Syria: Either a revolutionary victory or the fall of the regime

All the parties participating in the Geneva conference (the West, Russia and the Syrian regime) and the Iranians did not embark on this step without considering the implications of what would come after. After the opposition split as expected during the talks, which will not stop now despite their obvious failure, it will undoubtedly realign and reposition many of its stances in a way that is compatible with the regime and the West’s suggestions; a way that will make “fighting terrorism” its main objective.

As usual, this infection will move on to affect some of the organisations fighting against the regime. It would not be surprising if we learned that some branches of the Free Syrian Army realigned their position by creating an alliance with the regime. Some members of the opposition, the ones that were formerly bandits and gang members will work in collusion with the regime and agree to hand over territories in the remote parts of the country. The thugs in the opposition brigades are willing to change their loyalties or affiliations and, as result, the West will consider them worthy of receiving weapons.

As for the moderate Islamic opposition brigades, there will be attempts to dissolve them by way of promising financial support and rewards and they will also be distracted from their main goal because of the emergence of new enemies (born out of new alliances). Not to mention the fact that internal clashes within the opposition occurred due to the failure of military leaders to formulate a strong political partnership with one another.

Due to the lack of a military project and the loss of a common political goal, these moderate Islamic brigades will gradually slip into working for militias. The biggest loss that will come out of all of this is the loss of precious time. The time invested in intervening in Syria had led to no concrete results. Pain in Syria will be amplified as the elements of this conflict spiral further out of control.

After the expected failure of Geneva II occurs, the brigades of this conflict will line-up on the battlefield once again and slowly but surely militia practices, which are supported by militia economics, will diffuse into the brigades because finances function as a key catalyst for changes in a conflict. This is what normally happens in long-lasting armed conflicts and it seems that this time, not only will easily swayed brigades be affected, but everyone as a whole.

Thus, soon we will find that moderate Islamic groups, the Salafists or other factions in the Free Syrian Army will be swayed by outside finances that give them the promising notion of more political independence. As a result of these new factors, foreign supporters of the conflict in Syria will find that they will have less influence and control over the areas they once tried to implement their policies and as such, everyone will enter into new internal conflicts. A fiasco will ensue and rebellious brigades will engage in more dirty work by carrying out political assassinations, kidnappings and theft in the midst of the chaos.

As for the military’s formal bodies, they will search for more loyal followers (not to unify the direction their guns are pointed, as they claim) and this is what it has been doing since the war begun. They will always find people who are willing to point their gun in another direction and change parties due to the level of chaos. The countries involved in this conflict will find that the individuals who are willing to change their political affiliations and loyalties are at the heart of this chaos because they have learned how to master the game that was imposed on them by outside forces. Moreover, once these rebels change their affiliations they consider those who were once their teachers as just another party in the greater picture.

Moreover, Al-Qaeda’s factions will gain more influence and power and it will seek to gain full control of new areas in order to implement its organisational ideologies. This is one of the things that will push us into a conflict with all revolutionary groups and in every way possible. We began to see the possibilities of such changes with the rise of Daash in Iraq. The rise of such groups gives the West much pleasure because they believe that we will beg them to interfere and defeat such groups so that they will no longer be present on Syrian soil.

When it comes to the regime, it is evident that its army has become a minor player within the greater conflict and the army’s influence and power will fade away within the year if the conflict continues as is. The regime is now closer to the militias than it is to the state and its military organisations in all parts of the country now consist of a mixture of militias within the national army, popular committees and organisations as well as intelligence groups. Everyone is involved in the looting and kidnapping that characterise the objectives of these militias. It has become a financially rewarding career to fight alongside the sectarian system.

For this reason, the regime’s control over these militias will gradually weaken; this is happening now. Even if the regime falls today, these militias will maintain their control over various parts of the country; however, they will be forced to confront each other in the same way that they will be forced to confront Iran’s allies, in an armed conflict that will affect everyone. The armed conflict will continue even when the regime loses its ability to control these independent militias.

