Who is Mohamed Gharred, Ennahda's former adviser?

Mohamed Gharred is a young Tunisian politician with links to Canadian civil society and a former affiliation to Tunisia’s Ennahda. He started his relations with the Tunisian moderate Islamic-inspired party right after the revolution as an activist, helping his peers from Canada while doing his studies in Montréal. In 2014, at the age of 24, he got involved with the party’s activities on the ground for the first time as Media Director of the region of Nabeul, charged with coordinating the campaign of some prominent Ennahda figures, such as Meherzia Labidi and Bouthaina Ben Yaghlan. From that point, the young politician had a quick ascension in the party ranks. After helping lead an internal campaign in favour of the reforms announced by the party’s 2016 Tenth Congress, which were said to accomplish the definite transformation of Ennahda from an Islamist movement into a civil-political party, Mr. Gharred became one of the party’s international relations advisors, a position he occupied until his resignation on 7 June, 2019. During his years of good office in the party leadership, he was able to integrate into the circle around Rached Ghannouchi. A talk about Gharred’s reasons to resign sheds light on interesting aspects about the party’s working and internal dynamic.

Good morning, Mr. Gharred. When you resigned from Ennahda in June 2019, you said on your Facebook page that you did it ‘for reasons I keep to myself now’. Why did you decide to open up now?

I made no statements to the media when I left because the 2019 elections were soon and I did not want my legacy in the party to be just of political calculation and opposition. There were real issues I was concerned about and I wanted them to be told the way they were. So I kept waiting over the past years.

How close were you from the circle of Rached Ghannouchi? And how did you get into this circle?

I was not part of any circle of Ennahda from 2011 to 2014. I was just friends with some people from the headquarters, who were friends of my parents. But that changed after my participation on the ground for the 2014 elections. There was a tendency within the party that was so ideological and close-minded, the ones known as “the eagles”. I was very disappointed with their aggressiveness and offensive behaviour in a time the country was very divided. I feared those people were going to lead us to be outlawed again. After the elections, I knew that I could not work with them. And I knew that we would only be able to move forward with the party reforms if we sidelined them. At that time, Rached Ghannouchi was the counter-balance to this tendency. That is why I tried to connect with people close to him. I succeeded in getting in touch with one of his daughters. It was a very good meeting. She is very open-minded, modern, progressive in the way of doing things. She introduced me to another daughter who has the same profile. From that moment on, I started to get in touch with his family and visit their offices often […] When you meet people from the Rached Ghannouchi cycle in their offices, you feel that you went from a very old thing to an Ennahda more open, progressive and westernised. Frankly speaking, there are two centres of power within the Ennahda party. You either have to be close to Rached Ghannouchi, and you cannot do it without being close to his family, or you have to be close to what internally is known as al tandhim (the establishment) or “the eagles”, who are Brotherhood minded. So, I went for those I thought I had more common values with […] Even though I may have differences with some people of Ghannouchi’s family, I deeply believe his daughters should have a place in politics even after Ghannouchi. They have been honest in supporting the party reforms.

You have said many times in the media that you were part of Ennahda’s reformist trend. What does that mean?

The reformist trend is made up of those who are not Brotherhood minded and want the party to achieve something meaningful for society. They are those who fought hard during the Tenth Congress to pass the party reforms, mainly that all dawa activities are made through NGOs. We disagreed with the “eagles” in vision and methods. We wanted Ennahda to make a definite move away from any sectarian functioning or mindset, to become a modern and effective civil-political party which delivers to society and is open to all conservative Tunisians who could contribute to the party.

Was this trend successful?

We had a temporary victory in 2016, when we mobilised behind Rached Ghannouchi to push the party reforms and the conciliation with Beji Caid Essebsi started. The party reforms brought by the Tenth Congress intended to convey a message to the large part of Tunisian society, who is modern and progressive. It sought to diversify the party basis, giving more opportunity for conservatives within the whole society and refraining from relying too much on the so called “historical legitimacy”. Ghannouchi’s policy of conciliation with Nidaa Tunis was approved within the party because we saw we needed stability in the country. So, we agreed on things with Rached Ghannouchi that year. The best symbol of this orientation was when he appointed Zied Laadhari as the party Secretary-General. We were moving from Abdelhamid Jlassi, radical and ruthless establishment guy, to someone really progressive and modern. Two different profiles. That was pretty much a success for the reformists within the party. It started well in the beginning.

