The conditions for regaining Yemen

The return of the Yemeni government members to Aden in preparation for the official resumption of the government’s work inside Yemeni territories reflects a development that may be radical in the events of the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen for the past six months.

For the first time since “Operation Decisive Storm”, launched on 26 Mach, there has been a change in the military balance of power on the ground in favour of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s forces which are backed by Arab military support. This support began aerially, and then progressed to naval and finally ground support. Such mobilisation played a critical role in adjusting the fighting in favour of Hadi’s forces and allowed them to regain control of the main city in southern and central Yemen. If the return of the government represents a new development in the events of the crisis, then we must also be aware of the Yemeni and Arab requirements of this development. Any waste of the gains achieved, or even a delay in utilising them will not only cause military setbacks or political obstacles, but will also have disastrous consequences on the future of Yemen as a state as well as on the geostrategic situation in the Arabian Peninsula, Red Sea and the region as a whole.

The Arab parties concerned about their own fate and the fate of the region, not only Yemen, must monitor and evaluate the Arab management of the crisis and its results thus far realistically and objectively, far from self-punishment and narcissism. One of the most important matters that must be monitored and considered is the fact that the Yemeni government returned to Aden, but still hasn’t returned to Sanaa, i.e. the mission is not over yet.

The Houthi control of the capital city of Sanaa on 21 September 2014 is still the status quo. This means that the victories were partially achieved and are incomplete. The movement towards Sanaa actually began last week, and it is occurring “slowly but surely” according to a military source in the Arab coalition. It is important for the concerned parties to be aware that staying in Sanaa and regaining full and permanent control over it is no less important than the achievement of entering the city.

The rapid exit of the Houthi forces and Ali Abdullah Saleh from Aden and the cities in the south should not be relied upon as a standard measure of time and it had its own motives and circumstances. They are fully aware that their defeat in the Sanaa battle opens the way for Hadi’s forces to move towards the north, including Saada.

More importantly, the regaining of Sanaa implicitly means the failure of the scenario dividing Yemen which is a goal in itself for some parties inside and outside Yemen. The internal and Arab support which helped liberate Aden may gradually subside with the progression towards Sanaa and then to the north, which will require government control over the central and local state institutions, starting from Aden, then Taiz and finally Sanaa. There is great danger in focusing on managing life only in Aden and the southern cities, as it will give the Houthis the chance to reinforce their control over Sanaa and the northern provinces. This will basically threaten the establishment of a new division which will go on for a long time before it is ended, if it is indeed ended.

Therefore, the step to regain management of the country must be accompanied by measures to ensure the stability of the internal situation. Hence, a national, not sectarian Yemeni army must be formed that would protect the people and the land, as well as the state. The nucleus of the army should be the troops who were trained in Riyadh and they should benefit from the military experience provided by some Arab countries at the moment in the fight against the Houthis, thus completing the mission and contributing to forming a national army and training it. This should coincide with restoring normalcy in the cities seized by the Houthis and Saleh, because settling for only forming an army will allow the war to continue in the country. It also violates one of the most important aspects of a state’s legitimacy, i.e. playing a role in serving the citizens and promoting civilian life. However, being content with this role alone without having a force to protect the state would mean incomplete and fragile control. In other words, it will regain governance, not sovereignty.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 21 September 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.