As for the regime’s allies that are fighting with it today, countries such as Iran will become a direct player in the conflict in a matter of a year or even a month. Iran will not become a direct player because it fears that its withdrawal from the equation will lead to the collapse of the Syrian regime, which is an outcome that is not desired by the West (contrary to what some might imagine), but because Iran’s presence in Syria will reach a point that will make it impossible for the Syrian regime to get rid of them even if they wanted to (which will not happen). The increasing presence of Iranian volunteers seeks to fill the void left by Iran’s unexpected losses in Lebanon and Iraq.

In this way, Iran will become a direct player in the region that will be impossible to avoid. Iran will use Syria as its playing card to implement its vision for the region and this will undoubtedly lead all the countries in the region, especially the Gulf countries, to an initiative to reach an agreement with the West and Iran.

Iraq and Lebanon will also lose their historically unprecedented opportunity to sever Iran’s influence in their countries via the fall of the Syrian regime. Instead, both countries will become an extension of Iran’s influence over the region in a way that they have never been before. This will later lead to a full explosion of conflicts within Iraq and Lebanon, which will give Iran the perfect opportunity to take advantage of the chaos. Over time, even the militias affiliated with Iran in Syria will begin to set up independent zones of influence within the country (with the consent of their Iranian friends) and they will enter into conflicts alongside their Alawite allies.

All of these possible scenarios represent the narrow tunnel that the Syrian revolution has entered and how it will affect the entire region in no more than a year’s time. The revolution will need years before it will be able to find a way out of these scenarios and decades before the region, in its entirety, will overcome its disastrous effects. We will not be able to find an end to the conflict in Syria, at least not in the way we desire.

The countries of the Arab Gulf will not be able to save themselves from this huge Iranian victory. Everyone will entire into the narrow tunnel leading to a greater conflict as we lose precious time in our attempt to find a suitable solution to the Syrian crisis. This solution seeks to bring an end to the revolution and completely dissolve the opposition in all of its ranks and, at best, we will find ourselves living in a system based on minority rule (very much like the one in Yemen) with Bashar Al-Assad as a temporary ruler.

In this moment of fatigue, these are the expectations and the outcomes that are desired by the West, the regime and all of its allies. It is for the reasons mentioned above that the regime was left to do all that it has done. This is the moment that will be born out of the very long drama that is Geneva II, which will insure the survival of the regime no matter what the cost.

There are no issues arising from waiting until the Syrian revolution dies out, as the Syrian people grow more tired because they will ultimately fall into the same political trap as the one that is being designed by Geneva II. The West might also try to impose a solution similar to the Bosnian scenario or surprise us with yet another UN-drafted resolution; however, in the end the Bosnian-style plan will ensure the survival of the regime in the event that the Yemeni model fails. The regime’s survival is the main concern of the Geneva II conference.

The Bosnian model will cause the majority to lose its rights and any sense of justice, thereby giving the Alawites and other minorities the greatest zones of influence including natural resources (access to the sea, gas, oil and water). Damascus will become the weak centre, which will be seized and controlled by all parties. As for the Sunni federations, they will weaken due to the lack of access to economic and natural resources and they will be forced to affiliate themselves with neighbouring countries, rendering them dependent on these countries for their support and guidance.

The only other alternative to a Yemeni or Bosnian style solution, which values Iran and Al-Assad regimes’ interests, is for the Gulf countries and Turkey to muster up the courage to approach the situation in a new and unprecedented way. They must build up an alliance with the real forces of the revolution so that the only possible outcome is a military overthrow of the regime in the event that another more suitable solution is not possible.

In the end, the main goal or priority is to rid ourselves of Al-Assad’s regime before it is too late; even if it means that some chaos might ensue. For the cost of addressing the consequences of chaos will be far less than the cost of the regime’s survival and Iran’s victory.

Translated for Al Jazeera net, 18 March 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.