UK recognised Hamas’s right to armed resistance 32 years ago, British documents reveal

The United Kingdom not only engaged in direct dialogue with Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 32 years ago, but also acknowledged the Palestinian group’s right to armed resistance, recently released British documents reveal.

According to records I obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, British diplomats held secret discussions with Hamas representatives in London and the Middle East. The documents indicate that these meetings provoked strong reactions from both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which sought to tarnish Hamas’s image.

On 10 February 1993, during a meeting at his official residence, British Ambassador to Jordan Patrick H.C. Eyers informed a Hamas delegation that, as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, the UK “could not condone” Hamas’s use of violence in the occupied territories. However, he acknowledged that Hamas was acting “legally within their rights”, while also noting that their actions “contributed to the cycle of violence which made more difficult the resolution of the conflict by peaceful, political means.”

The meeting was set-up at Hamas’s request and was attended by Ibrahim Ghosheh, the movement’s representative abroad, Mohammed Nazzal, Hamas’s representative in Jordan, and Karen Wheatley, the embassy’s security officer. Ghosheh described Hamas as a liberation movement dedicated to freeing Palestinians from Israeli occupation, emphasising the group had not operated outside Palestine and “had no plans to extend its activities beyond Palestine.” He insisted that Hamas’s attacks targeted only Israeli soldiers.

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At the time, Hamas played a key role in the First Intifada (1987–1993), a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that ultimately led to the signing of the Oslo I Accords between Israel and the PLO in September 1993. Due to its growing influence, Israel deported 418 members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement (IJM) to Marj Al-Zuhur in Lebanon in December 1992, an action that drew international condemnation.

During the meeting, Ghosheh criticised Israel for “exceeding internationally acceptable bounds by the use of force” and called on the UK “to take steps” to support the Palestinian cause. He noted that the UK “was known for its support of just causes”. When asked about Hamas’s stance on the peace process, Nazzal clarified that while Hamas “was not opposed to peace per se”, it rejected “the terms of reference of the current peace process”. He argued that the process seeks to deal with Palestinians “as a population and not as a people.”

Eyers told the Hamas representatives that the UK agreed with their position on key issues, including “the status of the occupied territories, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination.” However, he emphasised that the UK disagreed with Hamas on the means of achieving these goals, stressing the importance of peaceful solutions. The ambassador noted that the positive press coverage that the Palestinians received in the early days of the Intifada “enabled politicians in the West to take an interest in the issue of Palestinian rights.” But he also warned that the increasing use of firearms by the Palestinian resistance “limited the politicians’ room to maneuvre”, and that any moves which confirmed Western prejudices of Palestinians “could only damage their cause”.

Following the meeting, Wheatley observed that Hamas leaders were well spoken and “seemed keen to emphasize common ground and not antagonize” the ambassador.

In London, a dispute emerged within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) between the Security Coordination Department (SCD) and the Middle East Department (MED) regarding Hamas’s classification. The SCD, which maintained security contacts with Israel and other countries, viewed the Palestinian movement as an organisation with a “terrorist wing”, The MED disagreed, arguing that Hamas’s attacks were largely confined to Israeli military and paramilitary targets in the occupied territories and that the resistance group “has never mounted an international terrorist operation nor a cross-border raid into Israel from abroad.”

Israeli and pro-Israel media outlets alleged that Hamas was planning attacks on Western targets, but the SCD found that “none of this is substantiated” adding that Israel and the PLO “have an interest in blackening the reputation of Hamas”. Their purpose, the SCD argued, was “making life difficult for the supporters of the organization both at home and overseas.”

After further analysis, the UK’s security agencies concluded no “great deal of credence” could be attached to media allegations that Hamas was planning to attack Western interests. Meanwhile, after contacts with the Israelis, the agencies concluded that “there was nothing to substantiate the Israeli claims that Hamas supporters  in the UK play a pivotal role in supporting violence within Israel and the occupied territories.”

