Developments in Fatah's political thought as seen through its conference documents

Fatah will hold its seventh General Conference in August in Bethlehem and there is a workshop taking place to prepare for it, as well as an organisational committee. Around 1,000 of the movement’s leaders and members are expected to attend.

If it goes ahead, it will be the second time that Fatah is holding its conference in the occupied Palestinian territories since the movement returned from exile. It will also be the second conference held after the death of the movement’s founder and leader, Yasser Arafat.

It is a fact that Fatah is facing great challenges related to the questions raised about the stalled negotiations. For example, its development from a national liberation and armed resistance movement into an authority; the deterioration of its fighting role against Israel; the decline in its popularity within the community; its bloated structures; and the presence of competition, in the shape of Hamas, which requires the movement to make an effort to improve its position, revive its energy, and make changes to its leaders, dialogue and work.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to take a preliminary reading of the developments occurring in Fatah’s political thought during its rise and fall over half a century. It has been a long, strenuous and complicated struggle to pinpoint where this movement was and where it is today, and the stages it has gone through.

Fatah determined its political thought in its “perspectives, goals and methods” issued in the late sixties; it is repeated in its literature and rhetoric, especially in the introduction to the movement’s constitution. This was readopted in all conferences held outside Palestine.

The core facts are that “Palestine is part of the Arab World” (Article 1); “The Palestinian people are the sole authority that decides their own destiny, and they have complete sovereignty on all their lands” (Article 2); “UN projects, accords and resolutions, or those of any individual which undermine the Palestinian people’s right in their homeland are illegal and rejected” (Article 6); and, “The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism” (Article 8).

As for the goals, as defined by Fatah, they are represented by, “The complete liberation of Palestine and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence” (Article 12). The movement was launched before the 1967 Six Day War and, at the time, its definition of Palestine wasn’t limited to the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It is worth noting that these goals were adopted by Fatah early on in order to serve the objective of one secular democratic state, as expressed in Article 13: “Establishing an independent democratic state with complete sovereignty on all Palestinian lands, and Jerusalem is its capital city, and protecting the citizens’ legal and equal rights without any racial or religious discrimination.” This means that at the time, finding a solution to the problem of Jewish immigration or the future of the Jews in Palestine, including the distinction between Zionism and Judaism, and the liberation of the Jews from Zionism, was a prime idea.

In terms of means and forms of struggle, Fatah stressed that, “Armed public revolution is the inevitable method to liberating Palestine” (Article 17); and that “this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated” (Article 19). It is worth noting that these principles also included, “Opposing any political solution offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine” (Article 22).

Now, regardless of our opinion or assessment of these articles, how realistic they are, or the capabilities of the Palestinians, these ideas formed Fatah’s identity and set them apart from any other movement. They also contributed to the growth of its popularity in an environment teeming with various nationalist, left-wing and Islamic ideologies.

However, the movement did not commit to these positions, as we all know. Over time, it has made several qualitative changes due to international, regional, Arab, Palestinian and Israeli changes, developments and pressure. There are even some ideas, perspectives and goals that have been completely written off, but this all happened after the commitment to armed resistance when the core of Palestinian work was brought back into Palestine after the First Intifada (1987-1993), particularly after the Oslo agreement (1993) and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and especially after the death of Yasser Arafat.

In this context, it is worth pointing out three things: first, the aforementioned principles were included in the documents issued by the fourth (Damascus, 1980) and fifth (Tunisia 1989) General Conferences despite the qualitative changes taking place in Palestinian politics, which were made by the leaders of this movement in particular from their positions in the PLO. Such changes were exemplified by the transformation of their goal of liberation to the goal of establishing an authority or state on any liberated part of Palestine. This has been the case since the “10 Point Programme of the PLO” was adopted during the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council in 1974.

Perhaps this reveals the truth about the Palestinian Authority’s disregard for political establishments, focusing instead on practical policies, as well as its underestimation of the gap between its slogans and practices, and distinction between decisions and choices. This is one of the most important features of the Palestinian leadership’s work; that is, the PLO, the PA, and Fatah.

