The US-Turkiye S-400 and F-35 standoff: Future paths and implications

Turkiye and the United States have long shared a strategic alliance under the NATO umbrella, with both countries mutually benefiting from economic, military and geopolitical cooperation. However, the ongoing dispute over Turkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defence system and its exclusion from the F-35 program has put a significant strain on this relationship. The future of the US-Turkiye defence partnership remains uncertain, with potential ramifications for NATO and the broader international security landscape.

The S-400 controversy: A strategic dilemma

The conflict began in 2017, when Turkiye signed an agreement with Russia to purchase the S-400 air defence system for $2.5 billion. The S-400 is one of the most advanced long-range surface-to-air missile systems in the world, capable of tracking and targeting stealth aircraft. Turkiye’s decision to acquire the S-400 was based on multiple factors, including the desire for an advanced air defence system and Turkiye’s perception of US reluctance to sell the Patriot missile system under favourable conditions.

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However, the US and NATO immediately raised concerns. The S-400 system is not interoperable with NATO defence architecture, and there are fears that deploying the S-400 alongside NATO military assets could compromise sensitive data, particularly on the F-35 fighter jet. Washington argued that the radar of the S-400 could potentially learn to detect and track the F-35, undermining the jet’s stealth capabilities and compromising NATO security.

Despite repeated US warnings, Turkiye went ahead with the S-400 purchase, receiving the first shipment of the system in July 2019. In response, the US suspended Turkiye from the F-35 program, which Turkiye had been part of since 2002 as one of the original partner nations. Turkiye had planned to buy 100 F-35 jets, investing around $1.4 billion in the program and playing a key role in the supply chain, with its companies producing more than 900 components for the aircraft.

Turkiye’s expulsion from the F-35 Program

Turkiye’s removal from the F-35 program marked a significant shift in US-Turkiye defence relations. The Pentagon cited the S-400 system as a risk to the F-35, as it could potentially allow Russia to access critical information about the jet’s stealth and operational capabilities. In addition to suspending Turkiye from the F-35 program, the US formally imposed sanctions in December 2020 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), targeting Turkiye’s defence procurement agency, the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), and its key officials.

As a result of these sanctions and the expulsion, Turkiye was not only denied access to the F-35 aircraft but also lost its position as a key component manufacturer in the program. Turkish companies had anticipated up to $12 billion in business from the F-35 program, and the loss of this revenue has had a notable impact on Turkiye’s defence industry.

Current state and potential future scenarios

The future of the US-Turkiye dispute over the S-400 and F-35 will depend on the ability of both nations to reconcile their security interests and find common ground. There are several potential scenarios that could shape the resolution of this conflict:

1. Partial compromise and integration in NATO systems: Turkiye could be persuaded to either limit the operational use of the S-400 system or to store it without integrating it into active defence operations. The US could then offer a pathway for Turkiye to regain its role in the F-35 program or find alternative defence arrangements, such as offering Patriot missiles under more favourable terms. This would require a high level of diplomatic compromise and trust-building between the two nations, considering Turkiye has so far rejected conditions to “mothball” the S-400.
2. Development of Turkiye’s domestic defence capabilities: Turkiye has expressed growing interest in self-reliance within its defence sector, emphasizing the development of indigenous military technologies. The country has been working on the TF-X National Combat Aircraft, which it hopes will serve as a fifth-generation fighter jet to potentially replace the F-35. However, developing a fully capable domestic alternative is a long-term project that requires significant investment, expertise and time.
3. Closer ties with Russia and non-NATO defence partners: Should diplomatic negotiations fail, Turkiye may deepen its defence cooperation with Russia, including the potential purchase of additional S-400 batteries. Such a move would signify a considerable shift away from NATO and a tilt toward a more Russia-oriented defence policy. This would likely increase geopolitical tensions within the alliance and further isolate Turkiye from NATO defence arrangements.
4. US Flexibility and Regional Security Concerns: Given the strategic importance of Turkiye within NATO, the US may reconsider its stance in favour of broader regional security concerns. Turkiye’s geographical position, spanning Europe and Asia, makes it crucial for addressing issues like migration, Middle Eastern conflicts and Black Sea security. A potential compromise could involve the US and NATO finding ways to include Turkiye in defence arrangements without directly linking it to the S-400 standoff.

The dispute over the S-400 and F-35 represents a broader challenge for US-Turkiye relations and the stability of NATO. Turkiye’s balancing act between East and West, the rise of its independent defence industry, and geopolitical changes in the Middle East and Eurasia make the situation complex and multifaceted. While both countries recognise the importance of maintaining their strategic alliance, finding a resolution to the S-400 issue remains a delicate matter that will shape the future of regional security and NATO cohesion.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.