Are Israeli-American relations losing their special status?

The phone call between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu two nights ago, was described by most Israeli media outlets as favourable, particularly regarding the Iranian issue. It did not, however, dispel the prevailing impression in Israel that there is a negative change in America’s Middle East strategy, notably toward the occupying state. This impression, which extends to circles close to the government, stems primarily from the collapse of a long-held assumption that the US administration will always stand by Israel, and perhaps even be in its pocket. This impression has formed after a series of unilateral steps taken by the Trump administration without consulting or obtaining Israel’s approval.

These steps specifically include: the agreement signed by the Trump administration with the Houthis in Yemen, which did not impose a red light on the continued firing of missiles at Israel, the embrace of what Israel describes as “former Islamists” in Syria, the embrace of Turkiye and Qatar; and the rush to reach an agreement with Iran, which, according to most Israeli readings, would allow it to almost completely maintain its nuclear programme. Regarding the war on Gaza, there is a near-consensus that the US administration’s deep disappointment with Israel’s conduct in the context of this war is a common factor linking all these steps.

According to more than one Israeli bilateral relations expert, these steps prove, first and foremost, that President Trump has no regard for Israeli interests. In his view, American interests and his interests are paramount. Secondly, the US president has traditionally delivered messages to Israel directly, sometimes sharply, and without any restraint. However, Trump has chosen a new method of indirectly delivering messages to his Israeli ally. This includes unwritten means and taking or refraining from taking steps, rather than clear and direct statements.

READ: Reports: Trump said to have told Netanyahu to end Gaza war now

An example of this is when Netanyahu was surprised to hear about the launch of diplomatic dialogue between Washington and Tehran, without having any prior knowledge of this process, which was being conducted behind his back, despite it being a top priority for him. This was only the beginning of a series of additional steps that did not include any direct public criticism from the White House, but did serve as a serious indication of the declining status of what are described as the special or exceptional relationship between the two countries.

In this regard, it is worth noting, specifically, that Trump’s decision not to visit Israel during his tour of the Gulf states is a clear indication that the special relationship between the two parties is losing its spark and exclusivity.

Naturally, there are multiple suggestions on how Israel should deal with this change. We have found that there are two main approaches: First, the need to examine and understand the root reasons for this change by the Americans, rather than simply saying this is part of President Trump’s nature and temperament. Some who hold this view openly call for examining the limitations of Israel’s power in front of the US.

According to the position of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, now is not the appropriate time, nor is Trump the appropriate president, to create a crisis initiated by Israel. A crisis like this might offer some advantages over a normal American administration, but it’s an uncalculated risk for an administration like Trump’s.

The second approach, embraced by the government’s mouthpieces and its prime minister, is that the last thing Israel needs is to surrender and concede. Their argument is that Israel hasn’t always relied on the Americans to ensure its security, as during the first two decades of its existence, the US did not stand by its side, or did it provide it with weapons or economic aid or support it diplomatically.

Translated from Arab48, 11 June 2025

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.