What do you mean by historical legitimacy?

Historical legitimacy within Ennahda means that those who themselves, or whose family members, have historical links to the movement have a differentiated status within the party and are given a certain priority. By “historical links” it is generally meant to have suffered oppression. It is generally said of those that “He/she is one of our sons/daughters”. That, in practice, means to be truly “one of us”.

You said the reformists’ victory was temporary. So what went wrong?

After 2016, Ghannouchi sidelined the extremists, but did not eliminate them. They were appointed to other positions. The sheik was reluctant about backing us and moving forward with the party reforms. But the reformist trend had no power if he did not support us. We had not suffered under the former regime as the establishment had, so we did not have their historical legitimacy. They were the poor people who were oppressed and sacrificed their lives for Ennahda while, we, the reformists, were “the suit guys” trying to steal their movement from them […] For you to have an idea, the establishment guys were different from us even by their ideological vocabulary. For instance, I did not call party colleagues as “brother”; I call them by their names. So, we the reformists, were not as appealing to Ennahda’s base as the establishment was. One comment I heard often by them after my first media appearances was “We like you, but Ennahda is not your place” […] I personally did not have any interest in investing efforts to become more appealing to Ennahda’s basis if that meant being the typical nahdawi leader rejected by the general society. I had hopes that we succeed in reforming and diversifying that basis because I knew there was nothing wrong with me, for example, or with the Tunisian society, in general, but something was wrong within Ennahda’s body. And, by Ennahda’s body, I don’t mean the hundreds of thousands of sympathisers who vote for Ennahda, but the few thousands who are active within the party, who I and a few others nickname as “the guardians of the blue temple”, in reference to their sectarian way to operate. Ironically, the leaders the pools have shown for years to be Ennahda’s basis’s favourites to play important political roles in the country are the least famous or accepted figures by the general public […] Also, we, the reformists, did not have the eagle’s mobilisation capacity. They had far more experience than us. They were the ones who opposed Bourguiba at school and Ben Ali at university and reorganised the movement secretly between 2004 and 2010. They are so organised, like a party within the party […]

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Therefore, because we did not have the party base and the machine the establishment had, the only way for us to have leverage to push the internal reforms we wished was if Ghannouchi backed us. But his position was of playing the power balance between the two tendencies. For him, the most important thing was to keep Ennahda united and powerful in the domestic scenario. He would not back us if that risked losing a portion of Ennahda’s militants and its unity. By unity, I am not referring to the party leaders, because Ghannouchi is very experienced in handling those kinds of resignations. I am referring to the grassroots, the base. Those who guarantee 20 per cent of votes every election to keep the party in office and are the ones who go to the streets whenever the party needs to demonstrate power. But, for me and many reformists, diversifying the party base by opening it to the larger portion of conservatives in Tunisian society was a fundamental part of the reforms, even if that would cost one third of Ennahda’s basis. I, personally, always considered essential to diversify the party. I’ll give you an example. With the purpose to diversify Ennahda, we succeeded that the party launch an online platform for new members in order to avoid that the regional and local offices block the applications of people with no historical legitimacy; that is, that do not belong to the current “Ennahda body”. That platform made the eagles hysterical at the time because they were afraid of losing their current base that guaranteed them an automatic vote. So that shows that the establishment was, all the time, against the internal reforms we reformists wanted, and Ghannouchi was not fully determined to pass them either, if that risked losing part of the militant base and Ennahda’s unity and, in a broader sense, risked the party’s survival within the country’s newborn democracy.

Did the lack of support from Ghannouchi cause the reformist tendency to lose momentum?

