Globalisation and the fight against ISIS

The British Parliament’s decision to endorse David Cameron’s strategy against ISIS is regrettable. This is not because there is anything even remotely salvageable about that murderous, barbaric, pseudo-Islamist organisation – or its terrorisation of Syrians and Iraqis – but because the launching of yet another bombing campaign in Mesopotamia is likely to be counterproductive in the long run. Moreover, by supporting a military campaign that is likely to spread to Syria soon, Parliament has possibly misread the kind of globalised actor that ISIS represents.

David Cameron said, “This is not a threat on the far side of the world. Left unchecked, we will face a terrorist caliphate on the shores of the Mediterranean and bordering a Nato member, with a declared and proven determination to attack our country and our people. This is not the stuff of fantasy; it is happening in front of us; and we need to face up to it.” He went on to warn that, “This mission will take not just months, but years”.

Putting this decision to a vote might have seemed quite a risk for the Prime Minister who was embarrassed last year when the government was defeated by Labour and a rebellion from Tory backbenchers who opposed bombing the Syrian regime in the aftermath of a chemical weapons strike against civilians. At the time much of the coverage suggested that ‘war weariness’ was to blame for Parliament’s reluctance.

Parliament’s rejection last time eventually had the knock on effect of scuppering the entire American-led march to war, so it is particularly noteworthy that this time the British vote came only after America’s bombing campaign had begun. Also significant is the fact that the government has only asked for the authorization of strikes in Iraq, not Syria, and noted an Iraqi government request for help as justification.

However, ministers have already hinted at a possible extention of the mission to Syria at a later date. Michael Fallon, the defence secretary, said “There is a strong case for action against Islamic State in Syria. Isis is based in Syria. That’s where its headquarters are, that’s where its resources and its people are. They have crossed the border into Iraq and to deal with Isis, you do have to deal and defeat them in both Iraq and in Syria.”

While Tory veteran MP, Kenneth Clarke, seemed to hint that the long term plans remained vague but that Syria would likely be a target eventually “I still think that we are at the early stages of working out exactly where we are going. There is absolutely no doubt that ISIS has to be defeated in both countries.”

Emotion in not a strategy

In the end the vote wasn’t even close and it was the Labour party’s support for the war that made difference. There are perhaps several different ways to analyze the difference between this time and the 2013 decision. Such a change of heart brings to mind the old joke that ‘a liberal is really just a conservative who hasn’t been mugged yet’ – particularly, with reference to the ostensibly left-wing Labour party. Yet, this only partially captures the motivation for war.

Certainly the invitation by Iraq’s government makes a difference in some ways. And perhaps it is easier for the 2013 opponents of war to stomach attacking a non-state actor, as opposed to the Syrian regime, head on. Almost certainly the critical factor, however, was an emotional reaction to the videos released by ISIS of the brutal beheadings of UK and US citizens, earlier this month. Indeed, as former US President Bill Clinton told Charlie Rose, revenge is clearly at least part of the motivation to act on the American side too.

Of course, as I argued last week, it is impossible not to be emotional when one sees that kind of inhumanity being carried out. But we should not confuse legitimate rage and horror with an effective strategy.

Perhaps most significant is the threat that a bombing campaign has the potential of strengthening ISIS by enhancing its legitimacy internationally. As Hassan Hassan argued in the Guardian:

“Isis can afford to lose their supply lines, infrastructure and many of their members – who are likely to be among the ones who recently joined it – as long as they can compensate by achieving popular recognition. They are already adapting to the campaign, reducing checkpoints (now mostly mobile) to a minimum and relocating weapons warehouses to safe areas in both Iraq and Syria.”

Indeed, two additional factors are likely to harm the allies’ legitimacy in the region (possibly leading to even more conflation of anti-imperialism and support for ISIS). First, despite the apparent state of denial enjoyed by US and UK officials, it is almost inevitable that the bombing campaign will help reinforce the Assad regime’s grip on power. If this is the case then it will demonstrate that, despite the ever-present rhetoric of universal humanitarianism (what Marwan Bishara has, in other contexts, neatly dubbed ‘surplus morality‘), Western jets only take to the skies when their own citizens are killed and the images are broadcast around the world.

Second, and perhaps more damning, are some of the allies that we are joining in the war. Most prominent among them is Saudi Arabia, an intensely conservative pseudo-Islamist regime with a devastating human rights record. Indeed, according to the rights group Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia executed 22 people during two weeks in August, and further, at least eight of those executed were beheaded.

In short, this is a bombing campaign undertaken in the name of humanitarianism and security that is almost certainly going to strengthen Assad – in spite of that regime’s horrific crimes – and moreover, it is taking place with the support of one of the world’s most prolific human-rights abusers.

Though I strongly argued against bombing in 2013 (and I stand by that argument) I can, of course, concede that – from a strategic perspective – it is likely to be far worse to act inconsistently (or obviously selectively) than to not act, or act too often.

The grim messages these events send to anyone observing the situation from a distance are that (a) white lives are more important than brown lives, and/or (b) some methods of brutal killing are acceptable while some are not (notwithstanding the apparent Saudi penchant for decapitation).

What to do instead?

Rather, than bombing I suggested that instead, a better approach would be to pursue a menu of other options that are designed to strangle ISIS and its ilk. It is, of course, likely that the coalition will be pursuing many of these possibilities in addition to the bombing campaign, and as a result many would argue that this undermines my case against war.

