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US, UK disagreed on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, British documents reveal

January 14, 2025 at 5:50 pm

The Iranian and other flags flutter in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organisation’s headquarters in Vienna, Austria, May 24, 2021. [Photo by Michael Gruber/Getty Images]

The UK disagreed with the US on the impact of the Iranian role in Iraq, more than a year after the US-led coalition invaded the country, newly released British documents reveal.

The UK Cabinet Office documents also showed that US policy makers were “impatient” with British insistence on engagement to prevent Iranians from pursuing nuclear ambitions.

In March 2003, the United States led a coalition to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein’s regime, citing later-discredited claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a threat to international peace and security.

Iran refused to support the invasion, fearing the US military presence in neighbouring Iraq would be a serious threat to its interests and national security. But Tehran welcomed the fall of Saddam’s regime, which fought an eight-year-long war against Iran from 1980-1988. Gulf countries were worried that Iran would dominate Iraq after ousting its regime. Kuwait, which had been invaded by the Iraqi military in 1990, politically supported the coalition’s military action.

A few months after the invasion, the US-established Iraqi Governing Council (ICG) was endorsed which signed a Temporary Administrative Law (TAL) in Iraq.

Although Iran was supportive of the ICG and ATL, the US remained “deeply suspicious of the Iranian intentions in Iraq”, particularly Tehran’s alleged support for the insurgence of Shia groups targeting the US occupying forces, the documents show.

The American officials told their British counterparts that they were considering action against the agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) whom they believed were active in Iraq. The documents show that the American-British communications occurred in the lead up to the summit between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the US President George W Bush in the White House in April 2004. Iraq was on the top of the meeting’s agenda.

British documents showing that the US and UK disagreed on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program

During his visit to the US, Blair separately met with then-United Nation Secretary General Kofi Anan in New York to discuss a potential future role for the UN in Iraq.

In a briefing report prepared for Blair, his advisors hoped the UK would agree with the US and the UN on a “comprehensive strategy” for the rest of 2004 in Iraq.

Before Blair’s visit, the Bush presidential election campaign was politically struggling due to the difficulties the American occupying forces were facing in Iraq.

Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state, admitted to David Manning, the British ambassador in Washington, that the US administration acknowledged the challenges it faced in Iraq about three months before transition of sovereignty to the Iraqis was to take place on 1 July 2004.

“The truth was that the US was gradually losing on the battlefield,” Armitage confirmed, adding that “there was a lack of a coherent strategy.” In a dispatch about the meeting with the American official, Manning alerted his government that Armitage believed that unless the situation improved rapidly, it was inevitable that Bush would have to authorise additional troops to be deployed in Iraq. This would be “unpopular domestically” and “politically ugly” for the president.

The US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also admitted to Nigel Sheinwald, Blair’s advisor for foreign affairs and defence, that the White House understood that the situation particularly in the centre of Iraq “remained awful” and that the American forces “were in vulnerable positions”.

Blair’s advisors confirmed that the UK agrees with the principle of “tough action” where Iranian officials were found to be involved in “nefarious activity” on Iraqi soil, but emphasised the need for any actions against the Iranians to be “handled sensitively”. The British were concerned that any measures against the Iranians would put their interests at risk. The advisors alerted Blair that the British forces “were in the front line dealing with the Shias in South Iraq”. In addition, they warned him that “retaliation against UK interests in Iran is possible.”

Based on their reports on developments in Iraq after the invasion, Blair was advised that the British overall assessment of the Iranian policy in Iraq “is less negative than the Americans’”. They pointed to the Iranian political support for IGC and TAL, characterising it as “acquiescence” from Iran which the American and the British “have enjoyed”.

The British perspective assessed that this Iranian behaviour “can help achieve our objectives”. While the briefing report advised Blair to reassure Bush that a “beady eye” will be on intelligence activity of Iran, it recommended looking for ways in which Iran can be offered a “buy-in”. For example, Blair’s aides advised “taking up an Iranian offer to supply 200MW of electricity” to the south of Iraq where there were popular fears of an electricity shortfall in the summer of 2004.

The UK prepared a strategy to strengthen security protection for civilians working on vital reconstruction projects such as power stations. Increasing import of electricity from abroad including Iran, “which could supply 200 MW at short notice”, was a part of this strategy. In addition, the British expected such a deal with Tehran would “underpin the Iranian support for the political process” in Iraq.

British documents showing that the US and UK disagreed on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program

At that time, improving the quality of service provision to the Iraqi people was one of the crucial problems faced by the coalition forces under growing security threats. The British advisors warned that major power shortages “could lead to popular unrest if urgent remedial action does not continue unhindered”. They feared the deteriorating security conditions could threaten the efforts to produce more electricity.

The documents also reveal a divergence between the US and UK on the most effective way to address Iran’s nuclear programme.

The briefing report shows that the British government reviewed the UK policy on the issue ‘in light of concerns that a gap was opening up with the US on how to handle Iran in the medium term.” The government considered “selling the UK thinking on how to handle the nuclear issue” a priority for the talks between Bush and Blair. The US believed that the Iranians had nuclear ambitions and the pressure needed to be maintained to deter them and, while the British didn’t disagree with this view, they saw “the benefits of conditional engagement drawing Iran into the IAEA web”.

The UK, along with France and Germany, were involved in an initiative for talking to Iran. But some US policy makers were “impatient” with this initiative and “would prefer a more aggressive approach” starting with referring Iran to the UN Security Council. The Americans explained to their British counterparts that such a step “would create a climate of pressure and threat aimed at forcing Iran into a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear ambitions”. However, the British officials doubted it was possible to secure a referral of Iran to the UNSC at that time. In addition, they didn’t expect anything would be achieved by such a referral. They insisted that there should be “further serious failures (from Iran) coming into light” in order to secure such a step.

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