Clashes in Tripoli: Causes, key players, and potential repercussions

Monday night’s clashes erupted rather suddenly in Libya’s capital, Tripoli, underscoring the fragile security situation in the country. The violence which involved heavy artillery and armed confrontations between rival factions, has highlighted, once again, concerns over the stability of Libya’s capital and the broader implications for the rest of western region under the control of the Government of National Unity (GNU). It also comes at the time when the United Nations mission was gearing up to launch a new round of consultations among the warring factions to, hopefully, have them agree to elections sometime this year.

Notably, the violence was limited to a few neighbourhoods west of the capital and in the Abu Salim area south of the capital. On the following day, life appeared normal, as if nothing had happened and the ministry of interior declared Tripoli safe.  Late on Tuesday night the elusive calm was shattered by heavy gun fire across the city forcing Tripoli’s municipal council to declare the city a “war zone”, suspending schools and urging people to stay indoors while calling for peace.

The death of chairman of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, appeared to help usher in the calm that prevailed between Monday morning and Tuesday night. Better known as Gheniwa, Mr Al-Kikli has been at the top of SSA since he was first appointed by former Prime Minister Fyez Sarraj in January 2021. Despite his criminal record and notorious reputation, Gheniwa endured and at times appeared untouchable, let alone being shot dead.

Everything could have ended with his death and calm could have returned to the stricken city but instead the euphoric Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah announced what amounted to be an open war against all militias in the capital, including the Special Deterrence Force known as (Radaa) which is more organised, disciplined and reputable than the SSA. Tripoli is now at a turning point with the potential for even greater misery and destruction than it has ever witnessed, including during the previous wars of 2011, 2014 and 2020.

By Wednesday afternoon, Al-Dbeibah, who is also the minister of defence, ordered a ceasefire across Tripoli. In a statement the ministry of defence said that the government had reacted to the latest “developments [latest fighting]” from a sense of “national duty.” However, it emphasised that illegitimate groups will still be targeted without saying when. This means what happened is more likely than not to be repeated at some point in the future. With this statement, the GNU seem to have realised, belatedly, that it made an untimely error when it opened up another front against its enemies after wide spread horror, fear and destruction. No official figure from the latest violent episode has been published so far.

What triggered the latest clashes?

The foremost cause of the latest fighting is the usual power struggle between armed groups that enjoy legitimacy from the government that not only recognise them as legal entities but also finance them. The wider situation in Libya is also a factor as the country remains divided. In the eastern and southern regions General Khalifa Haftar dominates and another parallel government, under his protection and backed by the Tobruk based parliament, is operating out of Benghazi.  In Tripoli itself, the GNU is not on good terms with the presidential council or the high council of state, both located in the capital.

Amidst this turmoil the UN has been trying to re-launch a new round of political negotiations among the different factions with the aim of organising elections as soon as possible. In a statement issued on Wednesday it condemned the “quick escalation” of violence and called for an immediate ceasefire and “protection” of civilians in the capital. Thus far, this call by the UN mission has gone unheeded.

Key players and their repositioning

As it stands, no major change is expected to the status quo in wider Libya. The country will continue to be under two different administrations and both are carefully watching each other in light of what is unfolding in Tripoli. The GNU and Al-Dbeibah are now weaker than they used to be a few days ago but they are not finished yet. Pulling back for the brink was more than a face -saving decision by GNU.

Still in the capital, the situation will remain tense and could easily escalate at any time particularly if the armed groups from Misrata, Al-Dbeibah’s home town, stayed in Tripoli—something most city dwellers do not like. Likewise, Haftar has allies in western Libya in cities like Zintan, in the mountain region and in Zawia, closer to Tripoli. Should things escalate again and those groups see an opportunity to oust GNU from Tripoli they are not likely to hesitate. Now that they have been alerted to what is planned for them, Raada forces can relax for some time and continue their business as usual in Tripoli maintaining control over sensitive locations including Tripoli’s only functioning airport. However, as part of the ceasefire, details of which are yet to be published, they are likely to leave the districts west and south of Tripoli.

READ: The UN has opened up Libya to foreign meddling and foreign fighters

As for the SSA, it is likely to be maintained in some form. After all, it takes its orders from the presidential council not from the GNU. It is unlikely though that it will resume functioning any time soon. The huge posters praising its work that used to hang on roadside billboards have gone already and its top leaders are being chased. While the SSA’ fate is being contemplated, most people, including in presidential council, are happy to see Gheniwa gone for good. After all, the man became too powerful influencing not only the security scene in Tripoli but also decision making in the Central Bank of Libya and beyond. That is not something the authorities in both the east and west of the country are likely to tolerate again.

The political process led by the UN is likely to remain frozen until each party sorts out its new positions and alliances which are likely to shift as the situation on the ground evolves. On its part, the UN will try to ensure that the reconciliation process does not stall for long. It is very unlikely they will make significant progress while chaos prevails in Tripoli and distrust becomes more entrenched across Libya. Hannah Tetteh, the UN envoy to Libya, who only took over the job last January is eager to make progress on the ground to report to the UN Security Council the next time it meets to discuss Libya, probably in July 2025.

As for the external parties supporting different sides in the Libyan conflict, they are watching carefully how the situation develops in the capital and what likely repercussions might emerge in the wider region. With countries like Turkey supporting GNU and Russia supporting General Haftar, what happened in Tripoli has now become part of the norm that does not require any re-setting of polices.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.