Fatah at a crossroads

Tomorrow marks the 50th anniversary since the founding of the Fatah movement and its seventh conference is due to be held in mid-January.

This conference may turn out to be a crossroads, as Fatah may either rise again or continue the decline that began after signing the Oslo Accords, followed by its failure to establish a Palestinian state by means of negotiation. The believed assassination of Yasser Arafat, the historic leader who led the Palestinian march despite the storms, and Hamas’s victory in the municipal and legislative elections that ultimately ended in a military coup and resulted in the movement’s unilateral rule in the Gaza Strip have also contributed to Fatah’s waning star.

Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, Fatah was at the forefront of the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). During that time, the movement realised the importance of reviving a national Palestinian identity, as well as the crucial role of the Palestinian and the significance of armed struggle. It is worth noting that Fatah was the faction that used bullets in the context of reviving the Palestinian cause, and therefore was able to attract the majority of Palestinian people across the social spectrum because it was a people’s movement and its audience was much larger than the number of the organisation’s members.

For decades, Fatah led the Palestinian people’s battles on various levels. It also made the “war and peace” decisions. Fatah led the Palestinians without any real political competitor to match it in strength or popularity, despite the important roles played by other factions, especially those on the left, until Hamas emerged. In Hamas, and especially after the demise of Arafat, Fatah had a serious contender competing for authority and governance. Sometimes Hamas was even able to control the decision of whether or not to go to war, for example during and after the Israeli military attack of late 2008 and early 2009, and then also in November 2012 and July 2014. It is true that a joint delegation held formal negotiations, but the cease-fire decision was first and foremost in the hands of Hamas, followed by the Islamic Jihad and finally by of Fatah, other Palestinian factions, and the Palestinian president last of all.

Fatah’s fate now depends on the results of its seventh conference; it will either continue to decline or begin to revive itself. Although history has shown that every great empire and movement goes through a series of phases, starting from childhood, youth, vitality and vigour and ending with old age and decline, this process can be reversed and does not only travel in one direction. The youthful phase can last for a long time or it can end quickly, and a movement can grow old then revitalise itself and become young again.

Fatah’s future is not dependent on the fate of the conflict between its various branches, especially between the president and Dahlan, as many might believe. It is evident that the main goal of the conference is to completely finish off Dahlan’s Gaza branch and impose Ramallah’s absolute control over Fatah.

The future of Fatah is actually dependent on its desire and ability to renew, change, and reform itself from top to bottom in terms of its programme, plans, and tools of the trade, especially its ability reinstate the national programme and rights of the Palestinian people. It must also reinstate the various forms of struggle and political work capable of applying these rights, as well the revision of past experiences required to carry this out; at least beginning from the launch of the modern Palestinian revolution until the present time. This revision is necessary in order to overcome the mistakes, sins, and gaps of the past and to deepen the movement’s achievements and build on them.

Fatah must also learn its lesson from past experiences, the most important of which is the impossibility of defeating the occupation, establishing a Palestinian state, and reaching a settlement that meets the minimum of Palestinian rights, or any Palestinian rights, by means of continuing to adhere to the Oslo Accords and relying on bilateral negotiations under American auspices. It should now be obvious that Palestinian’s cannot rely on political and diplomatic action considering the ongoing violations committed by successive Israeli governments and Israel’s insistence on moving forwards with settlement expansion plans and colonial and racist projects aiming to impose the fait accompli, thus making the Israeli solution the only solution considered feasible by the international community.

Without drastically and strategically changing this path, and without opening a political horizon that paves the way for the future of the Palestinian people in their occupied homeland and abroad, Fatah, along with the institutions it governs and the factions allied with the movement, will rapidly decline into an abyss.

Those observing the preparations for Fatah’s conference do not believe that the controversy and competition are centred on Palestinian needs and the Palestinian national cause; nor is it focused on the strategies that need to be adopted or the forms of struggle suitable for their achievement. Instead, we see that preparations for the seventh conference are focused on political and geographic divisions, especially between Fatah and Hamas, and the conflict between the various factions and competitors for membership in the conference. If this continues, it will hinder Fatah’s ability to lead the Palestinian people and will prevent the challenges and dangers currently threatening Fatah and the Palestinian cause from turning into potential opportunities and gains.

Fatah must not be deluded by the international recognition of a Palestinian state and the Arab and international support of the PA and the PLO led by Fatah because this recognition fundamentally contradicts the reality on the ground. In light of the Palestinian weakness and division, this recognition has a steep price, and this is evidenced by the current state of the PA, the proposal it submitted, and the unfair constraints imposed on it. Due to the fact that Fatah’s role in this leadership is declining, Fatah is no longer actually leading; there is a monopolising authoritarian system that is continuously growing while the PLO is shrinking and the PA continues to exaggerate its role despite the fact that it is an authority without authority. Palestinian politics has become a means of serving the occupation more than a means to end it.

In addition to this, Fatah must not feel a sense of security due to the fact that its rival Hamas is going through a crisis following the deterioration of its relations with Syria, Iran and Egypt. Fatah must not believe that it is only a matter of time before the fall of Hamas and that the PA’s return to the Gaza Strip is just around the corner.

If the Hamas authority falls under the weight of the current crisis before reviving the national programme and true partnership, Fatah and its leadership will not necessarily take its place. Chaos may well break out and more extreme forces and factions may spread because Fatah and its failed programme are not considered an acceptable or attractive option. Rather than combating Israeli interests, Fatah’s rule has led to the strengthening of the occupation, the expansion of settlements, the continuation of the blockade, the splintering of political division, and the marginalisation of the Palestinian cause. The most it has promised in terms of the current political horizon is the establishment of “a mini-state on part of the territories occupied in 1967 at the expense of the right of return and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. This option, which was adopted for over 20 years, may lead to the complete collapse of Palestinian national identity and an imminent catastrophe.

In all of this, I have not forgotten the fact that Fatah is trying to review its path and has been hinting at other options in place of bilateral negotiations, but this reconsideration does not mean that it has given up on this option. Instead, it aims to force the revival of the falsely named “peace process”.

Translated from the Arabic published by the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies – Masarat – 30 December, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.