Trump, Russia and the Syrian crisis

Ten days ago, US warships fired dozens of missiles at a Syrian air base from where it is suspected fighter aircraft belonging to the Assad regime took off to launch a chemical weapons attack on Khan Sheikhon in the province of Idlib; dozens of the small town’s residents were killed. There has since been considerable debate about the reasons that motivated President Donald Trump to adopt such an attitude towards the Syrian regime, as he has diverged from the policy pursued by his predecessor throughout the six years of the revolution.

Domestically, the Trump administration does not seem to be very comfortable; public opinion apart, though, Americans usually give their presidents the benefit of the doubt in their first few months in office. This is what has raised suspicions that the strike against the Syrian regime might have been an attempt to allow the administration to remake itself and regain the confidence of the US public. On the other hand, the statements made by American officials, including those made by the president himself, give the impression that the strike against Al-Shayrat Air Base might have constituted a tangible turning of US policy in Syria.

However, and notwithstanding this debate (which is difficult to settle in favour of this or that party), no one can afford to ignore the reactions provoked by Washington’s surprise move. The Europeans ignored their fierce disagreements about Trump and rushed to express support for his unilateral step, which did not enjoy any international legality, something which Europe is usually keen on. Those in Europe who perceive a growing threat from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and who are anxious lest the Trump administration relinquishes its defence obligations on the continent, found in the Shayrat attack a sign of a confrontational posture adopted against Russia. The limited nature of the strike did not prevent the Arab countries that are hostile to Iran and its ally in Damascus from celebrating and welcoming the US measure.

The predictable Russian and Iranian anger served only to bolster Trump’s new image that has emerged of late both quickly and unexpectedly. America seems to have returned to its responsibilities of curbing Russian blackmail across the Middle East and Europe, and resumed its role of protecting Western values by slapping Syria’s dictator, who has delusions of a victory for which he has long been waiting.

On 10 February, the New York Times published an analysis of the inclinations of the US president entitled “Trump’s Foreign Policy is fast losing its sharp edge”. The development that prompted this was the phone call made by the controversial American leader to his Chinese counterpart during which Trump emphasised the “one China” policy; this has been the traditional and stable policy of the US since the Nixon presidency.

Trump surprised many people when, immediately following his election victory, he received a telephone call from the president of Taiwan. This suggested that he intended to relinquish the one China policy and was going to deal with Taiwan as an independent entity entitled to exist separately from China. Beijing views Taiwan as an illegal entity that split from the motherland and is destined to return one day. The New York Times article may be said to be a response to Trump’s rapid relinquishing of the threatening insinuations in his conversation with the Taiwanese leader, hence the probing title for the analysis of his transformations. However, the headline was inaccurate in assuming that the slogans and promises expressed by Trump following his election victory amounted to foreign policy. In fact, Trump did not have a clear foreign policy prior to taking office; he had inclinations, desires and wishes, but these do not constitute a policy.

Indeed, it is still not possible to outline with certainty the main aspects of Donald Trump’s foreign policy. What is certain, though, is that he has already reneged, in whole or in part, on many of his electoral promises. He has, in fact, started to take limited steps within the foreign relations sphere that are to some extent different from those adopted by Barack Obama before him. Among other things, Trump told US voters that NATO had expired; that America’s allies in Asia and Europe must bear the burden of defending themselves; and that he would launch a new era of friendship and cooperation with Russia (whose president he could not but admire). He insinuated that he was going to lift the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by the Obama administration and that he might completely abandon Ukraine. Presidential candidate Trump even threatened China with commercial warfare. Some people imagined that, if elected, Trump would adopt a policy that is the exact opposite of that adopted by Richard Nixon, such as forging a pact with Russia in order to isolate China and place it under siege.

As far as his supporters within the electorate were concerned, Trump’s threats and promises during the election campaign seemed logical. Yes, they were strange, abhorrent and extreme, no doubt, but they did not miss their election target. Nevertheless, just weeks after assuming office, President Trump started retreating. He announced unequivocally his commitment to NATO and backpedalled on his China rhetoric. It became clear after his summit meeting with President Xi Jinping that the US and China were going to embark on rational discussions in order to reach a new concord on mutual trade relations.

Despite talking about an amicable new beginning in relations between Washington and Moscow, the Trump White House announced that lifting the sanctions imposed on Russia was not appropriate at this point in time. Meanwhile, there has been an ongoing deployment of US troops in Poland and the Baltic States. In the Middle East, Trump surprised Russia with the air strike against the Assad regime and by declaring very clearly that Washington would take additional measures against the regime if it uses chemical weapons against its people again. Moreover, the US has launched an investigation into whether Russia had been an accomplice, in any way, in Assad’s attack on Khan Sheikhon.

Unquestionably, Trump is an amazing and weird president. He has a unique ability to outrage and attract mockery. Yet this president, like all who preceded him, cannot use the state machinery that he was elected to operate in any way or direction that he deems fit. When power is distributed between elected officials and state institutions, and governance is underpinned by the balance between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, it is not enough to win an election in order for you to do what you want, even if you are president. The US federal authorities have traditional strategic considerations which the president cannot tamper with. Conversely, there are certain policies which the state cannot countenance, irrespective of how much the president is convinced by them. When presidential aides become a threat to the state’s traditions – as has happened with Steve Bannon, for example – they must be brought to heel or limited in what they are expected to do.

There is a need for another reading of the course that US-Russia relations are taking; they are more likely to be heading for conflict more than concord, and not only in Syria. The more acute the conflict, the clearer will be the limitations on Russia’s resourcefulness and ability to act.

This article first appeared on Arabi21.com.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.