Turkey's position after 'Operation Decisive Storm'

A few days after its launch, “Operation Decisive Storm” reformulated political balances in the Middle East around two new regional axes, one led by Saudi Arabia and the other by Iran. This calls into question the position of the third regional power, Turkey, which has, for many years, stressed its policy of staying away from direct confrontation and focusing on building bridges with all parties.

Being open to everyone

Since 2002, Turkey has formulated its foreign policy according to the theory propounded by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the prime minister and former foreign minister, that the role of Ankara regionally and internationally is tied to its geographic and strategic location between continents. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey has to be regarded as European, Asian, Balkan, Caucasian, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean all at the same time. The architect of Turkey’s foreign policy decided that the problems of neighbours and regional conflicts stand in the way of the development of the countries involved, and so developed his famous “zero problems” theory with neighbouring states.

It is on this basis that Turkey has been keen over a number of years to be open towards all parties, and to avoid getting embroiled in the policies of the various axes in the region.

Although it was categorised for a while in some circles to be part of the “axis of resistance” due to its position over Palestine, Turkey has never had a boycott policy against any of the Arab countries, even at the time of Arab Spring which put it at odds with Iran. This was followed by the military coup in Egypt, which found Ankara at a crossroads with a number of countries, the foremost of which is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Politics at the service of the economy

Turkey’s policy is extremely pragmatic, which at some stages led to the disengagement of politics and the economy; it may, instead, have utilised the former for the service of the latter. Bilateral relations with Syria grew prior to the revolution against the government of Bashar Al-Assad, despite a border dispute; economic relations with Israel continued despite the diplomatic boycott; and links with Iran – after the conflict about Syria – were not going to deviate from this norm.

Ankara was keen on using calm political language towards Tehran despite the collision of their differing views on Syria and Iraq. Turkish politicians are aware, of course, that international and regional relations are based on checks and balances, and that any expansion of power of one country will usually mean that the power of another will shrink and that its interests will be harmed. Thus, bilateral relations with Iran continued to swing between competition and cooperation for a number of reasons, the most importantly of which are the following:

1. Economic relations, as Iran is the energy line that feeds Turkey, which imports 28 per cent of its petroleum, 19 per cent of its natural gas and 20 per cent of its electricity from Tehran. This shows up in the trade balance deficit between the two countries ($4 billion for Turkey and $10 billion for Iran) while the temptations of the soon-to-be-lifted sanctions on Iran, if the nuclear agreement goes through to its logical conclusion, cannot be overlooked.
2. Adopting soft power and avoiding confrontation as a matter of principle. Turkey has built its current renaissance on stability and being open on the economic level; it sees that any regional conflict can undermine this and take it back dozens of years, especially if it revolves around sectarian or ethnic differences.
3. Lacking sufficient influence, which has damaged Turkey when things moved in the region and changed it from a state of “zero trouble” to “zero calm”. This made it almost powerless in front of Iran’s raw power and extensive armed involvement in a number of surrounding countries.
4. Domestic gaps, mainly matters relating to minorities, which give way to external meddling and pressures, such as the Kurdish and Alawite issues, where Ankara accuses Tehran of influencing leaders of the PKK in Iraq (in the Kandil Mountains) who oppose the agreement process with Turkey, and a community of Alawites in the country who have Arab origins.

Operation Decisive Storm and the winds of change

Operation Decisive Storm seems to have blown away many of these bases; there is no longer any estrangement with Riyadh or patience with Tehran and it looks as if three months at the helm was enough for King Salman to change a lot of equations in the relationship with Turkey. Between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Saudi Arabia to offer condolences on the death of the late King Abdullah and the visit of the Saudi crown prince to Ankara a few days ago, there have been a number of indicators which suggest the beginning of a new relationship. Turkey and Saudi Arabia share common economic and political interests, and have joint strategic security concerns as well, the most strands of which converge in the Iranian capital.

The nature of Turkish rhetoric towards Iran has thus swung through 180 degrees; reservations have been removed through clear backing for Decisive Storm and the offer of logistic support. The head of the Turkish parliament spoke for the first time about the “Shia expansion”, while Erdogan considered Iran to be a threat to peace and security in the region and an annoyance to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states; he called on Tehran to withdraw its forces from Yemen, Syria and Iraq.

The new Turkish position seems to be caused by a clear resentment of Iranian predominance in the region at the expense of its interests and role, but it is also justified with the attempt to invest in the ten nation-coalition from which Turkey hopes to play the role of regional balancing power, so it would lean on it in an attempt to regain the missing balance from the Ankara-Tehran axis. This is a feeling that is fuelled by “dry” months in relations with the West, mainly the United States, and which is deepened by the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 5+1 countries, which means the marginalisation of the Turkish role in exchange for giving Iran a free hand in regional affairs.

Within this framework, one can understand the implications of the sudden visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Ibn Nayef to Ankara hours before Erdogan visited Iran; although the visit was scheduled for the second meeting of the supreme council for strategic cooperation between the two countries, it became the heart of the storm after the Saudi manoeuvre.

Perhaps the goal of Ibn Nayef’s visit was to extend a hand towards Ankara one more time after Saudi had been isolated and showed on more than one occasion its desire to resume warm relations with Turkey; perhaps the talks included an economic dimension to try and contain Iran’s economic pressure on Turkey. Whatever it was, it certainly included a message that Erdogan carried with him to Iran on behalf of the Saudi-led coalition or even in the name of Saudi and Turkey together.

This way, the significance of the diplomatic steps between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan can be made clear and shows that they aim to tighten the blockade on Iran. We can understand sharp Turkish statements as an investment in the Decisive Storm coalition and pressure against a bitter neighbour in order to prepare grounds for talks and negotiations not only regarding Yemen, but also perhaps regional issues, in the forefront of which is Syria. This was expressed by Turkey’s foreign minister when he announced his country’s willingness to play a role in Yemen through mediating in negotiations; it was also expressed in Erdogan’s calls when in Tehran for talks between countries across the region as the way to stop the bloodshed.

In conclusion, it looks as if Ankara has abandoned its foreign policy of staying within its shell, which it has followed since the decline in the Arab Spring, and has returned to active engagement with regional issues. This is clearly an attempt to return to the favoured roles that it has played to perfection in the past, including that of a mediator. It is in a central position between Saudi Arabia and Iran geographically and maintains stable relations with Iran despite the disputes, while it is weaving new relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states with the support of its new-old ally, Qatar.

While Saudi Arabia was keen on sending a message to Iran saying that Turkey is implicitly part of Operation Decisive Storm, by consulting with Ankara and informing the Turkish government of the operation in advance, the Turks did not burn their bridges. Turkey’s rhetoric demonstrated that it supports a military operation in Yemen but that it was keen for Erdogan’s visit to go ahead despite the tension that his statements caused; this message was not lost on Iran.

Turkey’s support for Decisive Storm seems to satisfy the Saudi-led coalition and the government in Riyadh, while its non-participation in the actual operation itself satisfies Iran at this stage. It shows that Tehran has responded to the Turkish initiative and is keen to avoid a larger-scale regional war which would harm everyone’s interests. The stress has, therefore, been on the importance of dialogue to solve regional problems.

As such, it can perhaps be said that Turkey is trying to invest in the surprise coalition put together by Saudi Arabia and the military action in Yemen to stop Iranian expansion in the region, while its main concern is the more sensitive issue of Syria.

Translated from Al Jazeera net, 11 April, 2015

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.