Assad’s winning hand: what Russian involvement really means for the Syrian civil war

The civil war which has ravaged Syria since 2011 is at a turning point. On Wednesday, Russian fighter jets launched the first airstrikes of what announces itself as a long campaign to prop up the faltering regime of Bashar Al-Assad and prevent further enlargement of the Daesh zone of influence.

The airstrikes represent the first example of direct Russian military engagement beyond the old Soviet Union borders since the disastrous invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which saw the Red Army retreat following a decade of guerrilla warfare led by US-backed guerrillas, the so-called Mujahideen.

The intervention is apparently justified on national security grounds. With hundreds of Chechens and Russian Muslims from the Caucasus fighting amongst the ranks of Daesh, President Vladimir Putin has described the elimination of the group as a priority to protect his people from well-trained and motivated jihadists going back to Russia. Despite scepticism and outright opposition from Western diplomats, dozens of airstrikes have been conducted by the Russians across Syria.

In an attempt to avoid interference with Israel’s military operations, Putin discussed the matter with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The two agreed on a mechanism to avoid trading fire accidentally. It is well known that Israel has been targeting various armed groups threatening to overrun the Golan Heights as well as Hezbollah fighters assisting Assad’s forces amidst souring relations with Lebanon. Armed with Israel’s green light, Putin gave the go-ahead.

Contrary to initial reports from the Kremlin, the airstrikes appear to have been directed not at Daesh targets, but rather at a range of rebel groups opposed to Assad’s regime. Amongst these were CIA-trained “moderates”. Instead of opposing Daesh, Putin’s goal seems to be the restoration of Assad’s control over his country.

In a separate but related event, Al-Jazeera reported on Thursday that hundreds of Iranian troops have moved to Syria. Together with Tehran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah and Assad’s army, Iranian units are supposedly preparing a ground offensive supported by Russian airpower. These will probably target, once again, rebel groups other than Daesh.

Iran has backed the Syrian regime openly since the early stages of the conflict; however, until now, Iranian assistance was restricted to financial support and the deployment of military advisors. Participation in combat operations would mark a significant escalation in Tehran’s involvement. Similarly, Russia’s direct engagement departs from the financial, military and diplomatic support which has been propping up the Syrian regime since 2011.

The coordinated offensive against moderate groups attempts to polarise a conflict that has so far been characterised by a multitude of warring factions. By reducing the number of players, one reduces the number of possible winners. In this manner, Russia, Assad and Iran hope to force the West’s hand and guarantee the Syrian regime’s victory. Reports of a forthcoming major ground operation backed by Russian airpower indicate an attempt to reduce the number of possible victors to two: Assad and Daesh.

The Kurdish option, of course, was never really an option. Supported by US-led airstrikes, the YPG has proved to be a formidable military force; nonetheless, Kurdish rule over Syria would be obstructed internationally by Turkey and domestically by ethnic tensions, resulting in a highly unstable arrangement.

Once moderate forces have been excluded from the conflict, the West, faced with the choice between a supposedly Islamic “Caliphate” run by bloodthirsty extremists and a brutal yet “moderate” dictator, will have no other option but to cooperate with the Syrian despot to ensure the end of Daesh. Mounting efforts from the US, Russia, Syrian regime forces and Iran will eventually defeat the militant group.

Having undermined any other viable alternative to his rule, Assad will gradually re-establish control across the vast swathes of land that are today held by rebels. Turkish opposition to the establishment of a Kurdish State south of its borders will provide the international pressure needed for the Syrian regime to reach a power-sharing deal with the Kurdish forces controlling a significant portion of the country’s north. Such a deal might include self-governing arrangements similar to those between the authorities in Erbil and the Iraqi central government in Baghdad.

The coalition that has gathered against the threat of an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle-East would be embarrassingly outmanoeuvred by antagonistic figures such as Assad and Putin. Presumably, the restoration of the Syrian regime would, most likely, mark an acceleration of western disengagement from the region.

As a result, Russian foreign policy could affect Middle-Eastern political dynamics to a far greater extent than it does nowadays. Moreover, the Kremlin would keep its cherished military bases along Syria’s coast on the Mediterranean and Moscow’s success in ridding the world of feared terrorists would legitimate the more assertive foreign policy which has characterised Putin’s rule.

Perhaps more importantly still, Assad’s return to power would allow an increasingly prominent role to be played by Iran in the region just as it re-engages with the global economy. Across the Persian Gulf, the Saudis would see their influence wane as the Sunni kingdom’s proxies are defeated in Syria and its long-time ally, the US, distances itself from the region.

Andrea Alari is a graduate in Philosophy, Politics and Economics and a keen observer of Middle-Eastern Politics.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.