![Islamic Revolution's leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (L) presents newly appointed Prime Minister of Iran, Mehdi Bazargan (R) during a press conference, on February 5, 1979 in Tehran. [Photo by GABRIEL DUVAL/AFP via Getty Images]](https://i0.wp.com/www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-1237662304-1.jpg?fit=920%2C613&ssl=1)
The UK rejected several appeals made by exiled Iranian opposition individuals and groups in 1981 seeking British backing for military and political efforts to topple the revolutionary rule of the Islamic Republic, declassified British government documents reveal.
Following the victory of Islamic Revolution of February 1979, a wave of Iranian politicians, military officers, professionals, students, and businessmen fled into exile across Europe and the United States. From abroad, they attempted to rally Western, especially the British and American support for a counter-revolution in Iran.
A British policy review conducted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the lead-up to the Shah’s fall had recommended maintaining contact with both internal and exiled opposition groups. As a result, the FCO kept informal channels open, though it remained officially and publicly neutral.
Documents, unearthed by MEMO in the British National Archives, reveal that, one year after the Iraq–Iran war began, the FCO was approached by numerous Iranian exiles loyal to the Pahlavi monarchy. They sought support for plans to spark a revolution against Ayat Allah Khomeini’s revolutionary rule in Iran, which was officially recognised by the UK.
In early January 1981, Sir John Graham, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO, met with Mohammad Derakhshesh, a former minister under the Shah and a staunch anti-clerical figure. Derakhshesh requested British support for what he described as a “revolt” by Iranian teachers in response to the closure of schools and universities, and the growing control of the education system by clerics. He claimed to be chairman of the Iranian Teachers’ Association, which he said had a membership of 600,000.
He also informed Graham that he was mobilising overseas support for the teachers’ movement. When asked about his political stance, Derakhshesh stated that he had opposed the Shah and initially welcomed the revolution—but added that “what had emerged was not the revolution that he had wanted.”
According to meeting records, Sir Graham said he would “consider the proposal carefully” and offered to meet him again “to discuss the matter further” after Derakhshesh’s return from a visit to the United States. Graham later advised the relevant departments to assess whether Derakhshesh actually led a widespread organisation. While he doubted that Derakhshesh has “the personality to lead an opposition movement”, Graham noted that his background was “far from negligible.”
In late January, Ardeshir Zahedi, the former Iranian Foreign Minister, sent a message to the FCO through his friend Julian Amery, a pro-intervention Conservative MP and well-known Zionist politician. Zahedi claimed that the Khomeini regime was “close to its terminal phase”. He warned that the next regime could either be pro-Western or pro-Soviet, and argued that any opposition plan clearly supported by the US and the UK “would command the support of the (Iranian) emigration”.
In a reply to Amery, Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington called Zahedi’s views “interesting” and thanked Amery for sharing the perspectives of his Iranian contacts.
In February, AH Saheb-Divani, an Iranian businessman residing in the UK, sought British support for a group called Atresh-e-Rahaihaksh-e-Iran (ARI), or the Iran Liberation Army. In a meeting with FCO officials FM Wogan and J. Lamport, he said ARI operated across several European capitals. According to him, the organisation’s council had 25 members—15 of whom were Iranian army officers still serving in Iran. The remaining ten members represented political and business interests. Saheb-Divani declined to reveal names.
Wogan’s report about the meeting stated that Saheb-Divani told him that ARI aimed “to be ready the fill vacuum that would emerge after Khomeini’s death”, and that the Iranian army was its primary support base for the organization. Saheb-Divani claimed ARI had already established links with clerics, tribes, and the middle class in Iran, and though most activity was in Western Europe, the group “enjoyed support from many disaffected elements in Iran itself”.
Asked about ARI’s future plans, Saheb-Divani said the grouping intended to “establish military control for an initial period of time, probably about 3 years”. It would thereafter, “revive the constitution of 1906 with or without the monarchy”.
Two months later, Wogan met Shahrokh Firouz, an Iranian ambassador, and Nazam-e-Ameri, son of the late Sheikh Khazal, the historical leader of Khorramshahr, Khuzestan province.
They advised the UK to blow up Mehrabad Airport expecting to provide “the green light for those who would rise up to overthrow the regime”. The British official “thanked them for their counsel”. In an indication that his country believed the new realty in Iran couldn’t be reversed, Wogan said that “it would be nice if we could all put the clock back”.
In April 1981, Douglas Hurd, then Minister of State at the FCO, requested that Wogan meet Dr Mehdi Bahadori, cousin of a former royal court official imprisoned in Iran. Bahadori sought “moral support” for the Iran Resistance Movement, led by General Gholam-Ali Oveissi, former Chief of Staff under the Shah. Oveissi, known as the “butcher of Tehran” for his role in suppressing protests. He asked the UK to “have a word” with the Turkish authorities urging them to “allow General Oveissi a free hand in Eastern Turkey and provide him with money”.
The British diplomat rejected the request, stating that despite any regrets about the 1979 revolution, it was “an established reality”. He reiterated that the UK’s policy was to engage with the de facto government in Iran, and it could “could not offer him (General Oveissi) any support”.
In early June, General Oveissi requested “covert cooperation” from Britain to help pave the way for an “eventual political coup” in Iran. In a meeting with Gerald Ryan, a diplomat from the British Embassy in Paris, the General claimed that “agents of the British” were active and “held quite a considerable amount of influence” in Iran.
During the meeting, he complained that the free world had “not shown more active resistance” to the influence of Russian communism in Iran.
General Oveissi also claimed to have met with George Bush, then Vice President of the United States, who he said had promised logistical support for his plans to overthrow the Iranian regime. However, he complained that no such support had materialised.
