Weighing the cost of Morocco’s involvement in Europe’s fight against terrorism

As alert levels in Brussels ease gradually after weeks of vigilance over potential terrorism in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, Moroccan intelligence agencies are expected to have engaged in more security cooperation with EU countries. Their technical and field experience in tracking down dangerous nationals abroad has pushed the Belgian authorities, for instance, to request more sharing of quality intelligence to pre-empt as well as tackle radical threats.

Under the patronage of the monarchs of the two countries, the Belgian request occurred after the Moroccan agencies supplied efficient intelligence to their French counterparts regarding the St-Denis attackers. Though the outcome was to throw the spotlight on Molenbeek as a terrorist abode, the Belgians understood that Moroccan intelligence could be an asset in the war on home-grown terrorism, if not to EU countries generally.

However, Morocco’s involvement in the war on terrorism in Europe is not without its own repercussions. The Central Office for Judicial Investigations, Morocco’s version of the FBI, announced on 11 December that a Daesh-related cell was dismantled near the city of Kenitra. The official press release said that the nine-member group was well advanced in a plot to monitor and target some key estates with live ammunition.

Prior to that, two alarming incidents assured Morocco that it would become a potential terrorist target. First, the media highlighted some US intelligence reports warning the north-west African state about Daesh’s preparation for electronic attacks on its enemies. The reports assert that the group has reinvigorated its war tactics and reshaped its cyber warfare to hack, block or e-attack aviation networks or similar key infrastructure such as energy stations.

Morocco, though, is not lagging behind in cyber warfare capabilities. Last July, Hacking Team leaks revealed that it had spent over €3,173,550 on spyware that could reach up to 2,000 targeted devices. I estimate that with such investment, Morocco not only uses the technologies to “tighten stability” within but also to function as a hub for international hacking in the region.

The second is that the Ministry of Interior suspects that Salah Abdeslam, a principle plotter in the Paris attacks, has fled to Morocco. The Moroccan authorities have issued an arrest warrant with pictures of Abdeslam and his accomplice Mohammed Abrini. Though the media explained the escape by reference to their Moroccan origins, it is expected that they will retaliate against their home country, whose intervention they may view as a threat to their freedom or an obstacle for their destructive attacks in Europe or elsewhere.

Given the seriousness of their threat, and potential Daesh retaliation, Morocco needs to evaluate very carefully the price of involvement in a globalised war that jeopardises local as well as international security.

The publicity surrounding Morocco’s involvement in tracking the mindset of those behind the Paris attacks and Moroccan-Belgian security cooperation surprised observers. Usually, intelligence agents prefer to work in the dark, especially when related to an increasingly internationalised and cross-border problem such as terrorism. The openness would be taken as a miscalculation unless it is part of a media agenda to sell Moroccan security services to allies.

Furthermore, the Belgian request is a double-edged project. It can point the finger at the Moroccan socio-political context for indirectly feeding fanaticism. The suspects, born and grown up in Europe, mostly originate from Morocco. They are part of more than 1,500 Moroccans who have joined Daesh in Syria.

On the other hand, the appeal for help from EU countries acknowledges Morocco’s successful approach to terrorism. Morocco witnessed its own 9/11 on 16 May, 2003. Ever since, it has undergone few attacks but dozens of pre-emptive strikes and discoveries of sleeper cells.

Nevertheless, Belgium – or the EU at large – needs to learn from the Moroccan experience in its totality. In addition to security, the government in Rabat has undertaken a simultaneous multi-faceted approach to curb the seeds of terrorism. Since 2004, it has been restructuring the state religious provision. Mosques have been rebuilt, but controlled more. Imams have been re-trained and a religious radio station and TV channel were launched in 2006. Thus, part of the success of the Moroccan experience is recognising that it is the teaching of religion – not its prohibition – that can help to mitigate radicalisation.

At the socio-economic level, a UN Development Programme-related initiative has been at work since 2004 to reduce poverty and vulnerability, especially in remote areas. In politics, moderate Islamists have been integrated into political life while Moroccans whom traditional political structures – parties and unions – have failed to attract are integrated through civil society organisations.

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The attractiveness of its experience can help Morocco to seek more recognition for its proposal to solve the Sahara problem. Security negotiations and coordination are but one facet of holistic regional cooperation that would contribute to avoiding the recent Morocco-EU trade disagreement over Sahara products.

In addition, the Moroccan monarch is the president of the Al-Quds Committee. The countries with which Morocco is allied and cooperate today need to recognise that one of the key reasons behind the rise of politicised violence is the feeling of intimidation in the region, especially the inability to make advances in the Palestinian cause and the unconditional support that Israel receives from numerous Western governments. Morocco is thus in a good position to bridge the growing gaps between East and West on security issues in general, and the Palestine-Israel conflict in particular.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.