Al-Sisi and the Gulf states: A strategic partnership or temporary interests?

The recent leaked recording broadcasted by Mekameleen TV which shed light on Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and his office manager Abbas Kamel’s views on the Gulf states and how they should be dealt with raises many questions regarding the future of the relationship between Egypt and the countries mentioned in the recording.

The main question that stands out is the extent to which this relationship can be affected by what was said in the leak and whether there are potential repercussions on the overall relations. Apart from the style and language of the leaked conversation, which seems enough on its own, to show how Al-Sisi feels about these countries, there seems to be a need to look deeper and calmer into it.

Backgrounds of the relationship

To start with, we must put the relationship between Al-Sisi’s regime and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait in the context of these countries’ vision and positions regarding the changes and developments in Egypt and the Arab region in the past four years that have become known as the Arab Spring.

These countries did not welcome the Egyptian revolution and did not view it as something positive to be supported or celebrated. There are many reasons for this, most importantly their fear that this infection would spread to their societies as well as their fear of Egypt exporting its revolution abroad or it becoming a threat to their security and stability. This is especially true if an unwanted force rose to power, such as the Islamists, which is exactly what happened.

In addition to this, these countries had strong and close ties with the Mubarak regime, and its toppling was a big surprise for them. Therefore, they were keen to prevent any real change from occurring in Egypt that could affect them and their interests.

After the Muslim Brotherhood were elected into power, some of these countries could not bear it, so they started a regional and international campaign to isolate and besiege the group in an effort to overthrow it, which is what happened. Therefore, it was not strange for these countries to be the first to welcome the 3 July 2013 coup that toppled the Brotherhood. These countries embraced the coup leader and have continued to provide him with unlimited financial, diplomatic and economic support.

Common interests

The support provided to Al-Sisi’s government by these three countries reflects a number of common interests amongst them that can be summarised into three main interests. First, thwarting the Arab Spring and stopping the wave of change that began in 2011. These countries believe that the “Arab Revolutions” are a threat that needs to be ended by all means in order for them not to reach their countries. Egypt was considered the “spearhead” in the regional counter-revolution project and the abortion of the Arab youth’s calls and aspirations for change. Therefore, it was not strange that one of these countries hosted some of the old regime’s icons, such as the former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, who lost in the presidential elections to Dr Mohamed Morsi in 2012 and who did not hide his involvement in toppling Morsi.

These countries’ desire to stop the Arab Spring coincided with the Egyptian “deep state’s”, especially the military institution’s, desire to attack the January Revolution and eliminate all of its figures. Al-Sisi’s emergence in Egypt acted as the “saviour” for the deep state networks, while, at the same time, he was the only person capable of executing the desires of these countries to stop the fever of change in Egypt and the entire region.

The second interest is eliminating the forces of political Islam, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches in the Arab region. The Islamists are the threatening factor for these countries, not only because of their organisational strength, popular bases and mobilisation abilities, but also because they are the prepared alternative in the event that any internal developments occur.  Therefore they must be down-sized and their activities must stop, according to the strategies of these countries.

These countries took advantage of the Muslim Brotherhood’s mistakes after they rose to power in order to undermine them and eliminate them. Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi smartly realised this and promoted himself as the only person capable of carrying out the task.

Therefore, the 3 July coup was not just serving Egypt’s interests according to Al-Sisi, but also regional interests. Al-Sisi relied on the Gulf states’ fear of Islamists in order to get financial and economic support and this was achieved. It is no wonder that the media outlets loyal to Al-Sisi fuelled the Gulf’s fear of the political Islam trends and deliberately combined all of these trends in order to combat them under the pretext of “the war on terrorism”.

The third interest is regional stability, especially with the spread of Iranian influence and the rise of non-governmental forces and movements in the Arab region. This is seen as a threat to the internal unity in some Arab societies. Some countries are reeling on Egypt, specifically the military institution, to play the role of a “guard” in some of the regional and perhaps domestic issues.

Perhaps Al-Sisi also picked up on this and tried to cleverly utilise and invest it in order to blackmail these countries and take advantage of them and their money. In the leaked recording, he said these countries had “money like rice”.

So, there are clear common interests between the two parties. On their part, the Gulf states understand Al-Sisi’s great need for them and their support which kept his government alive in light of the unprecedented economic deterioration. Some of the Gulf states hope to turn some of the Egyptian institutions, beginning with the military institution, into a “tool” to be used to execute their agendas and objectives in the Arab region.