But this is not the point. My argument was, and remains, that while a strategy of asphyxiation is intended to have the affect of both killing ISIS – albeit perhaps more slowly than many would desire – a bombing campaign will likely harden support for it for other similar groups.

In my view, this is not just a question of how to deal with one organisation – this is a question for the age of globalisation – ISIS draws support from disaffected people from across the world. Moreover its very methods of advertising itself on social media is one that is likely aped from combatants, civil society groups and individuals seeking to draw global attention to their narratives during previous conflicts.

Its support network is multifarious and transnational (amongst a number of other complex networks) and, of course, its goal – the restoration of the caliphate (or at least, the corrupt interpretation it has of the caliphate) – is directly opposed to the status quo of a state-centric international system.

ISIS then, must be seen in a different light. It is not merely ‘a’ threat, or ‘a’ brutal, criminal organisation, in the singular (implying that it might be dealt with and then confined to the dustbin of history). Rather it should be seen as representative of an emergent category of non-state actor that is desperately opposed to the status quo.

Of course, alongside al-Qaeda, ISIS is certainly the worst kind of representative that of non-state actor one can imagine. But the point is this: viewing it through the lens of globalisation changes both how we understand the nature of this threat and how we understand the capacity of traditional means to combat it.

Bombing other organisations that have occupied a similar space in the grey areas of recognition and legitimacy in the international system is evidently not a method that has proven effective. Indeed, one can possibly stipulate a kind of grim correlation between the hardening of support for Islamist enemies of the Western allies to (a) the kind of methods used to combat them and (b) the absence of credible alternatives.

Examples from recent history can be instructive here: Although there is clearly no reasonable comparison to be made between ISIS and actors such as Hamas, one can perhaps learn from the historical precedent. This is because it is similarly a non-state actor that has transformed into a de facto government which has undergone various military campaigns from Israel similar to that which is to be unleashed against ISIS.

(It is worth briefly highlighting the differences: though certainly Hamas is an Islamist organisation and it has employed utterly reprehensible tactics on various occasions, there are numerous solid reasons why it is very different from ISIS. These include (a) the fact that they are routed in different interpretations of Islam; (b) the raison d’etre for Hamas is focused on particular territorial concerns which is distinct from ISIS’ regional expansionism; and (c) Hamas has enjoyed electoral success and endorsed various pragmatic compromises with political opponents – including offering Israel a long term ceasefire – while ISIS has brutally seized power from its rivals and has no democratic credentials at all).

What we can learn is focused on the nexus of Hamas’ as an anti-imperialist actions and rhetoric and its performance as a conservative Islamist government.

Much of the support for Hamas has rested on popular frustration with the status quo even to the extent that they have won backing from sections of population that has traditionally been both ideologically and culturally opposed to their core philosophy.

In other words, Hamas has enjoyed popular backing from a broad section of society, based on the notion that it offers a political and military alternative to the current situation (exemplified by its anti-imperialist rhetoric, the military confrontations with Israel and its their reputation as uncorrupted).

Yet, when acting as a de facto government in a besieged Gaza since 2007, Hamas’ popular support has waned dramatically. Nonetheless, Israel has frequently attacked the Gaza Strip, particularly intensely in three brutally campaigns in 2008-9, 2012 and earlier this year, and maintained a constant siege on the territory. In the wake of each of these military campaigns Hamas’ popular support has increased. It has also won support from various international backers – both states and non-states – as its ability to withstand Israel’s assaults has become popularised internationally.

The lesson here is simple, it may be the case that it ‘mowing the lawn‘ – as Israeli rhetoric refers to their Gaza campaigns – damages Hamas’ infrastructure and kills myriad cadres (alongside numerous civilians) but at the same time, a core of support for their ideology remains intact. And moreover Hamas’ credibility was bolstered in the aftermath because of its ability to maintain an ‘aura of resistance‘ in spite of the damage done to it, and because people have nowhere else to turn.

In other words Hamas has proven to be a robust actor in spite of Israel’s bombing. This is because it has managed to leverage a broader appeal based on its anti-imperialist rhetoric despite the heavy material damage that it has endured.

Learning the Lesson

Even without the Hamas example it should be clear that military options are of extremely limited utility. The 2007 US-led ‘surge‘ against militants in Iraq demonstrated the inability of a short-term military strike to improve the broader situation. Al-Qaeda was displaced from Iraq only to be replaced by ISIS. The danger of this latest campaign is that it risks allowing the same mistakes to happen again.

Put simply, the argument is this: one cannot bomb ideas – even stupid ones – into submission. And moreover, the more that one bombs people who have a proven capacity of manipulating the emotion, sentiment and ignorance of a globalised audience – particularly based on the narrative of imperialist oppression and the salvation of pseudo-religious extremism – the more that one provides fuel to the ideological fire.

The infrastructure of ISIS might well be ‘degraded or destroyed’ in this air campaign, but the category of political forces that it represents will not.

We need a better strategy to deal with the threat as a category. For a start, this means cutting off their ideological and material oxygen and holding fast while their support dies away of its own accord.

Dr Philip Leech is a Lecturer at in International Relations at the University of Liverpool. He is the editor of Globalisation Cafe and is on at @phil_haqeeqa

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.