If the Iraqi army was present

The day after Mosul fell into the hands of Daesh, a military expert said, “Mosul would not have fallen if the Iraqi army was present.” He went on to emphasise, with a pained expression, “Unfortunately, the word ‘if’ means very little.”

The Iraqi people remember their army every time adversaries surround them. They are also aware of the fact that the Iraqi National Army has experienced many setbacks as a military institution due to the authority that was born out of the American occupation. These setbacks have cost the treasury in Baghdad more than $30 billion while Daesh continues to gain control of Iraqi cities. All of this would not have been possible if the Iraqi National Army, which was created at the state’s foundation, had been present. The army would not have been disbanded by the “political elite” chosen by US occupational forces had its officers not been rooted out of the establishment.

The former US Presidential Envoy to Iraq, Paul Bremer — largely credited with getting rid of the army — has tried to distance himself from the current situation in Iraq and has even attempted to place the blame on new Iraqi politicians. In fact, it does not appear as though Iraqi politicians reject Bremer’s stance. Similarly, Kurdish leaders have been quoted in the past saying, “The [Iraqi] army must be uprooted from its very roots.” Shia leaders expressed their view that the Iraqi army was Saddam’s army and so needed to be disbanded.

The army’s disbandment did not happen because of the desires of the above-mentioned parties nor others like them, for they are all too weak to make such a decision. Kurdish leaders have said that although they welcomed the dissolution of the Iraqi army, they are ultimately not in a position to reject or accept such outcomes because they tend to bow down to US decisions. They did not learn from the example set by Nuri Said, a prominent Iraqi politician from the time of the monarchy who refused Britain’s request for the army’s disbandment seventy years ago. This comparable moment in history took place in the wake of the nationalist officers’ movement in May 1941, when Said insisted that the survival of the army was essential for national unity and the protection of the country’s national identity.

To be fair, it is also worth noting that the decision to disband the Iraqi army was not the brainchild of Bremer alone. The decision was made in Washington long before the Iraqi invasion and those who opposed Saddam knew about it before the event. Israel pushed for this as a form of retaliation for the three wars it had fought against the Arabs; during the first Gulf War nearly 39 Israeli cities were targeted as Saddam Hussein saw them as legitimate targets for his army.

Similarly, Iran gave its blessings for the decision to disband the Iraqi army and worked with friendly US channels to expedite the process; it saw in the Iraqi army an enemy that it had fought for eight years, an army that forced Iran’s leaders to drink from a cup of poison. Thus, the Iranian government worked with its affiliates among the Iraqi militias to liquidate Iraqi leaders via political assassinations, kidnapping and well-known, documented expulsions.

Bremer has said that the British were consulted when it came to the decision and that they also gave their support in advance. In fact, the British saw this as the perfect opportunity to avenge the events of May 1941, which remain fresh in their minds. All considered the survival of Iraq’s army as a threat because it has had a broad range of expertise throughout its history.

The Iraqis have been forced to remember the story of their country’s foundation when Musa Al-Kazim emphasised the importance of a national army that would be able to defend the country. Today, they are seeing how Iraq has been exposed and how easy it is for foreigners to enter. According to a study done by Othman Al-Mukhtar, more than fourteen countries have militias present on Iraqi soil; all want a piece of the “Iraqi cake” when the time comes for division and the closing of accounts. On top of that there are dozens of Iraqi militias, each of which is affiliated with a different sect or tribe and, in turn, is fighting to gain control of this or that area. If there was an Iraqi army that bore allegiance to all the sons of Iraq — if the army was present — then the picture would be very different.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 5 January, 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.