Meanwhile, Al-Sisi is completely aware of how much he needs these countries for himself and for the Egyptian state institutions, especially the military establishment. This was summed up by Abbas Kamel when he said in the recording that relationship between the two sides should be “give and take”.

Repercussions of the leak

In light of the information mentioned above, it would be exaggerative to say that the leak would lead to the end of the common interests between the two parties (Al-Sisi’s government and its supporters), despite the fact that it is scandalous and rude, at least in the foreseeable future.

The two parties are aware that the timing does not allow for them to break the link between their common interests and that any change or shift in the relationship would negatively impact these interests. On the other hand, both parties know that they have engaged in a complex and intricate game and if one abandons the other at that point, it would harm both parties.

Therefore, despite the fact that they realise the problems and shortcomings of the other side, they are both trying to benefit as much as possible from the other side until they can find an alternative that can play the same role and realise the same goals. In addition to this, neither side wants to give their opponents, especially the Islamists, the chance to take advantage of their problems in a manner that would harm them. Therefore, they are keen on making their relationship seem normal, as if nothing happened.

Despite this, the recent leaked recording will definitely have repercussions in the medium-term and it may drive some countries to re-assess their position towards Al-Sisi, not only as a person but also as a political project.

Perhaps this is what drove Al-Sisi to immediately take initiative and call the leaders of the countries mentioned in the leak, except for Qatar, in order to contain any negative consequences or repercussions that may occur as a result of the leak.

The most significant impact that this leak may have is the increased lack of trust and confidence in Al-Sisi and his men, not only because they have lost control over their computers and offices, which may lead to more scandals, but also out of fear that the consequences of such leaks may impact the Gulf public opinion and create more domestic pressure in order to stop supporting Al-Sisi’s government.

On the other hand, these countries may exploit the leak in order to pressure Al-Sisi and demand that he provide more and work harder to achieve their local or regional interests. This means that the leak may be used as a new source of pressure, added to Al-Sisi’s need for financial and economic support to ensure his loyalty.

Al-Sisi as a losing bet

Regardless of the latest leak, we cannot deny that there is a new dynamic to the relationship between Egypt and the Gulf states created by the rapid changes in the region over the past four years. This dynamic is being used by both sides in order to serve its interests and achieve its objectives. The important question at the moment is: Is this dynamic viable or is it vulnerable to other shifts and changes? In other words, to what extent do these countries’ bets on Al-Sisi seem successful?

A quick reading of the performance of Al-Sisi’s government over the past period may provide an answer, albeit a temporary answer, regarding the future of the relationship between his government and the states supporting it. The Gulf states are mistaken if they believe that their investment in Al-Sisi, both as a person and as a political project, is considered successful.

On the contrary, it is a losing investment for several reasons, the most important of which are: first, the man failed to achieve what he was brought in for, i.e. the elimination of the forces of political Islam. Despite the severe restrictions imposed on the Muslim Brotherhood and the oppression of its members and leaders, the group is still the most difficult and significant number in the Egyptian political equation, not only by means of its constant demonstrations, but also by means of its popular and social base that is still present, especially Egypt’s rural and suburban areas. This is true despite the decline in popular support for the group due to the hate and distortion campaigns launched against the group.

Secondly, these counties do not realise that “Al-Sisi’s Egypt” is completely different from “Mubarak’s Egypt”. Until now, Al-Sisi has miserably failed to establish his government and built a new political system. On the contrary, it seems that this government is weaker than it has ever been after the supporting 30 June forces abandoned him and after his clear security failures in Sinai. Therefore, counting on Al-Sisi and his ability to achieve the interests of his supporters is difficult, if not impossible.

Thirdly, Al-Sisi’s supporters do not realise that the “Egyptian state” they are relying on to promote and serve their interests is a state that only exists only in their imagination. It is enough for them to consider the size of the political and security breaches that occurred to this state’s most important state institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, from which the leaks are made, in order for them to confirm this unfortunate reality.  What’s more, this state in its current position of weakness, corruption and tyranny, poses the main obstacle to achieving these countries’ interests. This was revealed by the glorious January 25 Revolution, in the face of which the state could not survive. It is not unlikely for such an occurrence to happen again at any given moment.

In summary, the relationship between Al-Sisi’s government and the Gulf states supporting it does not live up to the level of strategic partnership. It is merely a “passing” relationship based on mutual utilisation imposed by common interests during a specific time in history. It does not seem that such a relationship will be viable for a long time.

Translated from Al-Jazeera net, 10 February 2015

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.