There will be no major war between Israel and Iran now

When Israel assassinated Fuad Shukr, a senior military official of Hezbollah and one of Hassan Nasrallah’s top military advisors, in the heart of the Dahieh suburb in the south of Beirut last week, it did so inside an apartment in the movement’s most guarded area and confirmed his death hours before Hezbollah confirmed it. The occupation state then followed this by assassinating Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas political bureau, while he was in Iran and guarded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps after attending the inauguration of new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

While the two operations had different targets and motives, they should not necessarily be lumped together. Nevertheless, many questions are being asked about the security capabilities of Hezbollah and Iran. Haniyeh’s deputy Saleh Al-Arouri was killed by Israel in Beirut earlier this year, also while he was in Dahieh, Hezbollah’s stronghold in the south of the Lebanese capital.

In theory, Haniyeh was in the safest possible place when he was killed, because security and precautionary measures are usually at their highest level during presidential inauguration ceremonies. This poses questions about the extent of the security breach by the IRGC and the Iranian security services responsible for the ceremony on this occasion, and the protection of the international guests.

Following Haniyeh’s assassination, Iran said that the targeting of its guest required a response on its part, taking us back to the same scenario that we saw in April, when Israel attacked the Iranian Consulate in Damascus and Iran responded with a massive but ineffective missile and drone attack. The talk then was all about what might result from such a response, including the possibility of a full-scale war. Israel has now said that any major response by Iran and its proxies to Haniyeh’s killing would require an Israeli response in the form of a comprehensive war on all fronts, and that Israel is prepared for that.

READ: Israel signals readiness for pre-emptive strikes against Iran, Hezbollah

The US, of course, has confirmed that it will stand with and defend Israel through thick and thin regardless of what Netanyahu does. The US Navy has deployed destroyers in the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier, amphibious assault teams and more than 4,000 marines and sailors.

Looking at the situation from a strategic perspective — and not from the angle of a strike and counterstrike to save face — the question arises about whether or not Iran and its proxies are ready for an all-out war with Israel.

The short answer to that is no, they are not.

For Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has no personal interest in reaching a deal to release prisoners, ending the genocide of the Palestinians or seeing stability in the region. Stopping the war means that his political career will be over, and he will be held accountable for his actions and perhaps get a prison sentence (he has been indicted on corruption charges). Netanyahu thus benefits from continuing the war and expanding its scope to include other parties, especially Iran, in the hope that this will save him from his own legal crisis and drag the US into the fighting.

However, the priority for Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution has been to protect itself in the face of occasional regime-change efforts led by Washington, and this means that it must make every effort not to go to war with the US or Israel. This is one of the reasons why Iran has been arming its proxies in the region as an advanced line of defence and to buy it time to develop a nuclear bomb or reach a deal with Washington that guarantees what it wants. As a result, talk of an all-out war or direct confrontation led by Iran is almost completely false.

Iran knows that such a war would be very costly and would probably end in its destruction and regime change. Moreover, Iran has no interest in intervening at a time when Netanyahu is drowning in Gaza, nor does it have an interest in confronting the US at a time when the negotiating table is being re-arranged to discuss the nuclear file. It is also preparing for the return of Trump to the White House, and this means that it must not to throw Hezbollah to the lions now, as that would lead to the destruction of both the movement and Lebanon at a time that does not serve Tehran’s agenda.

As such, Iran’s calculations are not related to Palestine, Gaza or Hamas.

They are secondary and are being used like other cards to try to strengthen its regional position, its negotiating position and its popularity after a decade of ongoing involvement against the Syrian people and other Arab nations. There is no doubt that such a move also has costs, but they are relatively few and acceptable given the results that Tehran hopes to get. That’s why, when Iran wanted to save face in April, it informed all those concerned, including the Americans, of the precise details of the response against Israel, enabling all of its missiles and drones to be shot down.

Netanyahu has gone too far in embarrassing Iran, though, so Tehran has to respond but it faces a dilemma. Not responding encourages Netanyahu to continue his aggression, assassinations and strikes inside Iran in an attempt to lure it into a war in which it has no interest. However, an effective response almost inevitably means war against Israel and the US, which is what Netanyahu wants, and will likely end with the destruction of Iran and the change of its regime. Everything between not responding and a real response is apparently acceptable to all parties and within the rules of the new game. Of course, there is a lot of scope for miscalculations, a serious possibility in light of the ongoing escalation, but the strategic calculations of all concerned suggest that this will not happen.

This article first appeared in Arabic in Arabi21 on 3 August 2024

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