In the United States, pro-Israel newspapers echoed Israeli claims that Hamas had established a “safe haven” on American soil, with its central command operating from within the US. However, a top-secret cable from the British Embassy in Washington to the FCO dismissed these allegations as an “apparent Israeli attempt to divert the attention of the American public” from the controversy surrounding the deportation of Hamas and IJM members to Marj Al-Zuhur.

The embassy’s assessment was based on communication with Ronald Schilcher, director of the US State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism. Schilcher confirmed that Israel was “patently trying to make something out of nothing” and noted that while approximately 20 Hamas activists were present in the US, the FBI “were keeping a close eye” on them. He specifically mentioned Dr. Mousa Abu Marzouk, a Hamas leader residing in the US at the time after obtaining a doctorate in construction management from the University of Colorado. While Schilcher said that Abu Marzouk could be described as part of Hamas’s political leadership, he dismissed Israeli claims that he controlled Hamas operations from abroad as “nonsense”. The US security official confirmed that Abu Marzouk’s interactions with Hamas members in Palestine were primarily focused on presenting Hamas’s case to the American public.

In the UK, the SCD estimated that there were about 100 active Hamas members, mostly students dissatisfied with the PLO’s moderate stance. Mark Canning, head of SCD, confirmed that “there was no information to substantiate” Israeli claims that Hamas leaders in the UK are directing terrorist operations in the occupied territories

The UK invited Israeli authorities to provide evidence supporting their claims, but Israel failed to do so.

The PLO strongly objected to the UK’s contacts with Hamas. A few days after the ambassador’s meeting with Hamas representatives, Dr. Asaad Abdel Rahman, member of the National Council and the Central Executive Committee of the PLO, informed Eyers that he had received “an agitated telephone” call from PLO leader Yasser Arafat who expressed “concern and irritation” over Western countries engaging with Hamas while refusing dialogue with the PLO.

In response, Eyers made several key points:

• The UK government would not justify whom its representatives chose to talk to.
• The claim that the UK avoided contact with the PLO was untrue, as UK diplomats were in regular contact with PLO officials in Jordan and Tunis, including Arafat himself.
• It was wrong to suppose that some hidden political purpose lay behind his receiving Hamas representatives.
•  The meeting was held at the request of Hamas representatives residing in Jordan and Hamas are part of the political scene in the country.
• It was important not to cut off groups like Hamas from ideas challenging their own.
• The UK remained committed to the peace process and made clear to Hamas that violence undermined the Palestinian cause.
• The UK intended to maintain lower-level contact with Hamas as part of its broader diplomatic engagement in Jordan.

In Washington, the US State Department echoed Palestinian negotiators’ concerns about Western engagement with Hamas. Faisal Al-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, members of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace talks, criticised Western countries for their willingness to talk to Hamas while some of them refused to engage with the PLO.

According to counterterrorism officials and the Jordan Affairs Department of the US State Department, Al-Husseini and Ashrawi said “it was very strange for them [Western countries] to have contacts with a terrorist movement that opposed the peace process.”

After internal discussions, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd instructed UK diplomats not to follow any US decisions regarding Hamas. In a top-secret telegram, Hurd authorised the British ambassador in Jordan and the UK consul in Jerusalem to “maintain working-level contacts” with Hamas.

In December 1993, another round of talks took place in London between Hamas leader Mohammed Nazzal and Janet Hancock, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Research and Analysis Department. Nazzal predicted that the Gaza-Jericho First Accord would collapse due to its failure to address Palestinian sovereignty and independence. Hamas “didn’t need to take any drastic action to scupper” the Accord, he said.

Nazzal emphasised that Hamas was keen to “have a dialogue with the British government in order to present Hamas’s views.”

Hancock noted that while Hamas remained committed to armed resistance, and considered itself a Palestinian nationalist organisation “with an appeal beyond the narrow Islamic constituency”, she believed that Hamas lacked a “vision for the lives of Palestinians” post-liberation.

In her conclusion, Hancock said the failure of the PLO to deliver any tangible gains on the ground as result of its policies is “one of Hamas’s strongest cards”. While this situation remains, Hamas “will prosper”. But if the situation changes the support the group enjoys “could fade, unless in the meantime it comes up with a credible alternative programme,” she explained.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.