As the alliance between Ennahda and Nidaa Tunis gradually transmuted into a blockage, this old establishment became vocal against Ghannouchi’s policies and gained leverage again. Part of their accusations was that Ghannouchi’s family was more and more influential within the party, which was actually true. This fact in itself was against the ideal of reforms within the party purported in 2016. Also, the rebellious behaviour of the eagles was faced by very passive institutions established by the 10th congress. As an example, three of four Ennahda figures who were in the media every day were eagles who would express their own opinion as if it were from the party, and Ghannouchi’s office, where most of the power relied after the 10th congress, were reluctant to correct their wrongdoing. Finally, the fact that Ghannouchi did not eliminate the establishment guys gave them oxygen to reorganise. You must have in mind that they have much more resources to meet people on the ground than us. Besides, the fact that they were sidelined and had no responsibility in the party gave them more free time to mobilise the grassroots. The result was that all the reformists lost the party’s internal elections in 2019. The old establishment won in all the country. None of the candidates to parliament were from Rached Ghannouchi’s side or the reformist’s side. All we have done in 2016, all the reforms, were gone! That night I resigned. The moment I saw the results, it was clear to me that Ennahda’s body aggressively rejected the reforms we reformists supported in 2016. They didn’t only bring us to the starting point of 2016; it was even worse, we went back to the 1980s! I resigned because the old establishment was back after Ghannouchi did not empower us with what we needed to fight them. After that, Ghannouchi changed the party lists to guarantee the balance between the reformists and the old establishment. But, for me, this is not how things should work. The reformists would continue to rely on Rached Ghannouchi to be appointed to certain positions, but what is the point of remaining in these conditions?

In retrospect, how do you evaluate the three years of party reforms from 2016 to 2019?

Unfortunately, after the tenth congress, the debate about the reforms has gradually shifted from the focus on the necessary changes to modernise the party to a polarisation between a pro-Ghannouchi versus an anti-Ghannouchi camp. That debate has brought to the opposite side people who have the ability to change and could have become reformists. I honestly regret that there could have been direct discussions between the reformists and part of the eagles. Ghannouchi being in the middle of the two camps was not a good thing. The best way would have been if the reformists were better organised to be able to engage in direct discussions with the most moderate within the eagles, who have the ability to change. It is important to highlight that the two camps were not homogeneous.

How do you evaluate Ghannouchi’s legacy today?

I consider myself privileged to have started my political career while Ghannouchi was the leader of Ennahda. Founders never repeat themselves, and Ghannouchi has over 40 years of experience, spanning very different contexts. Ghannouchi, the intellectual man, has enhanced in me, and probably in many party generations, the pride of being Muslim in today’s world. He has imbued in us the conviction that we should not compromise or sacrifice our identity and heritage to be modern and compatible with the contemporary world. Indeed, Islam is not only compatible with modernity, but Islam and the Islamic heritage have greatly contributed to great things humanity has achieved today. Ghannouchi’s idea of the compatibility between Islam and democracy is, in fact, not just an idea, but a mindset and a philosophy.

What is the future of Ennahda in your opinion? 

Ennahda has showed it cannot reform itself. It is an Islamist party. I deeply believe it is not a terrorist party, nor has anything to do with the assassinations of 2013, but it has failed to become a truly civil-political party because it has no clear political and economic orientation. I believe Ennahda’s fight now against Kais Saied is Ennahda’s last fight. The party will eventually end with Rached Ghannouchi and a new project will emerge. Rached Ghannouchi will enter history as one of the most progressive thinkers when it comes to Islam and democracy, Islam and civil liberties. But he has failed in terms of governance. What Tunisia needs now is a new conservative political party, able to regroup people from the Islamists, which is the very right-wing side of conservatives, and the centre right. In the whole world, you have the liberals and the conservatives. Very right wingers in the conservatives are just a tendency within political parties. They can’t be a political party themselves. In Tunisia, if you ask people if they are conservatives, more than 60 per cent will answer yes. Yet, Ennahda as the main conservative party, receives around 20 per cent of the votes. It means that Islamism is just a niche of conservatism. Ennahda represents just one ideology within the big conservative family. It is a political party confiscating the whole conservative space. At the same time, it is not fully representative of the conservatives. The country needs a second generation of real conservatives, who are economically liberal and have an economic identity as important as its social one.

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