Trans-border disputes for political escapism

It was around noon on Saturday October 18; Algerian border guards attacked 10 Moroccan civilians, gravely injuring one the face. A bullet crossed Salhi Rizkallah’s cheeks while he was ploughing his father’s land, according to his family. In response to the incident, Morocco summoned the Algerian ambassador seeking an explanation. The Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Moroccan smugglers of throwing stones at the Algerian military officials. Suddenly, the small village of Ouled Salah, near the north-eastern city of Oujda, attracted media attention and another dispute on the closed Moroccan-Algerian borders sparked a war of words, especially because Moroccan civil society intended to organise a sit-in in front of the Algerian Embassy in Rabat.

Although Algeria refused Morocco’s exaggerated explanation and denounced the “political exploitation” of the event, the wound in Rizkallah’s face is indicative of the tense relationship between the two sides of the Zouj Beghal (two mules in Arabic) border.

Similar incidents have punctuated many years of uneasy border relationships, either due to smuggling, drug trafficking, escalations over the Moroccan Sahara, arms races, accusations of human rights abuses, fighting terrorism or seeking better involvement in international affairs in a region always on the move politically. Also, on both sides, the media these days, especially online news websites, continue a quarrel that dates back to the onset of the French colonisation in the region. Though the dispute changed into a war in 1963, the two regimes have resorted to closing the borders as a strategic solution.

The borders between the two have been closed since the Atlas Asni terrorist attack in Marrakech in 1994, for which Morocco accused Algerian intelligence. The Algerian authorities did not deny the accusation, but hinted at Moroccan involvement in pre-civil war Algeria, when the dismantled Front for Islamic Salvation made a landslide victory in the first round of parliamentary elections in 1991, Karim Moulai, an ex-Algerian intelligence agent, told the press. Possibly, Morocco was hopeful of an Algerian leadership that would recognise the “Moroccanness” of the Sahara and bring the long-standing rupture into a halt.

To understand the reasons behind the current spat, despite the difficulty of the task, a closer look at the context may uncover certain insights. Today, Algeria suffers from two intermixing and coterminous problems. The first is the political void that results from the absence of the president. Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been ill since April 2013, when he was transported to Paris for medication. Ever since, an iron curtain has enshrouded his health condition, similar to the practices of most leaders in pre-2011 Arab World. Nevertheless, he was elected for a fourth term in April 2014. During his election campaign, his speeches were read for him. His inaptitude makes rumours about his demise familiar news.

The second problem is the police protests. On October 14, in a rare move, 300 officers took to the streets of Algiers against the working condition of other riot units, reportedly attacked in the southern oasis city of Ghardaia. On the following day, they besieged the presidential palace, requesting the resignation of the general director of national security, and demanding the setting up of a police union.

The Republic Guards were subsequently put on alert. The situation reflects internal struggles within the current regime, which mainly result from the idea that the military led the country from behind Bouteflika.

The losers from the situation, notwithstanding the path the current spat will take, are mainly two. Foremost is the Algerian population. Since the ouster of the Socialist Forces Front (FSS), Algeria has entered into a dark tunnel of civil war, deadly checkpoints, terrorist attacks and unidentified assaults on civilians. The outcome is that the Algerian political scenery has become intolerable to Islamists, despite their social presence. Leaders have become less tolerant of democracy too. That is why, the reaction of Algerians to the Arab Spring was a little timid, not because they don’t need more freedoms and rights, but due to the iron fist that smothers the country.

The second loser is North Africa. With the current situation, especially with the Algerian unconditional support for the Polisario Front, North African countries make considerable economic, political and cultural loses. Movement within the Maghreb Union is bracketed, visa permits sway and economic, civil society and academic cooperation is meagre.

What triggers anxiety in the current state of affairs, is that it perpetuates the need for foreign intervention and international mediation between the two adjacent countries. Exchanged accusations of human rights abuse weaken cooperation in international bodies, further aggravated by calls to file an international complaint for Salhi Rizkallah as a violation of human rights. Political exploitation of the disputes will continue on both sides, notwithstanding who incites first. This means the two peoples and regimes alike will continue to be crippled by a problem that only mutual understanding and reciprocal concessions can solve.

Abderrahim Chalfaouat is a researcher in media studies and MENA politics from Morocco.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.