China’s energy security and ambiguity in the Middle East crisis

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran once again exacerbated the geopolitical fault lines of the Middle East security dilemma. Israel’s unprovoked and illegal offensive against Iran for its alleged attempts at nuclear enrichment heightened the tensions in the region. Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles on Israel. The United States then bombed Iran’s key nuclear sites and plunged the globe into dire anticipation of another long, violent conflict in the Middle East. 

China’s role amidst this whole episode has remained that of a passive observer. China did condemn the United States’ bombing of Iran’s nuclear facility and called it a violation of international law and a threat to regional security. However, there was no diplomatic support for Iran or any assertive attempts to safeguard its energy security, both through the Strait of Hormuz and its oil imports from the Middle East. For Beijing, the Strait of Hormuz is more than just a geopolitical hotspot; it is a lifeline. Any conflict between Iran and Israel threatens to disrupt this vein of global energy, and thus China’s strategic security.

China’s energy imports of crude oil from the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz totalled an astounding $128 billion in 2023. In 2025, China imported 5.4 million barrels of crude oil per day through the Hormuz Strait in the first quarter of this year, according to the EIA. China’s oil imports from the Gulf account for half of its total energy imports. This makes the stability of the region a vital security concern for China. 

Similarly, Iran has strategic relevance for China not only as a major supplier of oil and gas, but also as a geopolitical partner to resist US dominance in the Middle East. Its vast energy reserves assist China’s resource security, while Tehran’s non-compliant foreign policy posture aligns with Beijing’s overall objective in establishing an alternative to the US-based international order. Iran is part of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China and Iran also signed a 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2021, laying the path for collaboration in energy, infrastructure, technology, and security. This long-term pact demonstrates the strategic depth of their partnership and their shared ambition to navigate a multipolar order.

China has also established close trade relations with Israel over the years. Israel recognised China’s Communist Government in 1950. In 2023, China was Israel’s 2nd largest trading partner after the United States. Between 2013 and 2022, Chinese imports to Israel doubled, rising from $5.6 billion in 2013 to $13.1 billion in 2022. Between 2010 and 2020, Chinese investment in Israel increased significantly, particularly in the technology sector, indicating growing strategic interest. This collaboration was formalised in 2015 with the formation of the China-Israel Joint Committee for Innovation Cooperation, and by 2017, over 30 Chinese enterprises had joined the Israeli market.

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The prolonged tensions in the Middle East call into question China’s carefully cultivated image as a global stabiliser and principled non-interventionist. As the self-declared architect of “global security cooperation,” Beijing’s ability to balance the stakes is in question. The inability to negotiate between two of its major partners risks exposing the limits of its diplomatic clout and undermining its claims to responsible great power leadership. The Middle East is a vital point for the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) with major routes and important regional partners that are vital for its success. The Israeli aggression against Iran and the retaliatory clashes once again exposed the geopolitical fault lines of the region. US attack on Iran’s nuclear facility and follow-up retaliation of Iran by partially closing the Hormuz Strait and sending warning missiles at a US base in Qatar highlighted Iran’s willingness to protect its national security.

This episode also highlighted the limitations of China’s diplomatic efforts and lack of assertive projection to protect its investments or ability to assist its strategic partners in the region. Despite China’s diplomatic efforts at the UN or condemnation of US strikes, its lack of any substantive measures to assert any support for Iran illustrates Beijing’s ambiguous position in the region’s geopolitical landscape. Instability in Iran or Israel doesn’t just disrupt oil, it undermines the very infrastructure of China’s Belt and Road objective across Eurasia. 

China positioned itself as a potential mediator after the 12 June provocation and urged for a cease-fire and de-escalation. Despite its prior history of mediation in the region, Beijing’s role in the conflict remained limited. China at the UN assembly called for “an immediate and unconditional ceasefire”, especially after Iran threatened to completely close the Hormuz. China would suffer the most had the tensions prolonged and a ceasefire not been brokered due to its dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. The threat of military action could have set back BRI projects and logistics from the Gulf towards East Asia. But despite these looming security concerns, Beijing’s response remained limited due to its non-interference in foreign conflicts. 

Although China’s approach has allowed it to establish significant relations with many countries that are hostile to each other, like India and Pakistan, its noninterventionist policy reached a stalemate in the current Middle East security dilemma. Israel has emerged as a major destabilising force in the area, bolstered by its strategic relationship with the United States. The United States’ support for Israel, along with direct assaults on Iran’s nuclear facilities, demonstrates Washington’s willingness to start another Middle East conflict to protect its strategic interests and closest regional ally. In this situation, Israel and the U.S are willing to harm China’s most significant security issues while China was forced to the mediation table, hoping to de-escalate tensions via dialogue. 

The threat of war may have toned down, but the tensions between Iran and Israel persist with occasional threats of another attack. In this strategic dilemma, China will ultimately have to make a decision: whether to passively rely on volatile peace in the region or take an active stance on its core security issues. The conflict between Iran and Israel is not only a test of military endurance, but also of China’s willingness to navigate through crisis management. Its response to this security dilemma is going to shape Beijing’s model of leadership.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.