Iraq’s PMF militia coalition is hindering political cohesion

Born a little over three years ago Iraq’s quasi-political Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) has grown unstoppably, much to the peril of Iraq’s political elite.

Civic life has borne the brunt of uninterrupted PMF crimes, and the sanctimonious rhetoric that once shielded members from criticism is no longer persuasive.

The ruling establishment is more sharply divided than ever before, on the subject of Iraq’s hard-line sectarian coalition of militias, and their future in politics.

The genesis of the PMF

The story begins in 2014, against the backdrop of Daesh’s conquest of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul.

Read more: 40,000 troops preparing to take Iraqi town from Daesh

Major threats of state demise posed by Daesh terrorists invited calls from Iraq’s highest Shia clerical authority, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.

His message was directed at Iraq’s able-bodied men – he urged them to offer themselves up to existing state forces in defence of their nation.

Their founding marked a new point in Iraq’s tormented history.

Men across the generational spectrum mobilised and barely a week into Daesh’s inception the ocean of volunteers beckoned by Al-Sistani’s call, were banded and rebranded as militia regiments. Though many analysts in English press have consistently downplayed the group’s outwardly sectarian composition, members are overwhelmingly Shia.

#Corruption

Al-Sistani’s edict undoubtedly laid the foundation on which the PMF arose. But against his instructions newly recruited rank-and-file members were not integrated into existing official security forces. As the force mushroomed, they quickly outgrew their reinforcement role for Iraq’s fatigued army and soon ripened into a parallel force.

Known by the name Hashd Al-Shaabi locally, the umbrella coalition is a near permanent feature of Iraq’s post-2014 political landscape, bearing the hallmarks of an ideologically driven force.

Legalising Hashd

In an attempt to professionalise the organisation a law was passed in November 2016, in the absence of unanimity. The law granted the group official army status. Warnings that moves to accelerate the formalisation of the highly decentralised force undermines local sovereignty and indigenous interests have gone unheeded.

“Just before the end of 2016, they [the PMF] existed outside of any legal or regulatory framework,” Iraqi analyst Yahya Al-Kubaisi recently said in a studio discussion on Al Hurra TV.

#MosulOps

“When the vote occurred, the Sunni parliamentary bloc voted unanimously against it. The fact that the law was passed by only one side does not make it legitimate.”

“The legislation violates article nine of the Iraqi constitution, by reinventing the image of irregular militias and awarding them with uniformed brigades. The fact remains, these are ideological forces,” he added.

The lack of regularity, organisational discipline and command authority are further flaws that even Hashd friendly voices such as Mishan Al-Jabouri have pointed to. Although their birth was directly tied up with the drive to rid Iraq from the scourge of terrorism, PMF’s unchecked abuses violating human rights and civil liberties suggests a betrayal of the purpose they were created to fulfil.

Modern day crusaders or renegades

Those rushing to the PMF’s defence have long argued that in absence of a functioning regular army Iraq would have fallen to Daesh. This narrative is propped up by the fantasy of crusade, remodelled to fit the Iraqi context, and excusing PMF’s criminality and delinquency. Though exhaustively deployed it fails to mask the group’s ambitions, foreign sponsorship, and retributive rights crimes.

Read more: Popular Mobilisation Forces: without us, Syria would have fallen to Daesh

When crusaders metamorphose into aggressors the rhetorical cloak of liberation is rendered ineffective. This controversy resurrected fears over PMF’s nationalist credentials, when its instructions flow from Iran and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives, embedded within the PMF.

Loyalties are torn, between Baghdad and Tehran.

Commanded by Iran’s most trusted Iraqi allies, Abu Mahdi Al-Mohandis, Hadi Al-Ameri, and Iran’s own IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, the PMF’s command structure is not anchored in the centre of Iraq’s political gravity, Baghdad, but scattered somewhere between Iran, Iraq and Syria, where PMF units are leading cross-border operations.

In a press conference last month, PMF commander Abu Mahdi Al-Mohandis conceded that “we [PMF militias] have secured the road between Damascus and Baghdad,” following an operation to repulse IS [Daesh] in the area of Al-Waleed, straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border. The announcement disrobes the group’s wanton disregard for inviolable borders, in pursuit of an ideological, transnational force in homage to the IRGC model.”

A month earlier Mohandis ruled out moves to dissolve the Hashd, in direct opposition to calls from Moqtada Al-Sadr for the group’s disbanding. Sadr’s motives, as I have written elsewhere, stem from the need to quash the brewing rivalry between him and PMF elements as the two jostle their way to the top, ahead of Iraq’s 2018 elections.

Read more: Caught between Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, will Sadr put Iraq first?

Yet consistent foreign backing from Iran will prevent the rise of a neutral, secular, regular standing army, as was the case in Afghanistan.

“No country can be governed by two armies” Iraq’s secular Sunni figure, Saleh Al-Mutlaq commented in a recent studio discussion on Al-Sharqiya News. “The PMF is an obstacle standing in the way of any attempt to build a professional military institution and unified army.”

On the Kurdish question, secular Ummah party leader, Mithal Al-Alusi drew a separating line between PMF militias aligned to Tehran and those that are not.

“Not all Hashd are hostile towards the Kurds… Hashd tied to Iran… [however]… are trying to cause headaches and trouble. Masoud Barzani is a real threat to Iran… by not submitting to Iran’s intimidations will help other Iraqis rise and free themselves of the yoke of Iran” Mithal Al-Alusi told Rudaw news.

Now that Mosul is back under state control, Kurdish officials have also been more public in their criticism of the PMF, as an institution Iraq’s Prime Minister is unable to command.

Abadi ambivalent official stance

Less clear about his position is Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi.

His support of the Hashd Al-Shaabi militias has been unequivocal, threatening in April this year to cut the hands of those that trivialise the gains made by the PMF.

Last week Abadi’s comments echoed a tone different to that voiced previously. Attempting to disown himself of PMF elements operating in Syria in support of regime forces, Abadi claimed that “outside Iraq the Hashd does not exist. Hashd Al-Shaabi is an official body that exists inside of Iraq and its borders alone. You will not find Hashd forces outside of Iraq’s borders”.

As Abadi bounces between defence of the Hashd and disavowal of those operating outside Iraq, no plan of action as to how they will be dealt with has been outlined. The public lack confidence in Abadi’s ability to release Iraq from the PMF’s stranglehold. America and Iraq’s political parties are similarly seeking to sideline militia actors from participating in next year’s parliamentary vote, no matter the cost.

Opinions remain split, and political cohesion stands at an all-time low, while rogue PMF elements continue to prey on the corpse of a decomposing nation.

Opinion: Who to trust in Iraq? Sunnis or Shias?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.