The bear that poked its friend in the eye

“Our northern neighbour is also providing assistance in Syria, but it is not happy with the Islamic resistance. In any case, it is providing assistance on the basis of [our] shared interests; but it is not clear that Russia is aligned with Iran with regard to Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad.” This statement, made by the Commander of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Mohammad Ali Jafari on 3 November, holds political significance. It was made at a time when the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that “ensuring that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad remains in power is not a matter of principle for Moscow.”

These aforementioned positions suggest fundamental differences between Iran and Russia, despite their keenness to appear as allies, especially with regards to the Syrian issue. However, it is obvious from the extent of the growing differences between the two sides that there are a number of serious differences and disputes between Tehran and Moscow.

There is no doubt that since the beginning of the Syrian crisis Tehran has sought to expand its influence in the area extending from Tehran to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea via Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. It has done so in order to secure its vital role as a regional heavy weight, and it has used its sectarian and doctrinal aspect to do so. This is evidenced by Mohammad Ali Jafari’s words when he said that: “The unification of the hearts of the Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians will form a single nation, which will pave the way for the emergence of the Imam Mahdi.” (Mehr news agency, 3 November)

However, this Iranian policy was faced with strong opposition from the countries competing with Tehran (notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey), which embraced the Syrian political opposition. This opposition has arguably prevented the success of the Iranian project until now, even economically exhausting it; thus driving Tehran recently to freeze its nuclear project in exchange for lifting the economic and military sanctions imposed on it. Iran has also resorted to relying on its “friend” Russia to rescue it by protecting the Syrian regime from falling after it started to waver in the face of the blows dealt by the armed Syrian opposition, especially the Army of Conquest (Jaish Al-Fatah) formed with Saudi and Turkish support.

The appearance of differences, at least on the surface, in the political positions of Tehran and Moscow just a month after the beginning of Russian military intervention in the Syrian crisis (which is supposed to support the Iranian policy in the country) suggests that Iran, with the increased level of challenges, has gone out of the frying pan and into the fire. This does not only apply to its confrontations with its traditional political opponents, but even in its confrontations with its alleged “strategic ally” Moscow.

However, Russian military policy has recently begun to deviate from the Iranian agenda. First, Moscow’s potential abandonment of President Bashar Al-Assad seems likely to be calculated in exchange for maintaining its influence and military base in Tartus as well as its economic ties with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Gulf states. Russia may also employ its intervention in Syria to pressure NATO regarding the Ukrainian crisis. How will Iran face this dispute over the fate of President Al-Assad, who is considered a red line for Tehran, especially if we take into consideration the fact that the final word will be Russia’s, as it is the top commander of the military operations in Syria at the moment, and given its permanent membership in the UN Security Council and its status as the main source of weapons for the Iranian nuclear project?

Secondly, Russia is wary of drowning in the Syrian crisis, and therefore it has limited its intervention to the involvement of the Air Force while depending on the Syrian regime army and the thousands of fighters from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Hezbollah for ground attacks. This means that the higher price will be paid by Iran, as it has been involved in the Syrian crisis for the past four years. Will Iran continue its dependency and association with Al-Assad despite the fact that it will continue to pay the higher price for keeping him in power – especially since the indicators of the Russian intervention do not suggest that the battle can be militarily resolved in the foreseeable future?

Third, Russia’s domination of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria, especially on the southern front (Golan), serves Israel’s security requirements. This takes the winning card out of Iran’s hand, as Hezbollah plays a vital role in executing the Iranian agenda in the Syrian arena.

Fourth, the ongoing and public security and military coordination between Russian and Israel in Syria causes more embarrassment for Iran, which openly voices its hostility towards Israel. This serves to destroy the credibility of Iran’s discourse regarding the Palestinian issue. In addition to this, Russia’s behaviour generates a growing political and security concern for Hezbollah, whose Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said in his infamous speech that the liberation of Jerusalem will be through Zabadani (a city in southwest Syria). So what if Russia sponsors the alliance with the Syrian regime and openly leads the security coordination with the Israeli occupation?

It is clear that Iran is experiencing a complex dilemma in Syria, including its failure to singularly protect the Syrian regime throughout the Syrian crisis; its resorting to help from the Russian bear, who has his own agenda that does not necessarily align with Iran’s; and the return of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the sole ruling party in Turkey, Iran’s rival that holds a very different vision for the Syrian crisis to Tehran.

The current scene confirms that military action alone has become incapable of resolving the battle in Syria and that the more force used by the Syrian regime and its allies will only lead to more bloodshed in light of the current balance of power. This will open the door once again to the political option, which will only succeed if it takes into consideration the interests and aspirations of the Syrian people first and foremost.

Translated from Alkhaleejonline, 9 November 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.