This would mean that Fatah’s leadership has been dependent on double-speak until that time. The decisions made during the sixth General Conference held in Bethlehem, after the establishment of the PA as per the Oslo Accords, and after the death of Yasser Arafat, included Fatah’s adoption of all forms of struggle, including armed struggle. It is obvious that this was just talk aiming to please the movement’s supporters more than anything else. The evidence of this is that the head of Fatah, the PA and the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, considers security coordination with Israel to be “sacred”.

The second issue is the fact that Fatah has gone past the founding concepts of the movement by turning it from a Palestinian liberation project for the establishment of one democratic state into a project to establish a state on part of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza). It also changed from adopting armed struggle as a means to liberating Palestine to adopting diplomacy and negotiations without seeking to legitimise all of this by means of a unanimous decision issued by the organisation; to be more accurate, the leadership does not feel the need to do so by virtue of its domination over the movement and the PLO.

The third issue that we need to be aware of in this context is that the fifth General Conference introduced amendments to some of the movement’s perspectives, goals and means of struggle in accordance with the “10 Point Programme” that addressed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and introduced the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. This was adopted by the National Council in Algeria in 1988, but the sixth conference totally wrote off all of these. It is as if we had a new Fatah but with the same faces.

For example, the conference summed up several important stages of the Palestinian national experience in one paragraph without providing any political connotations or evaluative or critical point of view: “On December 9, 1987, the First Intifada was launched, and the 19th Palestinian National Council, announced on November 15, 1988 the State of Palestine. This was followed by the Gulf War (1990), the fall of the Soviet Union and the loss of a friend that was always on our side, our loss as Arabs in Iraq and the Gulf, and the emergence of the US pole. We had to reconsider our strategies and take advantage to move towards peace. The peace process and establishment of a national authority opened the doors for us to free the Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as build the institutions of a future independent state, gain international recognition, make political, economic, and trade relations with the world, and make many internal advances on a political, constitutional and economic development level.”

We must take note that these words were written in 2009, after the failure of the second Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the Second Intifada, as well as after Fatah’s loss in the legislative elections (2006), Hamas rule in Gaza, and the Israeli war on Gaza. After, also, Israel’s goals behind the Oslo Accords had started to come to light with 16 years’ experience.

As such, the sixth conference issued general statements that do not suit a political movement that has led the struggle of an entire nation and made many sacrifices, such as its announcement of the goals being “liberating the homeland and ending the settlements”. When the “homeland” has been scaled down to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (at most), the word “liberation” has no meaning.

As for the issue of the refugees, it has been talked about with statements guaranteeing their right “to return and compensation based on the UN Charter and the General Assembly Resolution 194”; “the need to activate and reinforce the role of the Palestinian communities”; “involve the Palestinians in the Diaspora in the Fatah and the PLO’s activities”; and “take the initiative and help our people in the Diaspora when they are exposed to danger, such as the Palestinians living in Iraq.”

As a result, the sixth conference legitimised the changes made in Fatah since the end of the armed phase overseas (1982), especially since it morphed into the PA (1994). This transition was permanent with the end of the Second Intifada and the death of Yasser Arafat (2004), putting before us a new Fatah despite the fact that most of its political figures, who also established the movement, stayed the same.

Fatah’s transition from armed struggle to negotiated settlement starting in the early 1970s was not a result of a development in its political culture as a movement, nor was it adopted in its conferences. Instead, this decision was only made within the framework of the Central Committee; the same thing happened with the Oslo Accords (1993).

It is obvious that not all the political processes, from negotiations to uprisings, were studied in the leadership contexts, nor were they a result of political culture or internal dialogue or developments in the field.

What we can conclude from all of this is that the Palestinian movement did not give its political thought proper attention and that the leaders are the ones who control the major decisions. We also realise that democracy does not work well in the Palestinian political arena, including Fatah.

Of course, I do not mean to deny the legitimacy of any movement or political party’s political thought; this is a positive thing given that it brings about a result of internal interaction and a political process in the context of enrichment and development, while maintaining the main goal or the spirit that the movement or party was founded on. In Fatah’s case, this includes the enhancement of Palestinian identity and the political entity, as well as continuing the struggle to undermine the Zionist colonial and racist project represented by Israel.

In any case, it is difficult to predict the success of Fatah in providing the correct answers to the questions raised; perhaps it is too late for that, not least because it limits itself to negotiations.

Translated from Al Jazeera net, 30 June, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.