The British diplomat did not comment on the General’s statements or offer any commitment. Oveissi asked that his message be conveyed to the British government.
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The FCO later instructed Ryan and his colleagues not to accept any meeting invitations from Oveissi or his representatives without first consulting their superiors. They were also advised to be more cautious in their dealings with Iranians.
In July, General Seyyed Ahmad Madani, a former Iranian minister and Commander of the Iranian Navy, contacted the FCO through Peter Temple-Morris, MP, whose wife was Iranian, requesting a meeting with a mission representing the National Front, headed by Madani, to “put its cards on the table.”
When the mission, led by Dr Parviz Etminan, met with Wogan, they suggested that the “small Gulf states” could provide financial support for plans to instigate an uprising inside Iran. If the UK was serious about stopping the rot in Iran, they “had only to nudge the UAE in particular,” and Madani and his associates “could guarantee a successful uprising,” Etminan argued. He believed that Madani “could provide the pole of attraction for the opposition.”
Asked about the attitude of the Iranian armed services, Etminan claimed that the Navy and Air Force “would rise in the wake of a successful incursion” by Madani and his allies.
The British FCO official responded that the British “were always pleased to listen to what the various Iranian groups had to tell them.” However, he made clear that the UK’s position was that it “had diplomatic relations (of a sort) with the present regime” and “believed strongly that there should be no outside interference in Iranian internal affairs.”
At the time, the FCO decided to review British policy on contacts with the Iranian opposition after noting a rise in both the number and activity of Iranian exiles. The UK wanted, as A. C. Miers, head of the Middle East Department at the FCO, put it, to “avoid adding to the inevitable suspicion of the Iranian revolutionary government that we are plotting their overthrow.” The British were also keen to “remain in a position to deny publicly, with truth and conviction, that we have had discussions with opposition groups.”
Miers offered the following guidance on contacts with Iranian exiles, which was endorsed by the FCO:
- We merely listen without commitment.
- We make clear to the numerous intermediaries that we cannot contemplate backing exiled opposition to the regime, since we do not believe any of them has a chance of reversing the revolution.
- We do not wish to prejudice the relationship we are trying to build with the new government, which we have duly recognised.
- We must constantly bear in mind the undesirability of cutting ourselves off from opposition opinion in relation to countries like Iran.
- We have no intention of supporting any exiled group, financially or otherwise.
- We should not refuse to receive exiles in the Office, whether at their own request or at that of a third party.
In mid-1981, Amery, the British Zionist MP, once again advocated for military intervention in Iran. He argued that the Iranian opposition abroad could unite to provide an alternative to the revolutionary government. In a letter to Lord Carrington, Amery suggested that the UK should consult the Americans on launching an operation in Iran similar to the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh. He proposed that Iraq, Pakistan, and Oman “might be persuaded to provide the necessary springboards” for such an operation. Amery warned that the UK and the West might “wake up to find the Soviets in control of the oil fields and the Straits (in the Gulf).”
Lord Carrington rebuffed Amery’s suggestions, casting doubt on the effectiveness of the Iranian exiles. While acknowledging that the situation in Iran was “undoubtedly dangerous,” he noted that the Islamic Republic Party “does seem to be in control.” He added that the UK had yet to see any effective form of opposition and concluded, “There is probably no alternative but to allow the Iranian Revolution to follow its course without external interference.”
Meanwhile, Sir Graham criticized Amery’s “hanker for direct intervention” in Iran. In his response, he reiterated that, in the present world, Iranians “have got to work out their destiny.” “If that involves a counter-coup as a result of Iranian opposition to Khomeini’s Islamic Republic coming together, no doubt we shall be able to live with the result,” he said. However, Graham stressed that he “didn’t believe any émigré who stands a chance of making a comeback would benefit from or be prepared to profit from British or American backing.”
In September, UK Air Vice-Marshal WJ Herrington met Admiral Habibollahi, formerly of the Imperial Iranian Navy and a member of Azadegan—a military-oriented nationalist organisation operating in the UK, US, and France, presided over by General Bahram Aryana, former Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Iranian forces. The Admiral warned that the Iranian army had changed so much under the revolutionary regime that, if it seized power, Iran “would resemble Libya under Colonel Gaddafi”. He argued that early Western support would be needed to prevent the leadership from turning to the Soviet Union.
In a report on the meeting, Herrington noted that Habibollahi and his colleagues in Azadegan looked to countries like the UK for “moral support.” He believed they were “anxious to acquire a base of some kind—an island, perhaps—from which to operate and influence affairs in Iran.” Herrington suspected that Habibollahi had in mind Masirah, off the east coast of Oman in the Arabian Sea, the country’s largest island.
In his response, Miers from the FCO’s Middle East Department advised Herrington that the UK should “maximize our information while minimizing our commitment.”
That same month, the UK Ministry of Defence requested the FCO to meet Assad Homayoun, a former minister in the Iranian Embassy in Washington until the revolution, and now a coordinator for the Azadegan Movement. In a meeting with Wogan, Homayoun expressed his wish to “establish contacts with the British government.”
Wogan reiterated that the UK was always willing to receive and listen to any Iranian who wished to share insights on events in Iran, but emphasized that “there could be no question of any form of regular contact with any group, particularly those in opposition to the present regime.” He reminded Homayoun that the UK recognized the revolutionary regime and “believed Iran should solve its own problems without outside interference.”
In mid-November, Graham met with other former Iranian officials at their request. He told them that the days were past when the UK involved itself in the internal affairs of Iran. He stressed that the revolutionary regime “would likely consolidate its position and gradually bring increasing order to the country and economy.”
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