Has the Turkish model been replaced by Iran’s growing role?

Since 2003, Turkey has appeared as a valuable asset in which global powers can invest, and as a leading actor in a region long described as being reluctant to engage in democratic transformations. However, with the advent of the Arab Spring, things changed and the role portrayed for Turkey by the US has been declining, especially in light of the rise of that other regional power, Iran.

America sought to endorse the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which became the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) in 2003. US efforts did not stop at the GMEI, and it offered yet another project, coined the “new Middle East”. The avowed goal of these initiatives was to encourage political, economic and social reforms in the region, based on a vision to improve America’s image therein, which had been smeared and distorted as a result of the US invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq.

Seeking a new model that could be acceptable to Arabs, and was far from the images and stereotypes of the old, traditional regimes, thus became a must. This idea gained more momentum after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey’s 2002 parliamentary elections, and a new project for the democratisation of the Middle East became a viable option.

The rise of the AKP was the answer. It shifted the compass in the direction of moderate Islam at a time when this concept in general, and the Turkish model in particular, struck a deep chord with a dissatisfied public averse to corrupt regimes. And it became a priority.

Turkey thus became a crucial element in these projects and was deemed a model for a state guided by moderate Islam. The US recognised its qualities and designated a leading role for the country due to its geostrategic location, long-time record as a Western ally, extensive democratic experience and emergence as a nation combining Islamic and Western values successfully. These principles comprised the core of what came to be known as the Turkish model. This underlined the background of the ruling AKP, which originated in Islamist tradition but claimed to merge that tradition with modernism and liberal democracy.

The Turkish model then splashed across media and academic platforms. It became part of lively daily debates amongst the Arabs, and Arab thinkers and intellectuals encouraged their rulers to emulate it. Many aspects helped the model’s prominence to flourish within Arab societies. In addition to US efforts to propagate Turkey’s status as a representative of moderate and democratic Islam, the Islamic background of its ruling elite, its economic success, balanced relations with the East and West, military might and NATO membership have all put the Turkish model on track.

However, revolts do not come knocking on the door. They sneak in, changing chartered paths and dealing blows to strategic plans. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolts, the relatively stable environment in the Arab world upon which Turkish decision-makers built their strategies changed. At first, most observers thought that the Arab Spring would be a historic opportunity for Turkey to endorse its status in the region yet further, but things changed and its popularity has been declining with each passing year.

In various polls since 2011, Middle Easterners have proved to be lukewarm towards Turkey’s role in the region. Year by year, this tepid reaction has transformed increasingly into aversion and suspicion. Even in official circles, Turkey’s relations with several Middle Eastern countries have been tainted with tension and, at times, hostility.

Meanwhile, whether one likes it or not, Iran has been moving slowly but steadily towards an extraordinary status and role in the region. The country emerged from decades of isolation after the nuclear deal helped its economy and propelled it back onto the world stage.

The government in Tehran started formulating this role a long time ago, and the deal was just a stepping stone. Iran has been employing an ever-widening array of tactics to build strategic partnerships and alliances across the Muslim world and beyond. One of its most successful tools is soft power, which includes media, humanitarian aid, and cultural ties. The country also used trade and investment to penetrate the region even more. Iran Khodro is a salient example; the state-owned company has emerged as the largest carmaker in the Middle East, exporting over one million vehicles in 2007.

Recently, Tehran signed agreements with Afghanistan and Tajikistan to build railway and power lines linking Iran with the Central Asian republics, as well as China and Russia. Furthermore, Iran is cooperating politically and militarily with Russia in Syria with the aim of securing Moscow’s support in numerous spheres. One of them is Tehran’s attempt to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a full member. Iran has been accepted as an observer state; full membership will secure further strategic support from Russia and China.

Iran’s extended leverage in the region has always been demonstrated in a network of allies that has been expanding. The main logic behind this network lies in Iran’s soft power and its ability to export both revolutionary values and fraternal Shia connections. It was adept enough to promote itself as a revolutionary hub and an address for all those who aim to fight foreign imperialism. The eventual result was the formation of the “axis of resistance” to counter the “moderation axis” of US allies in the region.

In addition, Iran’s connections with Shia communities in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Eastern Saudi Arabia and Lebanon demonstrate the success of its soft power; the number of Shia visitors to Iran is evidence of this. According to 2013 figures, roughly four million tourists visited Iran, the majority of whom were religious Shia or there for medical reasons; some one million were regular tourists.

Tehran expanded its network further, beyond traditional state actors such as Syria and Iraq, to include non-state actors such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. It was also pragmatic enough to establish relationships with seemingly unlikely partners such as China, Russia, Turkey, India, Nicaragua and Algeria, and to sign scores of agreements in the fields of hydrocarbons and energy, trade and transport.

Inter alia, of the various elements that weakened the Turkish model was Tehran’s mounting leverage in the Middle East and the Arab Spring, which delivered a blow to Ankara’s achievements as Iran moved slowly but steadily towards a status it charted carefully. Then came the nuclear deal, which boosts Iran’s potential in the region and has, intriguingly, raised a third possibility: have the Arabs surrendered their aspirations to play a role in their own region? Although the Islamic coalition declared by Saudi Arabia seems promising, this idea has not been translated into practical steps, nor does a united Arab position seem in the offing. The diverse Arab positions on how to respond to recent attacks on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran are a case in point.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.