Sisi woos Trump and manoeuvres around the Gulf

Egyptian-American relations are going through a period of coldness, marked by tension, against the backdrop of differing positions on the war in Gaza; Washington’s plan to relocate residents of the Strip to Egypt and Jordan; the situation in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal; as well as other regional issues.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi may now feel cornered after betting heavily on the return of his American counterpart, Donald Trump, to the White House for a second term ending in January 2029.

But things did not go as El-Sisi had hoped. He may now be forced to offer sensitive concessions or resort to tactical manoeuvring and a strategy of geopolitical repositioning in an attempt to ease tensions with Washington or at least reduce their impact.

Political isolation

Cairo senses that it has been boxed into a corner and pushed into political isolation. This was evident during Trump’s regional tour last month, which excluded a visit to Cairo or an invitation for El-Sisi to attend the US-Gulf summit in Riyadh.

On 21 May 2017, El-Sisi stood beside Trump and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz during the opening ceremony of the Global Centre for Combating Extremist Ideology, as part of the Arab Islamic American Summit hosted in Riyadh; a scene that has not been repeated in the nearly eight years since.

The growing marginalisation of Cairo—backed by some Gulf capitals—is driven by Egypt’s declining regional and international influence, its deteriorating economic situation, and the collapse of El-Sisi’s popularity during his third presidential term, which extends to 2030.

Diplomatic leaks, reported by The New Arab, revealed that plans were in place for a meeting between Trump and El-Sisi in Doha under the pretext of mediation for a Gaza ceasefire, but those efforts reportedly failed, according to a diplomatic source at the Egyptian embassy in Washington.

“Where is my favourite dictator?” This is how Trump once referred to El-Sisi while awaiting a meeting with him on the sidelines of the 2019 G7 Summit in Paris. While the Egyptian president may remain in office until 2030, he no longer appears to be Trump’s favourite.

The sense of marginalisation has intensified as high-level contacts between Cairo and Washington have dwindled. The most recent gesture from the US side was sending Trump’s adviser for Arab, Middle Eastern, and African affairs, Masad Boulos, to Cairo about two weeks ago—an act that further frustrated Egyptian officials.

American pressure

Washington continues to pressure Cairo to accept Trump’s plan to relocate Gaza residents to Egypt and Jordan, to allow free passage for US ships through the Suez Canal (between 1,000 and 2,000 ships annually), and to have the Egyptian army participate in the war against the Houthis; requests that Egypt has rejected, further straining relations.

Pressure has mounted with reports suggesting that Saudi Arabia offered the US a military base on the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to secure navigation in the Red Sea and Suez Canal, according to Mada Masr an independent outlet.

The US military currently does not have a base in Egypt, although around 600 American troops are stationed in Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), in place since 1981.

American pressure has continued in other forms. In May, the US State Department placed Egypt on its travel advisory list under the “Reconsider Travel” category—a move that negatively impacts Egypt’s tourism sector, a vital source of foreign currency.

In March, the US Federal Maritime Commission announced an investigation into global maritime chokepoints, including the Suez Canal, to determine whether any state or shipping entity is creating unfavourable conditions for American shipping and foreign trade.

The scale, nature, and pace of US pressure correlate with American objectives and ongoing discussions with regional allies about boosting military presence in the Red Sea to protect American and Israeli interests and restrict Egypt’s independent decision-making, according to political analyst Amr Shehab.

Observers note that coordination between Washington, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi is shifting away from Egypt on key files—especially Gaza, Syria, Sudan, and Libya. According to The Economist, El-Sisi is increasingly viewed as a burden on regional capitals and is now listed among the “losers in the new Middle East.”

READ: Is Netanyahu harming Egypt’s economy?

Cairo’s charm offensive

In response to the imposed isolation, Egypt is trying to warm relations with Trump, who had warmly welcomed El-Sisi to the White House in April 2017, calling him “a great friend and ally” and praising his leadership in difficult circumstances, without mentioning Egypt’s human rights violations since the 3 July 2013 military coup.

El-Sisi has publicly expressed his desire to establish an American industrial zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone during his meeting with a high-level delegation of American businessmen at the US-Egypt Economic Forum in Cairo.

As a goodwill gesture, Egypt waived its requirement for US dairy products to carry halal certification through the end of 2025 and pledged to facilitate conditions for American investors in preparation for a new trade agreement.

According to an Egyptian opposition figure, speaking anonymously, US strategic calculations no longer see Egypt as the heavyweight it once was—potentially pushing Cairo to offer further concessions. He told Middle East Monitor that although Egypt officially opposes the relocation of Gaza’s population, this stance might not hold under the weight of the crises the regime is facing.

In April, Israeli Defence Minister Yisrael Katz stated that Egypt introduced, for the first time, a condition for a comprehensive ceasefire deal: the disarmament of Hamas and a weapons-free Gaza.

According to Muslim Brotherhood leader Qutb Al-Arabi, the Egyptian regime is now the “sick man” of the region. Major powers prefer to keep it in this state, not dead, but not recovering, so it remains vulnerable to blackmail and more willing to make continuous concessions.

READ: Fatwa chaos deepens Gaza’s suffering

A new manoeuvre

Alongside this charm offensive, Cairo is attempting to shift the rules of engagement through political and military manoeuvring. This includes launching military training cooperation with China, conducting joint air exercises dubbed Eagles of Civilization 2025, and pursuing a deal to acquire J-35 fighter jets from Beijing—a Chinese equivalent to the U.S. F-35.

Egypt has also opened a second avenue for manoeuvring through rapprochement with Iran. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Cairo last Sunday to hold talks with the Egyptian president on bilateral cooperation, Red Sea navigation, and regional developments.

Former Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Fawzi Ashmawi highlighted yet another potential manoeuvre: a legal challenge aimed at halting the 2016 maritime border agreement with Saudi Arabia, which involved handing over the islands of Tiran and Sanafir. In a Facebook post, he questioned whether this lawsuit signals a political rift between the two countries or is simply a bargaining chip for economic leverage, particularly given reports of a Saudi offer to host a US military base on one of the islands.

The doors of manoeuvring remain open. President El-Sisi might even resort to using the spectre of political Islam, hinting at reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, as a pressure tactic against Gulf allies if they consider abandoning his regime.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.