Aggression on Gaza and the reconciliation agreement

No sooner was the Israeli occupation’s battle against the Gaza Strip over in a disappointing result for the Israeli “goal bank”- despite the crimes it committed against the Palestinian people – did the division between Fatah and Hamas arise once again, violating the agreement recently signed, conjuring scenes of dispute and conflict that reflect the weakness of the foundation of the reconciliation agreement in establishing national unity and building a base against the occupation’s attempts to seize both the Palestinian land and history.

The sharp media attention went back and forth between the two parties since the “kidnapping” incident of the three settlers on July 12 and the subsequent Israeli aggression in the West Bank and then in the Gaza Strip, addressing the responsibility for the kidnapping and the first Egyptian initiative, followed by the ceasefire agreement, and both parties’ violations against each other and the legitimacy of the unity government’s work in Gaza before leading to the salary issue. However, no final solutions were reached in an effort to end the divisions.

Due to the fact that the main points of the dispute are hiding a sharply contrasting variable, which floated to the surface when Hamas rejected Egypt’s first initiative because it did not meet the resistance’s conditions of stopping the aggression, lifting the siege and reconstructing Gaza and which, according to Hamas, only included a ceasefire with disregard for the other issues postponing them to later negotiations, without actually naming them.

This is contrary to the subsequent agreement that was reached, through Egyptian mediation, and which came about through a unified Palestinian position and reflected the position of the resistance on the ground against the occupation. However, Fatah considered the two agreements to be similar and criticised Hamas’ position of rejecting the first and accepting the second after causing the Palestinian people to lose approximately 2,140 martyrs, causing 10,000 people to be injured, the complete or partial destruction of 35,000 homes, and displacing 360,000 people because of the aggression.

The verbal arguments became heated between the two parties when Fatah accused Hamas of targeting its cadres in Gaza during the aggression and exposing them to danger, while Hamas accused the PA security agencies of attacking dozens of its supporters during festivals organised by Hamas in the West Bank to celebrate Gaza’s victory.

The conflict reached its peak when the PA accused Hamas of hindering the work of the unity government that was born after hard work on June 2 followed by when President Mahmoud Abbas confirmed that “the PA will not accept any partnership with Hamas if the latter does not accept the establishment of one Palestinian state with one authority, one law, and weapons” on September 6, 2014. Hamas responded to this by calling for the formation of a new national unity government due to the “failure of the current unity government to address the internal crises” and its insistence on being a part of the reconstruction process and management of the crossings, which the PA rejects, considering them a part of the government’s tasks.

The manifestations of the dispute recently appeared in the crisis of the salaries of the former Gaza government employees, previously appointed by Hamas and amounting to about 40,000-50,000 employees. This issue still hasn’t been resolved, as both sides are holding the other responsible for paying.

If Fatah had initiated the formation of a five-party committee to hold a dialogue with Hamas regarding a number of issues in an effort to establish national unity, remove the obstacles in the way of ending the division, and consolidate the latest agreement reached by the two parties, which was signed on April 23 after the situation between the two parties reached its limits, then the situation would revolve around the possibility of overcoming the main issues of dispute, disregarding the temporary issues that could be resolved by a temporary agreement at the time between the two parties.

The issue of security coordination between the Palestinian and Israeli security agencies is on the horizon as Hamas accuses the PA, with its continued coordination in torturing the Palestinians and harming the reconciliation, of this. Fatah considers that the coordination “is not shameful and is in the best interest of the PA in order to protect the Palestinian people”, according to the speech made by President Abbas before the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC during their meeting in Jeddah on June 18. This statement was made in the context of the PA’s coordination with the occupation regarding the kidnapping incident of the three settlers, shortly before their bodies were found.

Accordingly, security coordination between the PA and occupation security agencies is an issue that stands to reason and reflects the PA’s position on Israel’s vision, considering it to be a part of the fait accompli that the occupation is keen on continuing to impose on the occupied territories.

The Palestinian recognition of the danger of Israel’s objectives behind the most recent escalation did not push for a collective embrace of a unified national strategy to confront the occupation’s attack and continuous crimes committed against the Palestinian people. Israel believes that it will not be held accountable for these actions by the openly biased United States, in addition to the fact that the Arab countries are preoccupied with their internal affairs, the interactions associated with the events, and the changes taking place in the region for the past four years.

Israel’s concern over the Palestinian national unity covers its fear of the reconciliation breaking the current fait accompli and hindering its project in the occupied West Bank, which Israel wants divided amongst the “state” of about 631,000 settlers today, and which Israel is seeking to make a million settlers in the next few years, within 62 per cent of the West Bank’s area in what is called “Area C”, which is rich with investment, economic and agricultural potential.

This state will also include a self-rule for Palestinians, either in the form of an authority, or even a state, within the fragmented areas that are not under the control of the occupation. This authority will be responsible for the civil and life affairs of the population, but will lack any sovereignty and security, which will be controlled by the occupation, while Gaza will be an isolated state with a separate authority, according to the warnings of Palestinian officials, after the land allocated for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders is taken over and there are no more demands for Jerusalem to be divided.

The variations in the political programme remain an obstacle in the way of implementing the reconciliation agreement, stopping at the actions of the committee formed to activate and develop the PLO , which aims to include Hamas and the Islamic Jihad under its umbrella in response to Hamas’ insistence on armed resistance, its refusal to recognise Israel, the liberation of the entire historical Palestine, and its quest to find a unified and comprehensive national programme in accordance with all forms of resistance for the upcoming phase. Meanwhile, Fatah has adopted the course of negotiations as the sole strategic option and has adopted peaceful popular resistance as the choice only against the occupation’s aggression.

While Hamas is demanding that the resistance keeps its weapons and integrates members of the police and security institutions in the Gaza Strip into the framework of the PA security agencies, the latter has repeatedly made statements that the future state will be demilitarised. This displayed the clear contrast in the interpretation of the terms of the reconciliation agreement by the two movements and the meaning of its content, which is destined to be applied to the areas of the government’s work, as well as path, perhaps.

Meanwhile, the focus of the conflict continues to fluctuate between the nature of the government itself, where Fatah believes that it will be “committed to the obligations of the authority, the signed agreements, and the political programme adopted and approved by the PLO institutions”, including the commitments made with Israel and its recognition, but Hamas completely rejects this, and believes that the government is “a transitional phase to carry out specific tasks according to the previously agreed upon timeline”, i.e. six months.

In the end, if the rabid Israeli attack against the Palestinian people is aiming to hinder the reconciliation and cause it to fail, then by considering the element of time, which many believe is the greatest challenge hindering its achievement, then the reconciliation will not be achieved, no matter how long, while the thorny internal issues continue to be postponed, including the issues of security, the PLO, and the elections, to which the occupation is, in one way or another, linked, and while there is no real will to give priority to achieving national unity which is a core phase in national liberation from occupation.

Translated from Al Quds Al Arabi, 16 September, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.