Although the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu ordered his ministers not to make any statements regarding the Egyptian army's overthrow of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, the elite Zionist security viewed this measure as a reduction of the negative effects of the Arab revolutions. The term "seminal act" has been used repetitively in Israeli descriptions of the act carried out by the Egyptian Defence Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi when he deposed President Morsi, to suggest that this step constitutes a turning point of a new era in which "Israel" is liberated from any of the sources of threat arising from the Arab Spring.
What Zionists count on gaining
What has heightened the state of satisfaction and contentment within official Israeli circles is the fact that the ousting of Morsi and pursuit of the "Muslim Brotherhood" make room for the following:
First: The restoration of the strategic partnership that existed between "Israel" and overthrown President Mubarak's regime; a partnership that had ended during Morsi's reign. As General Amos Yadlin, former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate and Director of "Institute for National Security Studies" said, the strategic partnership, which "Tel Aviv" hopes to restore with Egypt after the fall of Morsi's regime, is the recruitment of Egypt to help "Israel", again, in facing strategic challenges such as the danger of Palestinian "terrorism" and working together to face the global Jihad movements and the Iranian threat. Moreover, Yadlin notes that despite Morsi's short reign, he was able not only to end the strategic partnership with "Israel", but also worked to reduce Tel Aviv's manoeuvring margin as much as Egypt's strategic position would allow. He also pointed out Morsi's role in pushing "Israel" to end its latest military attack on the Gaza Strip before it was able to realise any of its goals. There is no dispute within "Israel" that Morsi's rule was a source of strength for the Palestinian resistance.
Second: The fall of Morsi will enhance the axis of "moderation" in the Arab world, which the Muslim Brotherhood's governance of Egypt weakened significantly. "Israel" believes that the restoration of the axis of moderation's strength will provide it with a large manoeuvring margin in a manner that allows it to regain its ability to build alliances with Arab regional powers if their interests meet.
Third: There is a deep realisation within "Israel" that the fall of the Brotherhood's rule and the consequent conflict between the supporters and opposition, as well as the increased sectarian polarisation between Sunnis and Shiites, will lower the priority of the Arab-Israeli conflict within the general Arab conflict, making it nothing but an insignificant detail. This will greatly allow for "Israel's" achievement of its goals with the least amount of resistance from the Arab World.
Fourth: It is an undisputed fact in "Israel" that the fall of Morsi was a serious blow to "Hamas" whose strategic environment greatly improved after the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, due to their ideological and organizational link. General Ron Tira – who was appointed to sensitive positions in the Military Intelligence Directorate in the past- expects that the "coup against Morsi will contribute to preventing "Hamas" from aggravating "Israel" in the future. However, most of the observers in "Israel" find it unlikely that Morsi's fall will encourage "Israel" to attack "Hamas" without strong grounds because it realises that such behaviour would give Arab public opinion the chance to intervene in a manner that would spoil the coup against Morsi.
Fifth: The Israeli elite have assumed that the isolation of Morsi has improved the Jordanian regime's ability to face calls for reform that may reduce its ability to continue its strategic cooperation with "Israel". Israeli minister and General, Efraim Sneh, believes that overthrowing Morsi has increased the chances of the Jordanian regime's survival, pointing out that hundreds of thousands of Israelis owe their survival to the role played by Jordanian security services through its cooperation with Israeli security.
Sixth: "Israel" believes that restoration of military rule in Egypt will contribute to restore America's position in the region, and this in itself is a significant strategic interest for "Israel" on the grounds that this transformation reduces the size of the strategic burden borne by "Israel" as a result of transformations in the region. Moreover, it contributes significantly to the restoration of Israel's deterrent power and improves "Tel Aviv's" ability to regain its regional status.
Seventh: It is agreed upon in "Israel" that the fall of Morsi will contribute to achieving "Israel's" interests in the Syrian arena. The Hebrew radio station quoted a number of sources from the Military Intelligence Directorate "Aman" saying that despite the limited role that Morsi could have played in the Syrian conflict, his regime recently took measures that improve the status of the Islamic groups working against Bashar Al-Assad's regime which conflicts with "Israel's" interests. According to the sources, any effective Arab intervention in favour of the rebels may lead to putting an end to the current fighting which conflicts with Israeli interest which aims to prolong the conflict.
In addition to the numerous gains "Israel" is counting on achieving, it warns against great sources of threat, including:
1. The ignition of the Sinai front through the growing activity of jihadist groups operating there and the targeting of settlements in south "Israel".
2. The rising reaction of the Egyptian public in a manner that forces the army to reinstate Morsi. This would mean that Morsi will take political action against "Israel" and the United States, on the grounds that he sensed that his isolation occurred after deliberations with the "Pentagon".
The author is a Palestinian writer. This article is a translation of the Arabic text published on islamtoday. net on 7 July 2013
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.