A case for a Saudi-US deal, minus the normalisation

On the eve of US President Donald Trump’s upcoming trip to the Gulf next week, one of the most hotly debated questions is the fate of the Saudi-Israel normalisation deal under the US-brokered Abraham Accords. Trump himself fuelled speculation on Tuesday, teasing a “very, very big” announcement before his departure. His Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, had already hinted at a breakthrough, reinforcing assumptions that normalisation will take centre stage. The real question, however, is how Saudi Arabia will navigate this pressure.

Saudi Arabia is slated to be Trump’s first stop, underscoring its strategic importance to Washington. Trump had intended to make Saudi Arabia his first foreign destination upon returning to office, but that changed with an earlier detour to Rome for the funeral of Pope Francis. Even so, Riyadh marks his first significant diplomatic stop. The symbolism remains: his first foreign trip in 2017 was also to Riyadh. Now, he returns to ink a potential arms deal exceeding $100 billion—an investment package inherited from the Biden era, which sought to advance the same deal as part of a broader push to expand the Abraham Accords.

The Biden administration had made Saudi-Israel normalisation a “national security interest”, imagining it as a cornerstone to unlock economic corridors across the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. After October 2023, the urgency grew. Washington saw normalisation as a way to both reward and rein in Israel, hoping Saudi leverage might induce Israeli concessions, a ceasefire in Gaza, or even progress on Palestinian statehood.

In this regard, the Trump administration shows continuity. Trump’s inner circle—from Jason Greenblatt to Mike Huckabee and Mike Waltz—have all echoed normalisation as a top priority. A team was already mobilized before inauguration, reflecting Trump’s enduring ambition to expand the Abraham Accords and possibly clinch a Nobel Peace Prize. In a recent Time interview, Trump reiterated his belief that Saudi Arabia will join the fold—a rare note of consistency in his otherwise erratic foreign policy.

But are all hopes lost? The answer lies in the Saudi’s court. Normalisation without statehood is a non-starter. Even under less extreme Israeli leadership, real statehood was never on offer. Today, with Gaza in ruins and the overwhelming majority of Saudis opposed, normalisation risks derailing Saudi Arabia’s de-escalation strategy and undermining Vision 2030. Worse still, it benefits only Netanyahu, who seeks political survival by parading normalisation as a victory.

READ: US prepares to sign nuclear cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia

With Trump’s looming Middle East visit already putting Saudi Arabia under immense pressure, Riyadh must now tread a very delicate line. First and foremost, it must clearly identify where its national interests lie. These are all concentrated in the first half of the proposed deal: a US-Saudi strategic alliance agreement, defence cooperation, deeper trade and investment ties, and crucially, US support for Saudi’s civilian nuclear programme.

This nuclear partnership could allow the Kingdom to build the infrastructure and expertise necessary to become a nuclear-latency state—on par with Germany, Japan, Canada and most importantly, Iran. These are serious, long-term strategic gains. Meanwhile, the second half of the deal—normalisation with Israel—offers Saudi Arabia very little of tangible value.

So why not pursue the former without the latter? Pending the best-case scenario—Israel’s irrevocable commitment to Palestinian statehood—Saudi Arabia should press ahead with securing the US security and economic package, minus normalisation.

Is that even possible? The second thing to recognise is that the Trumpian world offers both challenge and opportunity. Despite Trump’s self-proclaimed status as “the greatest friend Israel ever had in the White House”, there has never been a wider gap between Israel and the US than now. And Trump is clearly the one calling the shots.

There are ample signs of this shift. The very fact that the US is in talks with Iran—against Israel’s wishes—is one. Another was Trump’s decision to proceed with the withdrawal of US troops from northeast Syria, despite Israeli concerns about Turkish influence there. More recently, US is reported to consider lifting sanctions on Damascus—again, over Israeli objections. Observe too how he made a ceasefire deal with the Houthis without even informing the Israelis.

Perhaps the most telling sign came during US Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s April visit to Riyadh, where he confirmed progress on a Saudi-US nuclear agreement. What he did not mention was normalisation with Israel. This omission speaks volumes.

To take advantage of this opening, Saudi Arabia must understand and work with Trump’s transactional mindset. Business comes first. In his first term, Trump openly celebrated arms sales to Saudi Arabia, boasting of $110 billion in promised purchases. He even admitted choosing Riyadh over London as his first foreign visit in 2017 because of the scale of the deal.

Trump 1.0 also saw his administration strive to approve nuclear technology transfers to Saudi Arabia, bypassing Congress in the process. All this suggests that even Trump privately sees the core value of the deal in its economic and strategic dimensions, and not in Israeli normalisation.

Trump’s transactionalism extends beyond simple cash flow. Saudi Arabia can offer to deepen its defence partnership with the US, while keeping competitors like China, Russia, or even the UK and France at arm’s length. Despite America’s shale boom, Washington still relies on Gulf oil to fuel economic growth, while Saudi Arabia depends on stable prices to fund its budget. If the US expects Riyadh to offset Iranian oil cuts, security guarantees must follow.

Saudi Arabia can also leverage its financial clout. It is already pulling back financially, cutting $5 billion in US FDI since 2019 and slashing its US stock holdings by 41 per cent in 2024. Riyadh is now shifting focus to Africa and Latin America. If Washington wants to reverse that trend, it must offer Saudi Arabia robust support, including a green light for its nuclear ambitions. That’s a win-win, without normalisation.

Besides cajoling the US, a dose of reality may be healthy. Saudi Arabia must make one thing clear to Washington: if the US won’t support Riyadh’s post-oil nuclear ambitions, others will. France, South Korea, and especially China have already offered assistance. By tying nuclear cooperation to normalisation, Washington risks forfeiting oversight and influence over a growing Saudi nuclear programme. That would be a strategic blunder.

Despite Trump’s bluster about forcing Saudi Arabia to normalise ties, Riyadh can take comfort in the way Trump often repackages minimal foreign concessions into “historic” US wins. If managed shrewdly, even a scaled-down deal—without normalisation—could still be framed as a diplomatic triumph by the Trump White House.

Ultimately, everything hinges on Saudi leadership and diplomatic finesse. History shows that, on rare but significant occasions, the “Arab lobby” has outmanoeuvred the formidable Israel lobby. If Riyadh can pull this off again, it won’t just secure a strategic alliance with the US, it will also cement its role as a regional leader. Just as importantly, it will send a powerful message to Israel: it is no longer at the centre of the universe, not even America’s.

READ: The ‘Arab NATO’ is a US security trap for Gulf countries

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.