Freeing Hamas from ruling Gaza

Hamas is asked to end its rule over Gaza, first and foremost because this is what’s best for the Palestinian national interest. Before I list the reasons why Hamas must look for a way out of ruling the Gaza Strip, I would like to point out that there is no serious physical threat to the movement’s rule, despite the regional shifts and threats emanating from various places.

Israel and the regional parties that oppose Hamas are aware that any intervention on their part to forcibly remove Hamas will inevitably have negative consequences.

However, the Hamas authority should take the initiative to end its rule over the Gaza Strip because the movement’s rise to power has been associated with the decline of the Palestinian national cause. It has paved the way for the PLO to make a series of concessions with the least amount of real opposition, not to mention it provided the atmosphere for Israel to continue its Judaisation and settlement without reluctance and little resistance.

Hamas, who was burdened with the concerns and responsibilities of governing Gaza, was not able to devote themselves to the confrontation of the series of concessions and use their energy to carry out resistance operations, as it became clear that governance and resistance cannot be joined.

Mission impossible

Hamas’s presence in government has significantly enriched the Israeli targets bank and reduced the need for accurate intelligence information, as now; any operation carried out by Hamas is followed by a series of disproportionate Israeli military responses.

Not content with assassinating the leaders and activists of the military movement, Israel saw an opportunity to bomb the administrative, security and service institutions because the government that runs these institutions is governed by Hamas.

However, the Hamas dilemma did not stop there. As the party that governs the affairs of the Gaza Strip, it had become responsible, before Israel, for the operations carried out by other Palestinian movements. Unfortunately, since the other Palestinian movements are either interested in embarrassing Hamas or have foreign links, they immediately began operations against Israel, despite being aware that that the bulk of the Israeli response will be directed against Hamas. For example, when a Palestinian organisation fires a missile at Israel, which in most cases hits unpopulated areas, Israel responds by bombing Hamas security targets and openly states that hitting some of these targets will reduce the movement’s ability to be prepared for future confrontations.

Three Options

Governance to Hamas was like a “ball of fire” it was forced to hold on to, even though it was aware that the blaze of this fire grew with time. Therefore, the movement must re-evaluate its strategic thinking and search for a way out in order to devote itself to the resistance for which it was born.

According to the debate going on in the Palestinian arena, there are three alternatives available to Hamas:

1. Remaining perseverant and patient in the hope that changes occur in the regional situation that reinforce the status of the movement and expand its margin of manoeuvres once again. Although it is true that all the indications suggest that such changes are inevitably coming, it may take a long time, which would mean that the status quo will last a long time.
2. Utilising the confrontations with Israel to work towards reaching a reality in which the movement can rid itself of the consequences of governance, but this scenario may be very risky in light of the current regional situation.
3. Presenting all forms of flexibility required to achieve Palestinian reconciliation on the grounds that the reconciliation will lead to ridding Hamas of ruling Gaza.

Why reconciliation?

Achieving reconciliation remains the safest option despite the many issues it raises. There are those who believe that Abbas may use the reconciliation to pass a political settlement with Israel that affects the constants and rights of the Palestinian people and it will look as though he received Hamas’s blessing. Also, there are those who believe that achieving reconciliation at a time when one party is perceived as weak may force them to make compromises.

Some of these issues are exaggerated and the movement can afford to bear the consequences of some of them. As for the settlement, the chances of achieving it seem impossible because Israel is not interested in achieving a settlement and even if US Secretary of State John Kerry’s framework agreement is adopted, this will not prevent Hamas from expressing their principle position towards what is being proposed, just as they had done before governing Gaza.

With regards to the issues that are usually up for discussion during dialogue sessions, such as rebuilding the PLO, they are no longer relevant and not worth the movement’s effort nor its determination to voice its position. For example, it is clear that addressing the issue of rebuilding the PLO is irrelevant because the current official Arab government will not allow it for the time being.

If we are convinced that Hamas leaving the government is important and useful, then there is no justification for killing time trying to agree on allocations. However, in any reconciliation agreement, Hamas must insist and not show any flexibility in respecting the right of our people to resist the occupation by any means possible. They should not allow anything that would affect the armed wings of the resistance, bearing in mind that these two demands are not the demands of Hamas alone, but are agreed upon by most Palestinian forces.

This would not only free Hamas from the consequences and complications of governing the Gaza Strip and relieves the movement from the heavy prices it has been paying for it, but would also allow the movement to regain the reins of their initiative, both internally, regionally and internationally. It would also give Hamas the opportunity to build a wide Palestinian alliance that will restore the Palestinian cause to the centre of national priorities.

This is a translation of the Arabic text published by Paltoday on 19 February, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.