats.

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Huntington argued that the post-Cold War world would be primarily defined by conflicts along civilisational lines, particularly between the Islamic world and the West. Critics have long pointed out that this framework ignores intra-civilisational conflicts and the fluidity of cultural identities. Syria’s case illustrates these complexities.

The post-Assad government has not been engaged in direct confrontation with the West (or Israel), but has instead sought pragmatic engagement. Moreover, the notion of a monolithic “Islamic civilisation” is challenged by Syria’s political trajectory, which differs markedly from that of Iran, Saudi Arabia or the Taliban’s Afghanistan.

Rather than an inevitable clash between civilisations, Syria’s case highlights the adaptability of political Islam.

At the same time, Syria is also embracing elements of Fukuyama’s vision of free-market capitalism. After decades of economic stagnation under state-led socialism, the Al-Sharaa government has signalled a shift towards neoliberal economic policies. Recent moves include privatising key sectors, courting foreign investment and seeking reintegration into the global economy.

These developments align with Fukuyama’s firm belief that economic liberalisation is a natural endpoint for all societies, but they do not necessarily lead to liberal democracy, as he envisaged originally. Fukuyama noted on The Good Fight podcast in December shortly after the fall of Assad, that, “These authoritarian regimes are much more fragile than they appear… they rule simply by force.” He highlighted how the fall of Assad was emblematic of broader trends in autocracies, where economic mismanagement and internal dissent ultimately lead to collapse. Syria, like China before it, demonstrates that market liberalisation can coexist with authoritarian or non-secular governance.

Fukuyama observed further that, “Economic liberalisation does not necessarily lead to democracy, but it does create conditions where political change becomes more likely.” This insight applies directly to Syria, where the embrace of free-market policies could eventually foster new political dynamics, even if democracy remains distant.

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Beyond Syria there are notable cases that complicate both Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s theories. China has rejected liberal democracy while embracing a form of state-controlled capitalism that has allowed it to challenge Western economic dominance. Russia, too, has maintained a strong centralised state while incorporating elements of the global financial system. Even within the Islamic world, economic liberalisation has taken various forms. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, for instance, is an ambitious effort to diversify the kingdom’s economy while maintaining an authoritarian monarchy.

Developments in post-Assad Syria thus offer a unique case study.

They revive the question of whether cultural and religious identity plays a decisive role in governance, as Huntington argued, while simultaneously validating elements of Fukuyama’s economic predictions. The coexistence of an Islamist government with neoliberal economic policies suggests that the pathways to modernisation and economic development are not uniform, but can be adapted to fit a country’s own history and ideology.

For policymakers and analysts, Syria’s case presents crucial lessons. For one, it challenges the assumption that secularism is a prerequisite for economic modernisation. It also underscores the adaptability of Islamist movements, which are not inherently opposed to market-driven economies.

Whether one agrees with or supports the new Syrian government or not, its emergence forces a reconsideration of the dominant narratives that have shaped post-Cold War geopolitics. Syria under Al-Sharaa is neither a straightforward confirmation of Huntington’s civilisational conflicts nor a full endorsement of Fukuyama’s liberal democratic ideal.

Instead, it represents a hybrid model, one that reflects the evolving nature of governance in a world where ideological boundaries are increasingly fluid. The interplay between political Islam and free-market capitalism in Syria will be a crucial development to watch. As in Turkiye, which now wields considerable influence in Damascus, this dynamic may signal a broader trend in the future of governance in the Middle East

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.